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Legal scholars and jurists believe that federal judges often defer to
agency interpretations of statutes. Debate has focused on when judges should
defer and how judges should operationalize a deference regime doctrinally,
perhaps as a matter of stare decisis. Such normative debates about deference
rest upon assumptions that have not been rigorously tested, however. Exam-
ining the entire population of Supreme Court cases where an agency interpre-
tation was in play (1984-2006), our empirical study finds that the Justices
do not generally give deference-regime precedents anything close to stare deci-
sis effect, but that the policies underlying the major deference regimes do have
a discernible effect at the Supreme Court level. We also find that judicial
ideology affects the justices' applications of deference regimes. As a descriptive
matter, we find that deference regimes are more like canons of statutory con-
struction, applied episodically but reflecting deeper judicial commitments,
than like binding precedents, faithfully applied, distinguished, or overruled.
As a prescriptive matter, this study provides empirical support for pro-
posals to simplify the Supreme Court's continuum of deference regimes and to
characterize the Court's deference decisions in the form of canons of statutory
construction, and certainly not as precedents entitled to stare decisis effect.
More broadly, the empirical analysis casts doubt on both the wisdom and the
practicability of academic proposals to treat methodological opinions (such as
Chevron) as precedents entitled to stare decisis. A jurisprudential reason
for this skepticism, buttressed by the data in our study, is that statutory inter-
pretation methodology (including deference) is inherently ad hoc and ought
to be tailored to the circumstances of each statutory case, rather than bound
to precommitted rules. Put another way, judicial deference to agency inter-
pretations is a matter where bright-line rules will not necessarily yield greater
predictability and law-like behavior among judges than context-saturated
standards.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Jackson, Mississippi adopted a pay raise plan in order to
retain its municipal employees who were tempted to leave for better-
paying jobs elsewhere. The schedule provided higher raises to employees
with fewer than five years of experience; the planners believed that this
was the group where existing salary levels were least sufficient to retain
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needed personnel.' Older employees sued the city for violating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).2 Although the plan
did not violate the Act's disparate treatment rule, because it did not treat
employees differently because of age, the plaintiffs argued that the sched-
ule had a disparate impact upon older employees, few of whom had fewer
than five years of service with the city. The lower courts ruled that the
ADEA, unlike Title VII, does not provide a cause of action for disparate
impact claims; only disparate treatment can be the basis for an age dis-
crimination claim.3 In Smith v. City ofJackson, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and held that the ADEA outlaws some employer policies
that have a disparate impact upon older workers.4
City ofJackson is an important employment law precedent, but for our
purposes the key debate among the Justices was what weight to accord the
views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
agency charged with implementing the statute and authorized by
Congress to adopt substantive rules to fill in details of the ADEA.5 Apply-
ing a policy followed by the Department of Labor (the agency originally
charged with implementing the ADEA), the EEOC promulgated a rule
disapproving non-age employment practices having "an adverse impact
on individuals within the protected age group," unless the employer can
demonstrate a "business necessity" for such practice.6 A plurality of the
Court joined the opinion of Justice John Paul Stevens, who invoked the
EEOC's regulation as additional "support" for an interpretation he de-
rived from the statutory text, structure, precedent, history, and purpose.7
Concurring in the plurality's judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia found this
an "absolutely classic case for deference."8 He would have simply applied
the Court's Chevron jurisprudence: Because the statute does not directly
address the disparate impact issue and the agency interpretation is rea-
sonable, the Court should defer to the agency, without offering the
Court's own interpretation that would thereafter be binding on the
agency.9 Speaking separately for three, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ac-
corded the EEOC's rule "no weight" whatsoever, because it was an inter-
1. For a summary of the factual background, see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S.
228, 231-32 (2005).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
3. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 195-96 (5th Cir. 2003).
4. 544 U.S. at 240.
5. Originally created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC also has authority to
promulgate substantive rules implementing the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 628.
6. See 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724, 47,727 (Sept. 29, 1981) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d)
(2009)).
7. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 233-40 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this part of Justice Stevens's opinion. Id.
8. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
9. Id. at 243-47 (applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
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pretation of the statute's reasonable factors other than age defense, and
not its provisions creating employer liability.10
Decisions such as City ofjackson reflect the reality that statutory inter-
pretation has long been dominated by agencies. The bulk of our federal
law now derives from agency rules, guidances, opinion letters, manuals,
and websites.11 As a result, understanding whether deference regimes
constrain Justices helps us better understand the operation of law in the
modem administrative state.1 2 The main issue judges confront, then, is
how often and how much to defer to agency interpretations.1 3 Chevron
alone has been cited in over five thousand law review articles. 14 These
articles have usually argued the normative merits of different approaches
to deference. Supporters of broad judicial deference to agency interpre-
tations cite the legitimacy, expertise, and rule of law advantages of follow-
ing centralized agency rules as presumptive law on any federal statutory
topic.1 5 Critics worry that a regime of routine and broad judicial defer-
10. Id. at 262-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor's
opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not
participate in this case.
11. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L.J.
1463, 1469 (1992) (providing evidence of volume of guidance documents and legislative
rules).
12. A number of empirical studies of deference effectively ignore deference doctrine
and analyze deference purely in terms of whether agency decisions are upheld or
overturned. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer,Judicial Deference to Agency
Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 431 (1996);
Joseph L. Smith, Presidents,Justices, and Deference to Administrative Action, 23J.L. Econ.
& Org. 346 (2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political
Economy ofJudicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 657 (2004)
[hereinafter Stephenson, Mixed Signals]. Our paper examines whether such studies
analyze the correct dependent variable.
13. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 614-17 (1996) (discussing
unsettled nature of Supreme Court jurisprudence on deference to agency interpretation);
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Cheoron Era, 3 YaleJ. on Reg. 283, 283 (1986)
(highlighting varying standards of deference federal courts have given agencies' statutory
interpretations).
14. Lexis search, August 10, 2008. For prominent exemplars of this literature, see,
e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 481, 483 (1990)
(arguing Chevron demonstrates the proper "understanding of the boundary between
appropriate political control and impermissible bias"); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot,
To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke LJ.
984, 996-1054 (examining changing nature of administrative law, including impact of
Chevron on judicial review).
15. Chevron itself famously outlines the accountability and expertise rationales. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 865 (1984)
(arguing that because "|j]udges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government,"judges should defer to reasonable agency rules unless
Congress has directly spoken to the issue); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517 [hereinafter Scalia, Judicial
Deference] (arguing Chevron's clear deference rule allows Congress to better anticipate
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ence would encourage agency turf grabbing, exacerbate agency capture,
and compromise judges' traditional supremacy in declaring the law.1 6
The contending positions in these normative debates rest upon as-
sumptions that have not been rigorously tested. Indeed, the intensity of
the debate itself rests upon heroic (and substantially untested) assump-
tions. Thus, many advocates of a broad reading of Chevron seem to as-
sume that judges will follow Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in City of
Jackson and treat the Chevron regime as a matter of precedent, citing the
case when appropriate and then applying its now famous two-step frame-
work.1 7 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in City ofJackson treats Chevron
as a binding precedent that the Court is required to apply and follow as a
matter of stare decisis or something akin to it.18 Justice Scalia's position
has recently attracted support from some legal scholars.19 In a parallel
fashion, some critics assume that judges will follow Justice O'Connor's
separate opinion in City ofjackson, and argue that while Chevron is prece-
dent, it does not apply to a case's specific set of facts, which can be distin-
guished.2 0 Yet others assume judges will followJustice Stevens, and argue
consequences of writing vague statutes); Peter Strauss, One Hundred and Fifty Cases per
Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1121 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred
Fifty Cases] (arguing Chevron potentially serves important rule of law goals, as its regime
gives presumptive deference to nationally applicable administrative rules). For prominent
examples of work arguing that Chevron is constitutionally mandated, see generally Douglas
W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2 Admin. LJ. 269 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1985) [hereinafter Pierce,
Role of Theory].
16. See, e.g., Cornell W. Clayton, Separate Branches-Separate Politics: Judicial
Enforcement of Congressional Intent, 109 Pol. Sci. Q. 843, 871 (1995) (arguing that
extensive judicial deference to agencies raises grave concerns about rule of law); Cynthia
R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 452, 502-11 (1989) (critiquing impact of Chevron on balance of power
between President and Congress).
17. E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (insisting Court should follow "the original formulation of Chevron" and "[the
Court's] precedents" applying Chevron); Starr, supra note 13, at 284, 288-99 (arguing
Chevron is a "landmark case" that was by 1986 "firmly entrenched in the body of
[American] law").
18. Thus, Justice Scalia deemed the EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA in that case
to be "an absolutely classic case for deference to agency interpretation," even under the
"unduly constrained standards of agency deference" announced in Mead. Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243-45 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Noting his
dissent in Mead, Justice Scalia continued to insist that the pre-Mead formulation of Chevron
should be applied. Id. at 245 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
19. E.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1757,
1822-24 (2010) (arguing that deference regimes should be treated as matters of stare
decisis).
20. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J.
833, 833-35 (2001) (treating Chevron as precedent and analyzing its possible applications
in detail). Justice O'Connor accepted Justice Scalia's baseline (Chevron must be followed
17312010]
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it is far from clear that Chevron is or should be treated as a precedent
entitled to stare decisis effect.2 1 Indeed, Justice Stevens's plurality opin-
ion in City of Jackson failed to cite or discuss Chevron (an opinion Justice
Stevens himself wrote), a move virtually unthinkable if Chevron's holding
were binding as a matter of stare decisis.2 2 By failing to cite Chevron and
by treating deference as a "plus" factor for the result reached in his opin-
ion, Justice Stevens seemed to treat agency deference doctrine as a canon
of statutory construction, rather than as binding precedent.
What motivates Supreme Court Justices in these agency interpreta-
tion cases? Do Chevron and other deference regime decisions operate as
precedents the Justices rigorously follow as a matter of stare decisis? If so,
City ofJackson should be read as a serious debate about the relevance and
proper application of Chevron, where Justices consider not only the do-
main covered by Chevron, but also how it should be applied (as binding
precedent or as a canon). Or are the Justices simply voting their ideologi-
cal preferences, either favoring agency views they find politically conge-
nial or following a more subtle but still result-oriented strategy? For ex-
ample, did moderately conservative Justice O'Connor (joined by two
other conservative Republican Justices) refuse to apply Chevron because
the agency had adopted a liberal reading of the ADEA? And did liberal
Justice Stevens decline to apply Chevron so that he could hardwire his own
liberal interpretation into the ADEA? (If the Court agrees with the
agency-that is, the agency wins at Chevron step one-rather than defers
to it-at Chevron step two-the EEOC would not have the liberty to re-
voke its rule that was embraced by the Court in City of Jackson, since it
would be part of the meaning of the statute.)
It is true that such a simple ideological account does not explain why
arch-conservative Justice Scalia followed Chevron to allow the agency dis-
cretion to adopt a very liberal rule for the ADEA. But it is possible that
his willingness to go along with a liberal result in this case might be part
of a larger conservative strategy in the general run of cases. Thus, Justice
Scalia has been a champion of a broad reading of Chevron since the
Reagan era.2 3 His enthusiasm might be explained as a political judgment
that conservative Republicans would be more successful controlling the
where applicable) but distinguished Chevron under the facts of City ofjackson and invoked
other precedents to support her conclusion that the agency's views should not be
considered when they have not been publicly announced to address the issue in question.
See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 264-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
21. E.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 596-97 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (treating Chevron and Skidmore more like flexible canons than like precedents
demanding stare decisis effect).
22. Though ignoring Chevron, Justice Stevens's opinion carefully analyzed possible
ADEA and even Title VII precedents, including some tangentially bearing on the issue at
hand. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 230-43 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
23. E.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 256-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating broad
application of Chevron); Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 15, at 512 (stating Chevron
"applies with full force" in controversies of statutory interpretation).
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presidency than the legislature, and therefore, in the long term, a defer-
ential approach would be the best strategy for a conservative Justice-
especially if combined with a refusal to consider legislative materials, an-
other plank in the platform of his new textualism. Justice Stevens may be
following the reverse logic: Deference to agencies combined with the di-
minished role of legislative history would marginalize Congress and ad-
vantage the President in ways that would skew the law in a conservative
direction.
Simply reading the justices' opinions in City ofjackson does not tell us
which of these accounts is the more astute reading of that case or others.
A single case cannot give us enough information to distinguish among
the competing hypotheses about the judicial application of deference
doctrines. To answer these questions, we need to look at more decisions.
As Part I of this Article demonstrates, scholars have already carried
out valuable empirical work. This work suggests that Chevron and other
deference regimes do not constrain Supreme CourtJustices but may have
some effect on lower courtjudges. Unfortunately, however, no study has
been able to subject these hypotheses to large scale empirical testing.
Nor have previous analyses provided empirical evidence touching on the
deeper institutional question: What considerations motivate judicial be-
havior when evaluating agency interpretations of federal statutes? Do
judges seek to apply deference doctrine sincerely? Do they view it as
merely instrumental in achieving their ideological preferences? Or do
they neglect it altogether?
To address some of these topics more systematically, we started with
the database of 1,014 (later reduced to 667) Supreme Court cases involv-
ing agency interpretations of federal statutes between Chevron (1984) and
Hamdan (2006).24 We enriched the database in ways that allowed us to
track the deference voting patterns of individual Justices, and then we
subjected those patterns to empirical methodologies that have recently
been developed by political scientists. This is described in Part II.
Parts III and IV present our findings. Systematically examining the
voting patterns of individual Justices, we found that none of the Justices
maintains a coherent voting pattern consistent with the practice of treat-
ing Chevron and other deference regimes as precedents entitled to stare
decisis effect. Recall that Justice O'Connor considered but rejected the
application of the Chevron regime to the EEOC's interpretation in City of
Jackson;25 we found that this stance was not representative of her overall
voting record, which was eclectic. That is, sometimes Justice O'Connor
24. This is the database developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1089-90, 1105 (2008), the first comprehensive
statistical analysis of the Supreme Court's application of its surprising array of active
deference regimes. For the book-end decisions, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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zealously applied or distinguished Chevron orjoined opinions that did so,
while other times she ignored it even though its regime was clearly rele-
vant. Perhaps surprisingly, the same is true of both Justice Stevens, a
critic of broad interpretations of his own Chevron decision, and Justice
Scalia, the vocal cheerleader for a near universal application of Chevron's
framework. These empirical findings deepen the suggestion of our previ-
ous statistical study, that the Court does not apply its announced defer-
ence regimes predictably and that those regimes do not operate as a for-
mal constraint on the Justices. Stated doctrinally, our empirical evidence
falsifies the proposition that any of the Justices treats Chevron and the
Court's other announced deference regimes as precedents strictly bind-
ing on them as a matter of stare decisis. Especially with regard to Justice
Scalia, who is a fan of both Chevron and stare decisis (and apparently
believes that Chevron ought to be followed as a matter of stare decisis),
this finding is most surprising.26
If formal deference regimes do not drive the Justices' voting in
agency interpretation cases, what does? Our empirical analysis finds that
ideological concerns influence application of deference doctrine.
Justices are significantly less deferential toward agency policies with which
they disagree. On the other hand, we also find that the Court's an-
nounced policies justifying deference (namely, congressional delegation
of lawmaking authority and consistency of agency interpretations over
time) significantly influence the Justices' willingness to go along with
agency interpretations. This is perhaps our most striking finding from a
political science perspective, as most political scientists assume or believe
that rule-of-law considerations play no discernible role in judicial behav-
ior. Quite the contrary, we show that they do play a role-though the
legal bite of deference regimes is ad hoc and not entirely predictable,
much as one would expect if the regimes operated like canons of statu-
tory construction rather than like binding precedents. Also contrary to
much conventional wisdom among political scientists, we find that the
preferences of the President and Congress seem to influence the Court's
application of deference doctrine.
Part V discusses doctrinal implications of these results. We conclude
that commentators have frequently overstated the importance of the def-
erence doctrine debate. The Justices treat deference regimes like canons
of statutory construction, rather than as precedents formally binding on
future Courts. Like the canons and unlike binding substantive prece-
dents, deference regimes are episodically rather than systematically ap-
plied and are important more for their underlying policies than for their
precise legal rules. Ultimately, deference regimes operate mostly as pre-
sumptions or balancing factors evaluated by the Justices in combination
26. For an example where Justice Scalia followed precedents he surely considers
misguided, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33-42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (voting to uphold Congress's power under Commerce Clause to apply
Controlled Substances Act to personal medical use of marijuana).
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with a variety of considerations. In other words, Justice Stevens's opinion
in City of Jackson is a better barometer of how the Justices actually apply
Chevron and other deference regimes than is his more formal-sounding
opinion in Chevron, especially as Justice Scalia has expansively interpreted
that opinion. We argue that scholars are being unrealistic when they de-
mand that the Supreme Court adopt and consistently apply formal defer-
ence regimes that will "constrain" the Justices in future cases. The
Justices will not follow such regimes-and sooner or later lower court
judges will not either. The better path for reform is to simplify the defer-
ence regimes and tie them more tightly to their policy rationales, in the
manner that the Court has done for substantive canons of statutory con-
struction. Canonizing deference regimes may have as much or even
more "constraining" influence on Supreme Court Justices than trying to
make them binding as a matter of stare decisis. We also offer some insti-
tutional thoughts for how to ensure that courts actually defer to agencies.
Part VI concludes with some jurisprudential implications of our anal-
ysis. Taking our findings as a starting point, we discuss the general diffi-
culty of giving stare decisis effect to methodological precedents generally
and Chevron in particular. Deference doctrine illustrates the inherent
challenge in treating interpretative methodology as binding precedent.
And Chevron is particularly inapt for stare decisis treatment, because this
process-based precedent would undermine the reliance interests the reg-
ulated community has in the Court's substantive precedents. We also ap-
ply our results to the debate over the relative efficacy of rules and stan-
dards. Our analysis of deference illustrates that standards may in some
instances be as binding as rules, perhaps sometimes more so. Hence, our
proposal for overthrowing the formalist rule-like approaches (like
Chevron2 7 ) in favor of a standards-like approach (similar to Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. 28 ) does not necessarily sacrifice the rule of law. We conclude
by noting that norms also influence how the Justices apply interpretative
methodology.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SUPREME COURT'S DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
AND PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE COURT'S PRACTICE
Doctrinally, there is a difference between a judge's deferring to an
agency interpretation and a judge's agreeing with that interpretation. In
City of jackson, you might agree with the EEOC's views, based upon the
standard sources judges apply when interpreting a statute (statutory text
and structure, legislative history and purpose, statutory precedents)-the
EEOC, in your opinion, got the answer right. Or you might defer to the
EEOC's interpretation, either without taking a position on what you
27. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
28. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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think the statute means (as Justice Scalia did in City ofJackson29 ) or with
some exploration of what you believe the statute means and referencing
the EEOC's interpretation as confirmation or as a reason to end your
inquiry (as Justice Stevens did in that case3 0 ). Justice O'Connor neither
agreed nor deferred: The EEOC's view in this case was expressed in an
amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General; Justice O'Connor did not con-
sider such a brief entitled to deference, and she did not agree with the
EEOC's reading of the legal materials either.31
Consider a further distinction, between applying a deference regime
and actually deferring to an agency interpretation:3 2 Deference regimes
are doctrinal frameworks used to evaluate agency decisions. When the
Justices apply a more deferential regime in a case, the Court (theoreti-
cally) defers to a larger subset of agency policy decisions in the face of an
unclear statute. Put differently, the "window" of acceptable agency policy
decisions expands when the Justices apply a more deferential regime. A
judge who applied a weakly deferential regime such as Skidmore would
therefore uphold a smaller range of agency policies than the same judge
would uphold if she applied the apparently more deferential regime rep-
resented by Chevron.
TABLE 0: DEFERENCE REGIME
Defer to Agency Overturn Agency
Nondeferential Regime Agency Wins Agency Loses
Deferential Regime (e.g., Chevron) Agency Wins Agency Loses
But applying a deference regime does not require ajudge to defer. On
the one hand, the judge may find that the statute is clear, so clear that it
does not matter what the agency's view is. For instance, agencies do not
receive deference in cases decided at Chevron Step One.3 3 In City of
Jackson, Justice O'Connor would not have "deferred" to the EEOC even if
she had applied the Chevron "regime," because she would have decided
the case at Chevron Step One: The plain meaning of the statute did not
allow disparate impact liability for age discrimination defendants. 3 4 On
the other hand, the judge may find the statute ambiguous, but the
agency's interpretation outside the range of reasonable applications of
that ambiguous statute. For instance, an agency interpretation based
29. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
30. Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 262-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. See infra Table 0.
33. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361, 367-68 (1986) (declining to afford agency deference to Federal Reserve's definition
of "Bank" under Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 because definition was clear from
language of statute).
34. City ofjackson, 544 U.S. at 249-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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upon an incorrect reading of a relevant Supreme Court precedent would
not be entitled to deference, even if the statute were ambiguous: Under
Chevron Step Two, such a reading would be unreasonable as a matter of
law.
The previous study by Lauren Baer and one of us (Eskridge) demon-
strated that the Court applies a "continuum" of deference regimes, rang-
ing from very strong deference favoring the agency in foreign affairs cases
to a presumption against agency interpretations in criminal cases:3 5
* Curtiss-Wright deference, or super-strong judicial reluctance to
overturn executive decisions involving military policy and foreign
policy.
3 6
* Seminole Rock (or Auer) deference, or deference to agency interpre-
tations of their own regulations, unless such interpretations are
clearly invalid or unreasonable.3 7
* Chevron deference, or deference to "reasonable" agency interpreta-
tions, so long as Congress has not directly addressed the issue.38
* Pre-Chevron deference (e.g., Beth Israel), or deference to agency de-
cisions, so long as not clearly contrary to the statute.3 9
* Skidmore deference, a judicial willingness to go along with agency
interpretations based upon their cogency, the superior expertise
the agency brings to an issue, or the reliance interests generated
by longstanding agency constructions. 4 0
* Consultative deference, when the Justices invoke agency factual
materials or reasoning as a supporting justification for a judicial
construction of the statute.4 1
* Antideference, where the Justices begin with a presumption
against the agency's interpretation, as in cases involving penal stat-
utes or issues where the agency's interpretation raises constitu-
tional concerns.4 2
The scope of each deference regime is vague enough to leave the Justices
some discretion. For instance, in City of Jackson, which Justice Scalia
deemed an "absolutely classic case" for Chevron deference, he was the
35. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1090, 1098-1120.
36. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).
37. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
38. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 851
(1984). Chevron subsumed a number of deference regimes such as Beth Israel that were
previously applied in specific substantive areas. For a full discussion of these regimes, see
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1106-09.
39. E.g., Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979);
Beth Israel Hosp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978).
40. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239-40 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion).
42. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674-80 (2001).
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only Justice to apply Chevron.43 justice Stevens followed the consultative
deference regime, a kind of Skidmore-lite approach that considers agency
inputs as "plus" factors supporting or confirming an interpretation.44
And Justice O'Connor advanced intelligent reasons for according the
agency views "no weight." 4 5 At the very least, there is a lot of room for
play in the Court's application of the deference continuum. And the
Eskridge and Baer study found that, in a majority of cases, the Court ap-
plied no deference regime whatsoever. 46
There is now a significant academic literature on the Supreme
Court's deference regimes. Most of the literature has focused on Chevron,
but studies have also analyzed other regimes such as Skidmore47 and
Seminole Rock (increasingly characterized as Auer).48 Many articles have
debated the normative merits of different deference regimes, especially
Chevron.49 Authors frequently make assumptions regarding the impor-
tance of deference doctrine that have not been tested in the existing liter-
ature. Only two existing studies statistically describe the Court's applica-
tion of deference regimes, and neither engages in a systematic empirical
analysis of this issue.50 This study adds to and, we hope, enriches this
positive literature. In so doing, it also has implications for the normative
literature, as noted in the Introduction.
Most positive analyses of deference regimes have focused on the bal-
ance of power between the branches.5 1 A series of papers has debated
whether the Supreme Court uses deference doctrine to achieve the
longer-term policy or institutional goals of various Justices. Professors
Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer first raised this question, predicting
43. City ofJackson, 544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
44. Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1117.
47. E.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modem Skidmore
Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235 (2007).
48. E.g., Manning, supra note 13.
49. E.g., Farina, supra note 16, at 499-526 (assuming Chevron was a revolutionary
decision and offering cautions lest it be applied too aggressively); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 971-72 (1992) (analyzing
whether Chevron is revolutionary).
50. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24; Merrill, supra note 49.
51. Several studies have analyzed the effect ofjudicial deference to agencies on the
balance of power between Congress, agencies, and the courts. See, e.g., William Eskridge
& John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick, 8J.L. Econ. & Org. 165, 187 (1992) (suggesting
that courts can help to prevent agencies from straying from the original bargain reached
by Congress and the President); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling
Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org. 114,
117-24 (1998) (analyzing effect of Court's deference signals on interaction between lower
courts and agencies); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank Cross, Modeling Agency/Court
Interaction, 121 Harv. L. Rev. F. 13, 14 (2007), at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
media/pdf/tillercross.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting dearth of work
analyzing effect of deference on agency behavior).
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that the Court would instruct lower courts to defer to agencies when
agencies were ideologically closer to the Court than were the lower
courts.5 2 In their theory, the Court sets deference policy for lower courts
by deciding to uphold or overturn an agency; formal deference doctrine
was not part of this signal. Drawing from observations of the Court's first
decade of experience with Chevron, Cohen and Spitzer's empirical analy-
sis supported their theory,5 3 but a subsequent test by Mathew Stephenson
(with additional data from the Court's performance during the Clinton
Administration) did not confirm this result.5 4 Instead, the Stephenson
study found that the conservative Rehnquist Court deferred more fre-
quently to Clinton Administration agencies that were more liberal than
the Court itself.55 The Court therefore did not appear to behave strategi-
cally in the manner posited by Cohen and Spitzer. These studies ne-
glected formal deference doctrine and focused on whether the Court up-
held or overturned an agency. Our study evaluates whether this
assumption is justified.
Another strand of positive work has analyzed whether Chevron actu-
ally increased judicial deference to agencies. In the foundational empiri-
cal study, Professors Peter Schuck and E. Donald Elliott found that agen-
cies prevailed more frequently with the D.C. Circuit in the immediate
wake of Chevron, but that this effect diminished somewhat over time.56
Other studies reported that Chevron had a minimal effect on the lower
courts, however.57 Professors Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller analyzed
the effect of peer monitoring on lower court judges' compliance with
deference doctrine.58 They found that appellate court panels with both
Democratic and Republican appointees were more likely to uphold agen-
cies in Chevron cases.59 This indicates that although judges prefer to
52. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 441-45; see also Tiller & Cross, supra note 51,
at 13-15 (presenting formal model of interaction between Supreme Court, lower courts,
and agencies in which Court notes preferences of lower courts and agencies and then
chooses a deference doctrine to achieve its policy goals).
53. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 467-75.
54. Stephenson, Mixed Signals, supra note 12, at 660, 687-96.
55. Id. at 701-02.
56. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 14, at 1026-38.
57. See, e.g., John F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test:
Constructing a Positive Theory ofJudicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 Admin. L. Rev.
745, 758-59 (1992) (finding Chevron did not induce large increase in deference for D.C.
Circuit); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 Duke L.J. 1051, 1070-71 (1995)
("[T] he rate of affirmance of agencies in ... the circuit courts is about the same now as (or
even lower than) before Chevron was decided.").
58. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998).
Cross and Tiller define compliance with deference doctrine in terms of whether the Court
upholds agencies in Chevron cases. Id. at 2162-65. This definition neglects whether lower
courts act strategically when applying Chevron. For instance, a divided panel may simply
neglect to apply Chevron more frequently.
59. Id. at 2172-75.
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bend deference regimes when it fits their ideological preferences, they
are less likely to do so when potentially exposed by a dissent.60 (This
notion first appeared in Dean Richard Revesz's landmark study of D.C.
Circuit decisions in environmental cases.6 1 ) Thus, judges appear to pur-
sue their policy goals but seek to avoid the appearance of manipulating
the law when doing so.
Several studies have analyzed the Supreme Court's application of
deference doctrine. Professor Thomas Merrill analyzed 120 Supreme
Court cases involving agency interpretation of a statute. He found that
the Court did not apply Chevron consistently, neglecting to cite it in many
cases in which it was arguably applicable.6 2 Merrill also found that the
post-Chevron Court was not very deferential: Agencies prevailed at a lower
level after Chevron than before that precedent.6 3 Merrill's analysis did not
consider selection effects weeding out potential appeals before they
might reach the Court, nor did he attempt to predict when the Court
would apply Chevron. Likewise, Professors Cass Sunstein and Thomas
Miles examined a nonrandom sample of 84 Supreme Court cases that
cited Chevron, but did not examine the larger universe of Supreme Court
cases where Chevron was applicable but not cited. 64
The Eskridge and Baer study65 presented a more comprehensive sur-
vey of the Court's treatment of deference regimes and deference deci-
sions. Compiling a data set consisting of 1,014 post-Chevron Supreme
Court cases involving agency interpretation of a statute, that study found
(somewhat surprisingly) that the Court applied no deference regime in a
large majority of cases.66 Despite the focus on Chevron in the scholarly
literature, the Court applied the rule in less than one-third of the cases
where it was applicable under the Court's announced approach and was
not as prominent in the Court's decisions as the Skidmore regimes that
Justice Scalia had argued were overruled by Chevron.6 7 (In this respect,
City ofJackson, where the majority applied a light version of Skidmore, was
typical of the Court's performance in this period, except that the
marginalization of Chevron was usually not debated openly among the
Justices.) The statistical analysis in the Eskridge and Baer study suggested
60. See id. at 2172 ("[T]he presence of a whistleblower improves the chances that the
court will apply the applicable legal doctrine.").
61. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Environmental Regulation].
62. Merrill, supra note 49, at 982-84.
63. Id. at 980-84.
64. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 825 (2006) (acknowledging that
analyzing fifteen cases in which Chevron was applicable but was not cited by Court may be
too small to permit a formal analysis of the differences between Chevron and what we call
'non-Chevron' decisions").
65. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24.
66. Id. at 1121.
67. Id. at 1123-28.
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the hypothesis that the Court's announced deference regimes play a mar-
ginal role in the Justices' willingness to go along with agency decisions.
The Justices appeared to choose deference regimes typically to justify a
particular outcome, while seemingly ignoring deference regimes in other
cases.68 Also, the rate at which agencies were upheld did not appear
closely related to the deference regime. 69 Eskridge and Baer provided
the first clear description of how the Court applies deference doctrine
but did not engage in a deeper empirical analysis. The current Article
seeks to build upon this contribution and empirically analyze what moti-
vates the Justices when they apply deference regimes.
Thus, our Article starts with the data set compiled by Eskridge and
Baer, which includes all 1,014 Supreme Court cases from 1984 to 2006
where an agency's interpretation of a statute was at issue.7 0 Eskridge and
Baer coded each case for 156 variables, which included both basic de-
scriptive characteristics such as the form of agency policy at issue and
more complicated issues such as the ideological direction of the deci-
sion.71 From this data set, we then excluded agency litigating positions
(the agency's position on a case as expressed via briefs to the Court) be-
cause they are not entitled to a deference regime under any theory or
doctrine. 7 2 Excluding those cases, we were left with 667 cases in the
Eskridge and Baer data set that were potentially eligible for a deference
regime under administrative law doctrine. This subset includes cases
where agency interpretations were set forth in legislative rules, adjudica-
tions, interpretative rules, guidance documents, and amicus briefs. We
followed the Eskridge and Baer coding for these 667 cases but enriched
the data with information on how every single Justice voted with regard to
deference regime in all of the 667 cases.7 3
II. THEORY: WHAr DRIvEs JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN
AGENcy DEFERENCE CASES?
Academics have developed a variety of theories about what motivates
judges, ranging from personal leisure to doctrinal preferences to career
68. E.g., id. at 1101-02 (arguing Court invokes Curtiss-Wright deference only where it
is already siding with executive department).
69. Id. at 1141-42.
70. Id. at 1089-90.
71. Id. at 1094. For details of the coding mechanism followed by Eskridge and Baer,
see id. at 1203-26.
72. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 590-91 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) (identifying circumstances where agency positions are entitled to
Chevron deference, but omitting agency litigating positions).
73. Thus, Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1216-21, coded every Justice's vote on
the merits of every case but only coded the deference regime applied by the Justices
joining the majority or plurality opinion. We supplemented this data with coding for every
Justice's vote with regard to what deference regime was applicable in the case. Because
one of us (Eskridge) did all the coding in the Eskridge and Baer study, he also did the
enriched coding in the current study.
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advancement.7 4 The biggest debate is whether the Justices are primarily
concerned with applying preexisting legal rules and doctrines or are ad-
vancing policy or institutional preferences they favor. Our dueling ac-
counts of City ofJackson reflect that debate. Are the debating Justices re-
ally fighting over properly deduced legal doctrine, or is the doctrinal
debate mere shadowboxing, with the real contest between contending
ideologies?
In this Part, we outline the possible motivations Supreme Court
Justices are alleged to have under different theories of judicial behavior,
and we try to flesh out nuances of the different theories, as well as their
intuitive strengths and weaknesses. More importantly, we suggest some of
the ways our data can provide empirical tests of the different theories-as
well as limits on what we can learn from our data.
A. The Rule of Law Model
The "rule of law model," alternatively termed the "legal model," as-
sumes thatjudges seek to apply the law accurately.75 For instance, judges
should strive to interpret case facts correctly, adhere to applicable prece-
dent, and apply statutory texts faithfully.76 With respect to deference re-
gimes, a strong version of the legal model would predict that Justices
would apply deference doctrine as a matter of precedent. A weaker ver-
sion of the legal model would predict that the Justices' votes would reflect
the principles or policies underlying the doctrines, even if the precise
doctrines were not persistently invoked, analyzed, or distinguished (as
would be the case for a precedent-based version of the rule of law). 7 7
Unfortunately, there is no clear scholarly consensus on the accuracy
of the rule of law model. Empirical studies have found support for the
legal model in a number of contexts.78 However, other empirical studies
74. For a summary listing of such goals, see Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle of Judicial
Behavior 17 (1997) [hereinafter Baum, Puzzle of Judicial Behavior].
75. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity 7, 12-13 (1992); Richard S.
Markovits, Matters of Principle: Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional
Interpretation 1, 4, 12-13 (1998).
76. This perspective is rarely applied in political science analysis of the Supreme
Court, but it is generally used in the legal literature. For a discussion of this dichotomy, see
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Persp. on Pol. 261, 262 (2006) (recommending
positive political scientists pay greater attention both to normative import of their work
and norms of legal profession, and speculating about why they generally do not).
77. For an excellent differentiation of a stare decisis legal approach and weaker legal
approaches, see Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863, 1872-84 (2008).
78. For an example of work supporting the legal model, see Jeffrey A. Segal,
Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases,
1962-1981, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 891, 891, 896 (1984) (finding strong relationship between
facts and outcomes in context of search and seizure cases). For work supporting the legal
model in other contexts, see Joseph A. Ignagni, Explaining and Predicting Supreme Court
Decision Making: The Burger Court's Establishment Clause Decisions, 36J. Church & St.
301, 304-05 (1994) (religious establishment); Kevin T. McGuire, Obscenity, Libertarian
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have found that policy preferences generally trump legal considera-
tions.7 9 Critics argue that this should be no surprise; the legal model
seems particularly ill-suited to explain Supreme Court behavior, because
the Court only hears difficult cases in which lower courts have reached
different conclusions, which provides some evidence that the law is un-
clear.8 0 Put differently, the legal model may have little bite in cases
where the law has "run out."8 1 Justices will take advantage of this lack of
clarity to impose their policy preferences.8 2 However, theorists who be-
lieve that the "law" encompasses legal principles (and not merely legal
rules) may respond that the Justices can follow the law even in such un-
clear cases.8 3
Directly testing the legal model is extremely challenging. One prob-
lem is the difficulty of measuring judicial goals. Some judges may seek
only to apply the law sincerely, while others exclusively value achieving
their policy preferences. How can you tell the difference between these
judicial behaviors when judges, as a group, are loath to admit they are
doing anything but applying preexisting law in a neutral manner?8 4
Scholars are forced to infer goals from observable behaviors that are con-
sistent with multiple goals. They then must use these inferred goals to
develop a theory predicting the very behavior that was used to construct
the theory. This circularity problem has plagued the academic debate
Values, and Decision Making in the Supreme Court, 18 Am. Pol. Q. 47, 47-49 (1990) (free
speech and obscenity); Jeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl D. Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex
Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General, 41 W. Pol. Q. 553, 557-58 (1988)
(gender discrimination).
79. See, e.g.,Jeffrey A. Segal & HaroldJ. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the
Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 971, 983 (1996)
(reporting that in 90.8% of cases, Justices fail to switch their votes to support a decision
they previously opposed in response to new Court precedent). But see Saul Brenner &
Marc Stier, Retesting Segal and Spaeth's Stare Decisis Model, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1036,
1043-45 (1996) (finding moderate Justices switch their positions in response to shifts in
precedent); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305, 315-16 (2002) (finding new precedents
influence later decisions); Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story:
The Impact of Justices' Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
1049, 1061 (1996) (arguing Justices changed positions in accordance with precedent in
69% of cases).
80. For a discussion of this issue, see Baum, Puzzle ofJudicial Behavior, supra note 74,
at 82 ("The Court's selection of close cases makes it harder to discern the impact of legal
considerations in the cases that it decides, because the weight of the law seldom lies
overwhelmingly on one side.").
81. For the seminal discussion of this problem, see generally H.L.A. Hart, The
Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994).
82. See generally sources cited infra note 97.
83. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
84. For a vivid example of very different interpretations ofjudicial behavior, compare
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 61, at 1766-67 (arguing that D.C. Circuit
judges vote ideologically in some cases), with Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1339-54 (1998) (arguing Revesz's data do
not support notion that judges vote ideologically).
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over the dominant goal of Supreme Court Justices, and it is a problem
that limits our study as well.
In addition to the circularity problem, there is the problem of doctri-
nal uncertainty. Determining whether the Justices faithfully follow the
various deference regimes entails a case-by-case determination whether
the regimes "objectively" apply. But in some cases, such an effort has an
inevitably subjective element, because the scope of particular deference
regimes is frequently unclear.85 Moreover, the Justices have a variety of
choices ranging from applying no deference regime at all (Justice
O'Connor in City ofJackson) to the mildly deferential Skidmore or consulta-
tive deference standards (Justice Stevens in City of Jackson) to the highly
deferential Chevron test (Justice Scalia).*86 Even if the legal requirements
for deference regimes were tightly specified, Justices would frequently
have discretion when mapping the rules onto complicated case facts.
This discretion is illustrated in City of Jackson. Thus, Justice
O'Connor had a valid point: The EEOC's published rule purported to
interpret one of the ADEA's statutory defenses and said nothing about
whether plaintiffs have a disparate impact claim for relief under the stat-
ute.8 7 Justice Scalia had answers to her concern, but after reading both
opinions we were left thinking that the applicability of Chevron (or any
deference regime) was not entirely clear.8 8 Perhaps that is why Justice
Stevens's plurality opinion ignored Chevron and treated the EEOC's views
(clarified and focused on the issue before the Court by the Solicitor
General's amicus brief in City of Jackson) as more of a "plus" factor.8 9
Consider another interesting rule of law question: Does the form of
legal doctrine make a difference in judicial behavior? To take the most
debated issue, do legal rules induce better law-applying behavior among
judges than legal standards?90 justice Scalia maintains that the rule of law
is a law of rules: Open-ended standards invite judges to import their own
biases and predispositions into legal decisionmaking.9 1 Justice Scalia's
85. For an analysis of the vagaries of the Chevron regime, see Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 20, at 848-52.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10 (discussingJustices' voting pattern in City
ofJackson).
87. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 262-67 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
88. Id. at 243-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. When the Justices accord consultative deference to an agency interpretation, as
the plurality did in City ofJackson, they are often bowing to the views most clearly expressed
by the agency in an amicus brief and not in a previous rule, guidance, or decision. See
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1111.
90. On the distinctions between rules and standards and their different roles in legal
decisionmaking, see 1 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 139-41 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 56-69 (1992).
91. E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1176-80 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law]; accord Adrian Vermeule, Judging
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rules-only approach is reflected in his staunch support for a broad appli-
cation of Chevron, as he signaled in his City ofJackson concurring opinion,
and his view that Chevron requires courts to apply bright-line rules when
deciding whether Congress has addressed the issue in contention. In
contrast, Justice Breyer believes that contextual standards, applied by seri-
ous and fair-minded judges, usually provide the best way for legal doc-
trine to address the messy realities of actual cases.92 His more context-
oriented approach is reflected in Justice Stevens's all-factors-considered
(including agency inputs) decision in City of Jackson.
The rules-versus-standards debate suggests a way to shed some light
on the influence of doctrine that partially avoids the circularity and inde-
terminacy problems, and we shall exploit that in this Article. Thus, we
shall examine the Justices' votes and decisions to determine whether they
faithfully follow and apply existing deference doctrines when they are for-
mally applicable. We realize our results are subject to caveat on grounds
of the fuzzy edges of those doctrines; unsupportive results might be the
result of the inefficacy of law to constrain Supreme Court Justices, but
they might equally well be the result of the inefficacy of rule following to
constrain. Hence, we shall also use a number of proxy variables (i.e.,
policies underlying the deference rules) to measure when Justices should
apply a greater deference regime under administrative law doctrine. For
example, the Supreme Court has said that agencies are entitled to the
benefit of the Seminole Rock/Auer deference regime when they are inter-
preting their own valid rules,9 3 Chevron deference when they are acting
pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority,9 4 and
Skidmore deference when they have long-construed a statute in a consis-
tent way.9 5 Even if the Justices do not consistently or predictably apply
the Seminole Rock, Chevron, or Skidmore regimes, they might be more con-
sistent in going along with agency decisions that represent interpretations
of agency rules, are pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority, or are
consistent and longstanding.
B. The Attitudinal Model
While many law professors and legal practitioners embrace the rule
of law model forjudicial decisionmaking, most political scientists do not.
Instead, they accept the "attitudinal" model.9 6 Proponents of the attitudi-
Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 183-229 (2006)
(carrying forth this idea to rethink textualist method in statutory interpretation).
92. E.g., Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution
17-19 (2005).
93. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2468 (2009).
94. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
95. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 594-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Compare Greenawalt, supra note 75, at 12-13 (discussing traditional rule of law
analysis), with sources cited infra note 97 (advancing, by political scientists, attitudinal
analysis).
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nal model, such as Professors Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, assume
that judges seek to achieve their policy preferences when deciding
cases.9 7 Judges, like legislators and executive department officials, have
ideological preferences that fall on a continuum from conservative
(Justice Scalia) to moderate (Justice Kennedy) to liberal (Justice Breyer).
Supreme CourtJustices are especially free to pursue policy goals because
they are protected by both life tenure and the lack of higher court re-
view.98 Under this political science model, the Justices bargain over both
doctrine and case holdings to pursue their policy goals.9 9 The simplest
version of the attitudinal model predicts that Justices vote their raw pref-
erences. In City ofJackson, for example, Justice O'Connor and her fellow
conservatives refused to go along with a litigation-creating EEOC inter-
pretation of a civil rights law burdening small businesses and municipali-
ties; the Court's relative liberals joined justice Stevens's plurality opinion,
which created broader liability for age discrimination.1 0 0
The attitudinal model, especially in this simple form, has been criti-
cized on a number of grounds. First, some attitudinal studies have used
crude measures ofjudicial and congressional ideology.10 1 This and other
technical problems are not deep criticisms of the attitudinal model, for
they can be resolved through refinement of empirical methods. For ex-
ample, Professors Kevin Quinn and Andrew Martin have greatly im-
proved upon previous techniques to develop "ideal point" measurements
of each Supreme CourtJustices' ideology.1 0 2
97. See, e.g., David W. Rohde & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making
72-74 (1976); Jeffrey A. Segal & HaroldJ. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model 1-7 (1993) [hereinafter Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model] (describing judges as
policymakers influenced by their own predispositions); Jeffrey A. Segal & HaroldJ. Spaeth,
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 7-12 (2002) [hereinafter Segal &
Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited] (noting Supreme Court pursues policy goals).
98. Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model, supra note 97, at 69.
99. For analysis of bargaining on the Court, see James F. Spriggs II, Forrest Maltzman
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices' Responses to
Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. Pol. 485, 503 (1999) ("Our results therefore suggest that
justices are indeed rational actors-systematically making judgments about the most
efficacious tactic to secure favored outcomes."); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II &
Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United
States Supreme Court, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294, 312-13 (1998) (arguing that opinion
authors' choices are shaped by their own policy preferences and their colleagues' actions).
100. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)).
101. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 28, 35-36 (1997) [hereinafter Segal, Separation
of Powers] (classifying Court's decisions as only liberal or conservative, and assuming that
ADA scores used to measure Congress members' ideology may be measured on same
dimension as Segal-Cover scores for Justices).
102. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134,
145-53 (2002) (presenting ideal point estimates for Justices currently used in most
research on the Court).
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Second, and more important, one would expect thatJustices seeking
to maximize their policy preferences will act in a more sophisticated man-
ner than simply voting for their policy preferences in individual cases.
Justices seeking to advance their political agendas ought to take a longer
view and therefore ought to consider both the larger consequences of
altering doctrine and the reaction of the other branches to their deci-
sions.10 3 Thus, in City ofJackson, for the reasons discussed above, it might
make perfect sense for Justice Scalia to go along with the Court's liberals
for this age discrimination issue, but insist that the views of the EEOC
(then under the domination of the conservative Bush-Cheney
Administration) should be controlling in other cases as well. Corre-
spondingly, a strategically oriented attitudinalist might say that Justice
Stevens wanted a liberal result in City of Jackson, but was not willing to
announce broad deference to the Bush-Cheney EEOC in order to justify
it; hence, his opinion referred to the agency views as confirmatory rather
than controlling in this case, and presumably other ones.
A third important criticism is that the attitudinal model gets the
Justices' preferences wrong. A Justice who merely pushes a political
agenda, whether in a sophisticated way or not, will earn a poor reputation
within the profession (and perhaps a low place in the history of the
Court) and will often complicate her own life if those votes produce a
backlash in the political process or among lower courtjudges. Legal the-
orists as well as historians argue that the Justices prefer to follow the rule
of law and to protect their institution; even if the Justices also have raw
political preferences, an accurate account must include these other ones
as well.104 This is a point of contention. The conventional wisdom
among political scientists is that ideology has the most significant effect
on judicial decisionmaking.1 0 5
The attitudinal model has not been applied directly to deference
doctrine, but its application is fairly straightforward. Justices will either
manipulate existing deference regimes to justify their votes in particular
cases or will push for deference regimes that advance their political pref-
103. E.g., Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 474-75 (concluding that Justices act
strategically with respect to other government players to advance desired policy outcomes).
104. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 29-30 (1994) [hereinafter
Eskridge & Frickey, The Supreme Court] (discussing tension between substantive values
and rule of law in Supreme Court decisions); Barry Friedman & Anna Harvey, Pulling
Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings,
1987-2000, 31 Legis. Stud. Q. 533, 535-36 (2006) (considering whether Justices are
constrained by desire to protect Court from congressional interference).
105. For a review of the substantial literature finding that ideology influences judicial
decisions, see generally Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American
Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 Just. Sys. J. 219, 243 (1999) (confirming correlation between
party and judicial ideology by "synthesizing empirical findings on the link between judges'
political party affiliation and their performance on the bench").
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erences in the long term or will do both. These are testable propositions,
and we shall test them with the data set we have assembled.
C. The Strategic Model
The strategic model builds on the second criticism of the attitudinal
model and focuses on the impact of the Court's role in the system of
separated powers on its decisions.1 0 6 The model's central argument is
that when Justices cast votes they consider the political and institutional
reactions to different decisions; this sometimes constitutes a constraint on
the Court. For example, the Justices may modify their preferred out-
comes because of the threat of being overridden by Congress and the
President. Being overridden prevents the Justices from achieving their
desired outcome in a particular case and reduces the judiciary's legiti-
macy. The Justices therefore have one eye on the likely reactions of the
political branches when deciding cases, and they will tend to avoid issuing
decisions that Congress and the President can agree to overturn. The
Court enjoys greater protection in times of divided government because
it is harder for Congress and the President to agree on an override. Even
when Congress and the Presidency are both controlled by the same politi-
cal party, the many vetogates required for legislation make it unlikely that
an override would occur for an issue with strong interest group activity on
either side.107
For this reason, this "avoid-overrides" version of the strategic model
probably adds nothing to the other forms of analysis in City ofJackson:
Whichever way the Justices had decided the legal issue, Congress would
probably not have overridden the Court. Labor unions and civil rights
groups would have mobilized to oppose a statute revoking disparate im-
pact liability (the result reached by the majority), while employer groups
and state and local governments would have mobilized to oppose a stat-
ute creating a new disparate impact liability (if the Court had come out
the other way in City ofJackson). Although Congress and the presidency
were both dominated by probusiness Republicans, it is notable that the
106. For an overview, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make
139-57 (1998) (discussing how Supreme Court's relationship with other government
actors constrains Justices' decisionmaking); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin,
The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 Emory L.J. 583, 610-11 (2001)
(arguing "separation of powers scheme created by the Founders established an
institutional interdependence among the branches that allows for the possibility that the
Court might be a protector of the rules of the game without producing a substantial
countermajoritarian effect"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 613, 617-64 (1991)
(examining how separation of powers affects Court decisions concerning civil rights
statutes).
107. For a discussion of vetogates, see Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of
U.S. Lawmaking 118-44 (1998) (discussing relationship of Congress to vetoes).
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Bush-Cheney EEOC (and Department of Justice) supported the liberal
result reached by the Court.10 8
Early empirical work did not support the avoid-overrides version of
the strategic model,109 perhaps for the foregoing reason: Even under the
model's assumptions, there are not a lot of cases where this kind of strate-
gic thinking would be expected to be decisive. The Court has a lot of
slack in statutory interpretation cases. On the other hand, where its con-
ditions apply, there is reason to believe the avoid-overrides version of the
strategic model has some bite. Thus, some recent studies using more ad-
vanced ideological measures have challenged the previous finding and
have suggested, empirically, that the Justices do sometimes decide cases
with precisely these strategic features in mind."i0 Our study tests whether
Justices are more prone to apply formal deference regimes to agency poli-
cies that probably enjoy the support of both Congress and the President
and whether Justices are less prone to apply formal deference regimes to
agency policies that probably do not enjoy the support of both Congress
and the President.
Another version of the strategic model focuses on the Court's ability
to control and discipline the lower courts. Because it lacks the resources
to review more than a small fraction of cases, the Court must delegate to
lower courts. The lower courts may exploit this dynamic to skirt prece-
dent in favor of their own preferences. Both law professors and political
scientists have cogently argued that the sheer volume of lower court deci-
sions hinders effective Supreme Court review."' Thus, lower court
judges who do not fear the stigma of reversal may view defiance of the
108. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 244 n.1 (2005) (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing EEOC amicus briefs in lower court cases
supporting broad interpretation of ADEA).
109. See Segal, Separation of Powers, supra note 101, at 33-35 (discussing flaws in
empirical support for separation of powers model).
110. Previous studies struggled to place all three branches on the same policy space so
that ideology scores are comparable. Such work also struggled to bridge ideology scores
across different time periods. For the first ideology scores that bridge both of these
divisions, see Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and
Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 433, 444 fig.7, 446
tbl.1 (2007) (graphing preferences of Supreme Court, Congress, and President and
charting Senate preferences from different time periods). Bailey has since used these
ideology scores to show that strategic considerations influence judicial voting even
controlling for policy preferences and some legal merits. See Michael A. Bailey & Forrest
Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369, 374, 379 fig.5 (2008) (documenting
effects of legal variables on Justices' voting).
111. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631, 1634 (1995) (postulating Supreme Court will
expand precedential latitude to control lower courts); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases,
supra note 15, at 1095 (arguing Supreme Court uses deference doctrine as mechanism to
control lower courts).
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Court as clearly worthwhile' 1 2-and this may motivate the Supreme
Court to yoke the lower courts to agency interpretations if the Justices
consider agency views more congenial than the likely interpretations
reached by defiant lower courts. As before, empirical work provides
mixed evidence regarding the Supreme Court's effectiveness in policing
the lower courts. A number of studies show that while lower courts re-
spond to Supreme Court decisions,"'s exceptions clearly exist.114
The "discipline lower courts" version of the strategic model posits
that the threat of such defiance may motivate the Court to use deference
doctrine strategically.1 15 As Cohen and Spitzer argued, the Supreme
Court essentially enjoys a choice between delegating to courts and dele-
gating to agencies when it sets deference doctrine.1 16 By embracing
broad deference regimes and enforcing such regimes by reversing lower
courts that veto agency interpretations, the Supreme Court can direct
lower courts to cede policymaking power to agencies. The Court may
therefore apply the "ally principle" and delegate to the more ideologi-
cally compatible agent. If the Court believes that the lower courts share
its preferences more closely than agencies, it will embrace more narrow
deference regimes and reverse lower courts that defer too much to agen-
cies, thus empowering the lower courts; conversely, a Court out of step
ideologically with the lower courts will impose a doctrine requiring lower
courts to defer to decisionmakers more in tune with the Supreme Court's
ideology.11 7 This study also tests this version of the strategic model.
Justice Scalia's behavior in City ofJackson provides a potential exam-
ple of such strategic behavior. Proponents of the strategic model might
concede thatJustice Scalia is that oddballJustice who actually cares about
the rule of law, but most would interpret his noisy support for Chevron in
a civil rights case as an example of deeper strategic thinking: Empower
agencies in general (notjust the EEOC) and set stricter limits on judicial
112. Baum, Puzzle of Judicial Behavior, supra note 74, at 117-18 ("Strategic models
can take into account both the control of lower-court judges over cases dispositions after
appellate remands and, more fundamentally, the limited capacity of appellate courts to
review decisions of their subordinates.").
113. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The
Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court
Interactions, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 673, 674-75 (1994) (describing how lower courts respond
to Supreme Court in terms of principal-agent model); see also Baum, Puzzle of Judicial
Behavior, supra note 74, at 116 ("[T]hese studies consistently have found that lower
federal courts shift position in tandem with the Supreme Court across a wide range of
policy areas.").
114. For instance, several studies documented prolonged resistance in the Ninth
Circuit to the Court during the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., Baum, Puzzle of Judicial
Behavior, supra note 74, at 117-18 (summarizing studies).
115. See, e.g., Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 433 ("The Supreme Court may,
however, extend its control over regulatory policy through strategies that exploit two
closely related aspects of judicial review.").
116. Id. at 433-34.
117. Id.
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review of agency interpretations. A cynical (strategic) understanding of
Scalia's concurring opinion might be boiled down to this: Throw the lib-
erals a bone in this case, so that President Bush and Vice President
Cheney have freedom to direct administrative agencies to advance busi-
ness interests and to fight liberal values everywhere else.
III. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: Do JUSTICES GIvE STARE DECISIS
EFFECT TO DEFERENCE DOCTRINE PRECEDENTS?
We start our analysis with the strongest form of the legal model,
namely, that at least some of the Justices follow the Court's announced
deference regimes as a matter of stare decisis.
We start with this formulation in part because it is doctrinally impor-
tant and in part because it is particularly susceptible to empirical testing.
If the Justices treated deference regime decisions as precedents binding
on the Court as a matter of stare decisis, we should expect to see the
following patterns in the cases:1 18 Justices from a variety of perspectives
would recognize that certain precedents (like Chevron) are authoritative
and must be followed where applicable; if not followed, the precedent
must be distinguished or overruled.1 19 Justices regularly follow prece-
dents they do not agree with. 120 When a precedent is being overruled or
altered, the Court openly considers reliance and other rule of law consid-
erations that justify such a change. 12 1 Although members of the Court
sometimes seem to treat deference regimes (especially Chevron) as mat-
ters of stare decisis, the data establish that neither the Court nor any one
of its Justices actually does so in the general run of cases. 12 2
An initial difficulty with a stare decisis account for the Supreme
Court's deployment of deference regimes is that the Justices feel free to
follow their own distinctive philosophies in this matter. Stated another
way, the Justices do not seem to feel professional pressure to conform
their views to follow those expressed in previous "precedents." Justice
Scalia is the best example, for he has been outspoken and persistent in
favor of a near universal application of Chevron deference in both law
118. See Foster, supra note 77, at 1872-84 (distinguishing features of stare decisis
regime).
119. Id. at 1875-76 ("[Tlhe Court frequently engages in stare decisis analysis when
overruling decisions in the substantive law context, and . .. we would expect changes in
interpretive approaches [in statutory interpretation doctrine] to be accompanied . .. by
references to the doctrine of stare decisis and analysis of stare decisis factors . . . .").
120. Id. at 1876 ("[We would expect to find instances in which Justices vote, on stare
decisis grounds, to adhere to a doctrine of statutory interpretation, despite believing that
the doctrine is-or could be-wrong.").
121. See id. at 1875 (noting Supreme Court considered societal reliance when
departing from precedent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
122. See infra Figure 2 (showing wide differences in invocation of deference based on
Justice authoring opinion). If the Justices truly treated deference regimes as matters of
binding stare decisis, this pattern would not be so stark because the Justices would simply
defer to the preferences of the authoring Justice.
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review articles1 23 and in judicial opinions, such as his concurring opinion
in City ofJackson.124 His announced views about deference, moreover, fit
snugly into his general jurisprudence. As Frederick Liu has argued in an
unpublished paper, Scalia is a text-positivist and a judge-skeptic, and this
jurisprudence explains his expansive approach to Chevron.125 To begin
with, he believes thatjudges should apply preexisting legal rules precisely
as they are written and agrees with positivist philosopher H.L.A. Hart that
there is "open texture" in the application of legal rules beyond their
"core."12 6 What does a judge do when the law "runs out"? Contrary to
Hart, Justice Scalia abhors the positivist notion that when the law "runs
out" the judge exercises judgment (discretion!) to fill in the gaps-and
the modern regulatory state provides the Justice with a most excellent
avoidance strategy: When the text does not answer the interpretive issue
(when the law "runs out"), defer to the judgment of the agency charged
with administering the statute.12 7 Under this approach, the judge does
not exercise discretion, and any political judgment is made by a political
entity that is, theoretically, accountable to both Congress (which funds
and supervises the agency) and the President (who appoints the agency's
head(s), often subjects agency rules to executive department review, and
usually has the authority to remove the agency head).
Accordingly, Justice Scalia interprets Chevron very broadly and along
the positivist lines suggested above: When the statutory text answers the
question posed, the "honest textualist" simply applies that text (whatever
the agency's position might be); where the text is ambiguous, the honest
textualist defers to any reasonable interpretation officially and publicly
adopted by the head(s) of the agency-not just rules and formal deci-
sions, but also guidance documents, letter rulings, and even amicus brief
123. See, e.g., Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 15, at 516 ("Cheuron ... replaced
this statute-by-statute evaluation ... with an across-the-board presumption that, in the case
of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant.").
124. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479-80
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating his position that interpretations embraced by
agency heads in official regulations and guidelines are entitled to full deference whether
or not Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to the agency); Smith v. City ofJackson
544 U.S. 228, 243-47 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250-57 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in lacerating dissent that proper reading of Chevron requires Court to
defer to any interpretation formally adopted by the head of an agency).
125. We owe any insights about Scalia's positivism and its connection to his broad
reading of Chevron to Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases (May 28, 2008)
(unpublished supervised analytical writing project, Yale Law School) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
126. See Hart, supra note 81, at 124-36 (distinguishing between "core" issues covered
by a rule, and "penumbral" or fuzzy edges of that rule and arguing that at some point, the
law simply "runs out," and judgment must be exercised).
127. Liu, supra note 125, at 18.
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submissions endorsed by the agency head(s). 128 Among Supreme Court
Justices, justice Scalia's is the broadest reading of Chevron; although his
theory is unusually thoughtful, and even jurisprudential, in its scope and
ambition, it appears to enjoy the complete support of no other Justice on
the Court.12 9
Justice Scalia is not alone in developing a sophisticated approach to
agency deference regimes. Justice Breyer has been just as outspoken in
favor of a near universal application of Skidmore (not Chevron) as the ap-
propriate stance for the Court to take: When the agency provides good
reasons, applies needed expertise, or has advanced the same interpreta-
tion for a long time such that public and private actors have relied on it,
Justices should give the agency's view the benefit of the doubt.13 0 Like
Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer views his approach as a means of enhancing
democratic accountability. When deciding whether to defer to agency
interpretations, judges should assume the perspective of a "reasonable"
member of Congress seeking to enact a workable statute. 3 1 Courts
should therefore generally defer to agencies that are successfully making
their statutes "work."
We harbor no doubt that Justices Scalia and Breyer, two of our most
thoughtful scholars of administrative law, have publicly advanced theories
they believe to be correct. And it is likely that others, such as Justice
Stevens (who authored Chevron), have coherent and nuanced theories.
That individual Justices continue to harbor their own distinctive theories
of deference suggests that this is not an area where stare decisis is the
norm, though it is possible that the Justices consider Chevron binding as a
128. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 15, at 517 (arguing that under Chevron,
Congress can clearly anticipate the effect of writing a vague statute); Liu, supra note 125, at
34 (developing implications of Scalia's understanding of Chevron).
129. Compare Mead, 533 U.S. at 221, 229-30 (SouterJ., writing for all Justices except
Scalia) (arguing Chevron is generally not applicable unless Congress has delegated
lawmaking authority to the agency), with id. at 239-40 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (denouncing
Court's understanding and insisting that congressional delegation of lawmaking authority
does not exhaust cases where Chevron deference must be applied).
130. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (Breyer, J.) (considering
"the insterstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time"); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 596-97 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing Chevron made "no relevant change" to Skidmore's standards of
deference).
131. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution,
Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Harvard University 52 (Nov. 17-19, 2004), available
at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/Breyer_- 2006.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ("At the heart of a purpose-based approach stands the
'reasonable member of Congress' . . . . The judge will ask how this person (real or
fictional), aware of the statute's language, structure, and general objectives (actually or
hypothetically), would have wanted a court to interpret the statute in light of present
circumstances in the particular case.").
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matter of stare decisis but disagree as to its precise meaning. 32 Does this
explain the broad run of cases? These are testable assertions, both as to
the Court as a whole and as to individual Justices such as Scalia and
Breyer. Our project is not to psychoanalyze the Justices, but instead to
analyze what they actually do in the collegial setting of Supreme Court
decisionmaking. And in that setting, we aggregated how they actually
voted, and what opinions they actually joined, in the 667 cases of our data
set.' 33
Our hypothesis was that some Justices would systematically apply par-
ticular deference regimes as a matter of following precedent. City of
Jackson illustrates this hypothesis. Consistent with his separate opinion,
Justice Scalia, we hypothesized, would be the biggest voice for Chevron
over these twenty-two years of cases, perhaps concurring separately when
the majority or plurality opinion failed to hew to the rigorous two-step
structure of Chevron. Consistent with his joining the plurality in City of
Jackson, Justice Breyer, we expected, would go out of his way to show ad-
herence to Skidmore or Skidmore-lite regimes. We were quite curious as to
how the other Justices voted over time. Would Justice O'Connor reveal
herself to be undeferential in the broad run of cases, or would she join
her frequent ally, Justice Breyer, in being a voice for Skidmore?
Surprisingly, the data do not support the hypothesis for any of the
justices. Aggregate analysis of deference doctrine voting data reveals
three striking results. First, as illustrated in Table 1, the Justices did not
publicly disagree over deference doctrine very often. Justices expressed
disagreement over the application of a formal deference regime in only
101 of the 667 cases where an agency interpretation was clearly presented
to the Court; this represents a modest rate of 15%.134 Put another way, in
566 cases, no Justice wrote a dissent or concurrence applying a different
deference regime than the majority opinion. Thus, consensus on defer-
ence regime was the overwhelming norm. Any Justice could have dis-
rupted this consensus by filing a concurring opinion on the precise issue
(as Justice Scalia did in City of Jackson)-but in those 566 cases none
chose to do so. More important, none of the Justices dissented or con-
curred enough to alter the rate of disagreement on the Court; all Justices
were statistically indistinct from the Court average (Table 1).
132. For an example, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56, 275-76 (2006),
in which both the majority and the dissent treated Chevron and Auer as authoritative
statements of deference regimes, but the majority distinguished, while the dissent
followed, those precedents.
133. The Eskridge and Baer data set, see supra note 24, did not code concurring and
dissenting opinions for deference regime applied, so we added such coding for our study.
Hence, for all 667 cases, we coded each and every opinion for deference regime applied,
so there is a complete record for how each and every Justice voted in those 667 cases.
134. Disagreement is defined as writing a concurrence or dissenting opinion that
applies a different formal deference doctrine than the majority opinion. Formal deference
doctrines include Skidmore, Beth-Israel, Chevron, Seminole Rock, and Curtiss-Wright.
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TABLE 1: DIVISION AMONG THE JUSTICES ON DEFERENCE
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Deference Regime Legislative History
Mean Rate 95 Percent Mean Rate 95 Percent
of Division Interval of Division Interval
Average 15.33% 14.41%, 16.25% 20.03% 19.27%, 21.32%
Blackmun 16.85 12.93, 20.78 20.57 16.34, 24.81
Brennan 17.20 12.22, 22.17 22.18 17.70, 27.65
Breyer 13.74 9.92, 17.55 20.13 15.69, 24.57
Burger 20.00 11.74, 28.26 21.11 12.68, 29.54
Ginsburg 13.53 9.89, 17.17 20.59 16.29, 24.89
Kennedy 13.85 10.88, 16.81 19.42 16.02, 22.82
Marshall 18.11 13.33, 22.84 21.65 16.59, 26.72
O'Connor 15.67 12.85, 18.50 20.06 16.96, 23.17
Powell 19.83 12.57, 27.08 24.14 16.35, 31.93
Rehnquist 15.28 12.48, 18.07 20.00 16.89, 23.11
Scalia 14.56 11.68, 17.44 20.28 17.00, 23.56
Souter 14.51 11.23, 17.80 19.50 15.80, 23.20
Stevens 15.31 12.58, 18.05 20.42 17.36, 23.48
Thomas 13.66 10.33, 16.98 19.51 15.67, 23.35
White 17.18 13.08, 21.27 20.24 15.88, 24.61
Note: This table provides the average rate at which the Court divided on deference regime
and legislative history during the tenure of each Justice.
* Indicates statistically distinct from the Court mean at 5% level, two-tailed test.
To provide a baseline for comparison, we analyzed the frequency of
disagreement over legislative history, which is another methodological is-
sue in statutory interpretation, and one as to which Justices have an-
nounced different points of view. The results of that analysis are also
presented in Table 1. We found that the Justices disagreed more fre-
quently about legislative history, dividing in 20% of the cases (133 of the
667 total cases). This suggests that Supreme Court Justices reveal more
intense or committed preferences as to legislative history than they reveal
for deference doctrine. For example, Justice Scalia frequently files con-
curring opinions disassociating himself with even mention of legislative
history in opinions for the Court.1 3 5 This practice not only signalsJustice
Scalia's longstanding objection to the Court's reliance on or even consul-
tation of legislative history, but also signals his intense preference for an
135. For the most recent example, see Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2242
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia
authored or joined opinions endorsing a different application of legislative history in
11.6% of cases. This rate was statistically distinct from the Court average of 7.17% using a
two-tailed test (p=0.000).
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TABLE 2: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH JUSTICES VOTED To APPLY CHEVRON
Mean 95 Percent Interval
Blackmun 12.29 8.84, 15.72
Brennan 13.12 8.67, 17.57
Breyer 11.50 7.97, 15.04
Burger 13.33 6.03, 20.36
Ginsburg 12.05 8.60, 15.52
Kennedy 11.54 8.79, 14.28
Marshall 11.81 7.84, 15.78
O'Connor 11.29 8.83, 13.74
Powell 10.34 4.80, 15.89
Rehnquist 11.11 8.73, 13.63
Scalia 12.31 9.62, 14.99
Souter 11.79 8.78, 14.80
Stevens 11.71 9.27, 14.15
Thomas 9.27 6.46, 12.08
White 12.27 8.71, 15.83
Pearson chi2(98) = 135.2171 Pr = 0.008* Indicates statistically distinct from the Court mean at
5% level, two-tailed test.
exclusionary rule. 1 3 6 In contrast, Justice Scalia does not as often chide
majorities that ignore Chevron and rarely files separate concurring opin-
ions insisting that the Court follow Chevron; his concurrence in City of
Jackson was exceptional. This indicates that the intensity of his views on
Chevron is lower than the intensity of his views about legislative history.
The same might be true of Justice Breyer and other colleagues with dis-
tinctive views about deference regimes. The foregoing analysis suggests
that the Justices' preferences with regard to agency deference regimes are
less intensely held than their preferences with regard to legislative history
regimes, which are clearly not subject to stare decisis under the Court's
traditional practice. (That the Court does not treat earlier opinions dis-
cussing the cogency of legislative history as having stare decisis effect is
significant, for there is greater judicial discussion of the proper use of
legislative history in separate opinions than there is of issues of
deference.)
In the alternative, it might be the case that Justice Scalia (and his
colleagues) have given up on taking independent views about deference
regimes and have instead followed the Court's deference landmarks, now
including Mead as well as Chevron, as a matter of precedent. In City of
Jackson, for example, Justice Scalia assumed the correctness of Mead, even
though he had dissented from the Court's rejection of the universal
136. For a discussion of whether methods of statutory interpretation should be
granted stare decisis, see generally Foster, supra note 77.
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Chevron approach he favors.13 7 This alternative explanation, however, is
inconsistent with Eskridge and Baer's findings that the Court has not con-
sistently applied Chevron since Mead and that all the deference regime
precedents are applied haphazardly rather than systematically, as one
would expect if the Justices treated them as precedents entitled to full
stare decisis effect.13 8 For example, Justice Stevens was the strongest
voice for stare decisis on the Rehnquist and early Roberts Courts, 139 yet
his plurality opinion in City ofJackson ignored the Chevron debate between
Justices Scalia and O'Connor. Justice Stevens would not, and did not,
ignore any of the Court's pertinent ADEA precedents-including some
that were tangentially relevant to the disparate impact issue-yet he made
no effort to distinguish Chevron and, instead, worked deference into his
opinion as a factor confirming the conclusion he had reached through
traditional sources of statutory meaning. 140 Justice Scalia is perhaps the
starkest case: He has argued more vigorously than any of his colleagues
that Chevron should be given stare decisis effect, 14 1 yet his own voting
record contradicts this view.
Our second finding, illustrated in Figure 1, is that all of the Justices
supported each deference regime at roughly equal rates.1 42 For example,
Justices Stevens and Scalia have very different interpretations of Chevron,
which Justice Stevens authored but Justice Scalia has construed more
broadly. Yet they joined opinions applying Chevron at almost exactly the
same rate1 43 as did Justices Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Ginsburg. Indeed, no Justice exhibited a statistically significant diver-
gence from the Court average. Likewise, all the Justices clustered around
the 50% level in no-deference opinions they joined; Justices Scalia and
O'Connor were a little above 50%, the rest a little below. Even though he
is the Court's strongest proponent of broad presidential power, Justice
Thomas only voted to apply Curtiss-Wright deference in 1.5% of cases-
not too different from the voting record of his colleagues, and only a
fraction of the cases where Curtiss-Wright would have been arguably rele-
vant. The one area where Figure 1 reveals a predictable divergence was
Justice Breyer's willingness to join a higher percentage of Skidmore opin-
137. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 244-45 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment in part).
138. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1137.
139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642-46 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (taking seriously an affirmative action precedent that he did not join and
following that precedent more expansively than its author).
140. City ofJackson, 544 U.S. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
141. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the Court should "adhere to the original formulation of Chevron" and
that Chevron is a precedent upon which Congress has relied).
142. ChiefJustice Burger diverged from the Court average in his support of Beth-Israel
deference, but a higher proportion of his cases in the data set were decided before Chevron
was adopted in 1984 because he left the Court in 1986.
143. See infra Table 3.
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ions than his colleagues did. Justice Breyer supported either Skidmore or
Skidmore-lite in 33.9% of the cases, significantly higher than the Court
average of 28.4%.144
FIGURE 1: PROPORTION OF DEFERENCE REGIME VOTES BY JUSTICE
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These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that some of the
Justices are engaged in a long-term strategic game reflecting their very
different ideological preferences. 145 If justice Scalia, for example, is
pushing within the Court for universal Chevron deference because he
thinks it will marginalize excessively liberal congressional preferences, it
is not showing up in his aggregate voting behavior; he seems perfectly
happy to join opinions that ignore Chevron even when it is clearly applica-
ble under his theory of that case. His failure to object is particularly strik-
ing in light of the fact that he believes that Chevron is applicable whenever
the agency head has formally announced a public interpretation of the
statute. 146 (The Court, in contrast, requires congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority to the agency as the trigger for the Chevron re-
144. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed test
(p=0.031).
145. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 102, at 152 (finding "strong evidence that the
ideal points of many justices do change over time").
146. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458,
2479-80 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (insisting
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gime.147 ) Thus, for Justice Scalia, the large majority of the 667 cases in
our sample would qualify for analysis under the Chevron regime-yet only
a small fraction were analyzed that way, almost always without a peep
from Justice Scalia. 148
Likewise, ifJustice Stevens wants to narrow Chevron because it slights
Congress's goals and advantages the executive department too much, one
would not expect to see him with about the same percentage of Chevron
support as Justice Scalia. This finding reinforces the conclusion that
none of the Justices, not even Justice Scalia, treats Chevron or the other
deference regimes as mandatory precedents binding as a matter of stare
decisis. This finding also speaks to the intensity of the Justices' prefer-
ences with regard to agency deference regimes: This methodological is-
sue is not as important to Justice Scalia as is legislative history, if we are to
judge from the incidence of separate opinions that are found in Table 1.
Our third empirical finding is that when one focuses only on a
Justice's record when authoring opinions, and not her or his overall re-
cord of opinions joined, sharper distinctions emerge, and they emerge in
ways consistent with most of the Justices' self-presentations. Figure 2
maps the Justices along this dimension, and Table 3 evaluates the statisti-
cal significance of differences relative to the Court average. ChiefJustice
Burger and Justices Scalia and White authored majority opinions invok-
ing Chevron or an equivalent regime more frequently than the Court aver-
age, while Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Souter were well
below the Court average. 149 Marked differences also emerged for
Skidmore. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Thomas authored
majority opinions invoking Skidmore or the Skidmore-lite regime more fre-
quently than the Court average. By contrast, Justices Brennan, Powell,
and Scalia fell well below the average.1 5 0
on Chevron deference for memorandum adopted by agency and relied on in amicus brief
signed by agency).
147. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
148. See supra Table 1. Note that our data set of 667 cases excluded all cases that
Eskridge and Baer coded as representing agency "litigating positions" that Justice Scalia
exempts from his understanding of Chevron's domain.
149. All differences noted were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
150. See supra Table 1.
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FIGURE 2: APPLICATION OF DEFERENCE REGIMES BY AUTHORING JUSTICE
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The results summarized in Table 3 (and illustrated in Figure 2) were
not surprising. That Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Scalia
authored opinions invoking Chevron or an equivalent regime more fre-
quently than the rest of the Court is what we should have expected, given
common perceptions of each Justice's preference for deference re-
gimes.15 1 Because of his long-time view that Chevron had rendered
Skidmore obsolete, it was no surprise that Justice Scalia applied Skidmore
less frequently than any of his colleagues, but we were surprised that he
did apply Skidmore (or Skidmore-lite) deference rather than Chevron defer-
ence in a nontrivial number of opinions he authored. Not surprisingly,
pragmatic Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg invoked the more in-
formal Skidmore deference more often than their other colleagues; we
were surprised to see the same was true of formalist Justice Thomas.
What the foregoing data suggest is that the Justices' distinct prefer-
ences for deference regimes often (but far from always or even usually)
show up when the Justices author opinions-but also that nonauthoring
Justices tolerated and failed to object to large deference doctrine devia-
tions by their colleagues authoring opinions. Thus, City ofJackson, where
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring only in the result
151. ChiefJustice Burger was the Justice who was most willing to go along with agency
interpretations in Eskridge and Baer's survey. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1154.
Justice White was also consistently deferential to the political process, see id.; as the
assigning Justice in Chevron, he urged Justice Stevens to endorse agency leeway along the
lines of the published opinion. John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (2002). As we have noted earlier, Justice Scalia is a champion of
Chevron and reads the opinion more broadly than all of his colleagues. So even though he
joins opinions that ignore Chevron, his own authored opinions are more likely to cite
Chevron than those of his current colleagues, consistent with his stance.
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TABLE 3: INVOCATION OF DEFERENCE REGIME BY AUTHORING JUSTICE
Number
of cases Chevron Skidmore
95 Percent 95 Percent
Mean Interval Mean Interval
Average 5897 18.89% 17.89%, 19.89% 31.95% 30.76%, 33.14
Blackmun 328 21.34 16.91, 25.78 32.93 27.84, 38.01
Brennan 217 27.65* 21.70, 33.60 24.88* 19.13, 30.64
Breyer 310 23.23 18.52, 27.93 41.94* 36.44, 47.43
Burger 44 79.54* 67.63, 91.46 0 0, 0
Ginsburg 366 12.30* 8.93, 15.66 47.54* 42.42, 52.66
Kennedy 533 20.08 16.67, 23.48 28.52 24.68, 32.35
Marshall 274 19.71 15.00, 24.42 31.75 26.24, 37.26
O'Connor 678 11.65* 9.02, 14.07 35.69* 32.09, 39.30
Powell 171 15.79 10.32, 21.25 15.79* 10.32, 21.25
Rehnquist 374 13.90* 10.40, 17.41 33.69 28.90, 38.48
Scalia 619 27.14* 23.63, 30.64 14.22* 11.47, 16.97
Souter 435 12.18* 9.11, 15.28 34.25 29.79, 38.71
Stevens 693 17.89 15.04, 20.75 33.48 29.96, 36.99
Thomas 414 15.22 11.76, 18.68 40.58* 35.85, 45.31
White 319 32.92* 27.76, 38.07 30.72 25.66, 35.78
* Indicates statistically distinct from the Court mean at 5% level, two-tailed test.
reached by Justice Stevens and insisting on his own preferred regime, was
highly exceptional in our twenty-two year sample of the Court's work.
(City ofjackson was even more unusual as a case where the justices' debate
over the appropriate deference regime deprived the lead opinion of a
Court majority; accordingly, Justice Stevens's interpretation of the ADEA
garnered only four votes, because Justice Scalia's concurring opinion was
premised upon the EEOC's acceptance of that interpretation, with the
possibility of changing it later in the Bush-Cheney Administration.) Gen-
erally, authorship differences did not provoke additional concurrences or
dissents applying different deference regimes. Instead, Justices simply
joined opinions written by their outlier colleagues. This suggests that
preferences over deference regimes were not sufficiently important tojus-
tify the cost of concurring or dissenting.
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TABLE 4: AGGREGATE COURT APPLICATION OF DEFERENCE
REGIME BY OPINION TYPE
Majority Concur Dissent Total
No Regime, Antideference 46.60 61.22 60.49 49.82
Consultative Deference, Skidmore 31.87 21.33 14.89 28.38
Chevron, Beth Israel 18.63 16.34 22.49 19.13
Seminole Rock, Curtiss-Wright 2.90 1.11 2.13 2.66
Pearson chi
2 (6) = 143.6837 Pr = 0.000
There is another finding that we find more puzzling than significant.
As Table 4 indicates, Justices voted to apply the established deference
regimes less frequently in concurrences and dissents than in majority
opinions. The one exception is that Chevron is invoked slightly more fre-
quently in dissents than in majority opinions. Moreover, few patterns
emerge when these data are disaggregated among individual Justices;
only Justice Kennedy voted for formal deference regimes more frequently
when concurring or dissenting. The Justices therefore do not appear to
use their freedom when authoring dissents and concurring opinions to
express distinctive or divergent preferences over deference doctrine. Ad-
mittedly, we were somewhat surprised by this finding, as we would not
have expected significant deviation either way. On the one hand, Justices
drafting a majority opinion have incentives to fudge the deference re-
gime issue if there is division within the majority.152 There is less pres-
sure to accommodate divergent points of view by Justices writing concur-
ring or dissenting opinions, because there are fewer voices that have to be
accommodated. Concurring or dissenting opinions need not have any
other Justice joining, as was the case for Justice Scalia's concurring opin-
ion in City of Jackson. On the other hand, if our earlier surmise is cor-
rect-that the Justices' preferences for deference regimes are weakly
held-we should not expect to see as many concurring or dissenting
opinions that go out of their way to stake out distinctive positions regard-
ing deference regimes.s5 3 We expected these countervailing motivations
to cancel one another out-but the data mapped in Table 4 suggest that
the latter considerations were more dominant in practice. Interestingly,
a similar pattern emerges in the treatment of legislative history, docu-
mented in Table 5. This suggests that the Justices treat deference doc-
trine as roughly akin to legislative history: worthy of invocation in some
cases, but not matters of stare decisis, where the rule of law depends upon
152. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1108-09 (discussing incentives of
Justices to avoid citing Chevron).
153. Concurring and sometimes dissenting opinions tend to be more focused than
majority opinions, and that is another possible reason why we did not find more discussion
of deference regimes-but this dearth also suggests that deference was not the kind of
issue that was key to the Justices writing these separate opinions.
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close judicial attention to previous decisions relevant to the issues at
hand.
TABLE 5: AGGREGATE COURT APPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY BY OPINION TYPE
Majority Concurrence I Concurrence 2 Dissent 1 Dissent 2
No Reference 43.84 75.37 73.22 56.27 69.69
Some Reference 14.31 6.52 5.63 9.84 3.31
Positive Reference 23.42 7.86 10.14 16.82 9.82
Determinative 18.44 10.24 11.01 17.08 17.18
Reference
Finally, we found that a few Justices chose to apply no deference re-
gime at all in a high percentage of their authored opinions during the
period covered by our data set (1984-2006). Justice Lewis Powell is the
extreme case, neglecting to apply any deference regime in 68% of his
opinions. This behavior was correlated only weakly with the Justices' ide-
ologies (.20) but is highly correlated with date of appointment to the
Court: As Figure 2 illustrates, Justices appointed before Chevron (like
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and White) tended to be more
casual about citing and applying deference regimes than Justices ap-
pointed after Chevron (like Justices Scalia, Souter, and Breyer). This sug-
gests that authorship patterns with respect to application of deference
doctrine reflect generational preferences that are not correlated with
other important elements of judicial behavior. For example, Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and White went along with agency in-
terpretations at a statistically significantly higher rate than Justice Scalia,
but did not invoke formal deference regimes as often as the latter. Justice
Breyer stands in contrast to both groups: Like Justices White and Powell,
Justice Breyer goes along with agency interpretations more than his col-
leagues;1 54 like Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer is more likely to cite a defer-
ence regime to frame the analysis in his opinions.
The point of empirical analysis is to establish patterns of behavior
that either reveal preferences not apparent publicly or falsify public rep-
resentations. Even this preliminary run of the data reveals interesting
patterns in the Justices' official actions: For some of the Justices, an ex-
amination of their authored opinions supports the hypothesis that they
have different preferences with regard to deference regimes, with Justices
Scalia (the biggest public booster of Chevron) and White (the assigning
Justice in Chevron) applying Chevron most often, and pragmatic-balancing
154. The difference for both Justices is statistically distinct from the Court average at
the 0.05 level using a two-tailed test.
17632010]
HeinOnline  -- 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1763 2010
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg applying Skidmore most often in
their authored opinions.15 5 The preferences with regard to deference
regime were weakly held by all the Justices (including Justice Scalia), as
evidenced by the fact that all the Justices usually joined opinions that did
not reflect their deference regime preferences and did so without any
recorded disagreement. Furthermore, the dominant pattern in the au-
thored opinions by all the Justices was to apply no deference regime at
all.1 5 6 In their public performances (joining as well as authoring opin-
ions) none of the Justices behaved as though the deference regimes are
matters of strict stare decisis, where the Court is bound by the precedents
announcing the criteria for applying the different deference regimes.' 5 7
One important consequence of these empirical findings is that the stakes
of the episodic deference doctrine debates among the Justices (as in City
ofJackson) are lower than many commentators assume, at least for work
within the Supreme Court itself. This is an important point. Some
Justices and law professors write as though the stakes of the Chevron de-
bate are earth shattering, as though the future of the rule of law depends
upon the correct understanding ofjudicial deference to agency interpre-
tations.15 8 At the Supreme Court level, that is far from true, as the
Justices do not follow Chevron or the other deference doctrine decisions
as carefully as they follow and reason from substantive precedents. We do
not test the effects of these debates on lower court judges-but articles
like this one might influence such judges by demonstrating that no one
on the Supreme Court rigorously follows either the Court's announced
jurisprudence or his/her own announced deference regime preferences.
This could be a direction for future research.
These preliminary results also cast doubt on the strongest version of
the legal model for judicial decisionmaking in agency interpretation
cases: that Chevron and other formal deference regimes are rigorously
followed as a matter of stare decisis. Even the most devout apostle of the
rule of law-Justice Scalia-applies Chevron in a small fraction of the
cases where it is applicable as he interprets the case.1 5 9 If the rule of law
is a law of rules, Justice Scalia does not view the Chevron "rule" as one that
he has to observe most of the time, and he tolerates a great deal of rule
155. See supra Table 3.
156. See supra Table 3.
157. If the Supreme Court interprets a statute, that substantive interpretation is
binding on future Courts, and it would be considered incompetent judging not to follow,
distinguish, or (in rare cases) overrule that precedent in future cases where its holding is
on point or even where it is just relevant. In contrast, the Justices routinely ignore Chevron
and other deference regimes in cases where they are clearly relevant or on point.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that rule of law is at risk because of "avulsive change in judicial review
of federal administrative action" created by majority's interpretation of Chevron).
159. See supra Table 2.
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avoidance from his colleagues (unlike in City ofjackson).160 For the other
Justices, there is even less evidence that they understand Chevron and the
other formal deference regimes as precedents binding as a matter of
stare decisis.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens's opinion in City ofjackson is more repre-
sentative of judicial practice than is Justice Scalia's concurring opinion:
Deference regimes (Chevron, Skidmore, Seminole Rock/Auer) are more like
canons of statutory construction than binding precedents.16 1 Such an un-
derstanding has an intuitive appeal. The rule of lenity, for example, is
universally acknowledged as a canon of statutory construction, and of
course it is also a deference regime (or more precisely an antideference
regime, as it sets a presumption against the agency's interpretation of
penal laws).162 Like the rule of lenity and many other canons, Chevron is
a clear statement rule: Unless Congress has clearly spoken on the issue,
the Court will accept a reasonable agency interpretation, with the agency
retaining authority to alter that interpretation within the parameters set
by Congress. Skidmore, in contrast, is simply a canonical balancing
approach.
The critical distinction between regimes as precedents and regimes
as canons is that the former treat deference regimes as independent
trumping mechanisms, while the latter treat deference regimes as reflect-
ing values whose weight will vary from case to case, depending on con-
text. Thus, Justice Stevens in City of Jackson did not understand the
agency's interpretation to have been decisive, but it did provide impor-
tant confirmation that his reading of the statutory text and legislative his-
tory was on the right track.16 3 Conversely,Justice O'Connor believed that
the statutory materials cut the other way, and the agency's views were too
discordant with the legal materials and too late to affect herjudgment.164
160. Consider some dramatic cases where Justice Scalia went along with or authored
opinions that ignored the Court's Auer precedent (authored by Justice Scalia) requiring
super deference when an agency is interpreting its own regulations. E.g., Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 724-29 (2006) (Scalia, J.) (ignoring Auer even though Army
Corps was interpreting regulation that had been upheld by the Court); id. at 739 (citing
Cheoron in passing at end of opinion rather than as framing precedent). Similarly, in Solid
Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
majority opinion ignored Auer, and Justice Scalia joined without writing separately. Id. at
161. In other cases, Justice Scalia has been adamant that the Court accord Auer deference
to agency regulations. E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275-81 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
161. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on
Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 655-59 (1988) (analyzing rule of
lenity and various deference regimes as "extrinsic source" canons).
162. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2932-33, 2935 (2010) (drawing
from rule of lenity to hold that 1988 "honest services" law should not be applied beyond
core cases targeted by Congress).
163. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239-40 (2005) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion).
164. Id. at 262-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Like the canons, and unlike binding precedents, Chevron and the
other formal deference regimes have the following characteristics in prac-
tice: They are flexible rules of thumb or presumptions deployed by the
Justices episodically and not entirely predictably, rather than binding
rules that the Justices apply more systematically. They are often deployed
in distinctive ways by individual Justices, reflecting each Justice's particu-
lar normative vision, with Justice Scalia articulating the regimes as rules
restricting expansive agency interpretations and Justice Breyer articulat-
ing the regimes as standards helping judges understand which agency
innovations they should go along with and which they should resist. Idio-
syncrasy in deployment (or not) of deference regimes is tolerated within
the Court, and there is little collective pressure forJustices authoring ma-
jority opinions tojustify departures from other decisions or for the Court
to be consistent across the general run of cases. If deference regimes are
more like canons than precedents, one wonders whether these regimes
impose any constraints whatsoever on Supreme Court Justices. There is
little empirical evidence on the question of whether canons can constrain
judicial decisionmaking, and the scant evidence we have in hand cuts
both ways-sometimes canons seem to constrain, but usually not.1 65 If
the canons do not constrain the Justices in any way, do they vote ideologi-
cally, the way the attitudinal model suggests, or strategically? In the next
Part, we tackle these very questions.
IV. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL: WHAT INFLUENCES A JUSTICE'S
WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW AN AGENCY INTERPRETATION?
The foregoing analysis undermines the hypothesis that Supreme
Court Justices follow deference regimes the way they follow substantive
precedents, but it does not tell us what does influence the Justices' will-
ingness to follow agency interpretations. That is the project of this Part.
We start with the looming obstacle that usually defeats any kind of causal
analysis, namely, the "simultaneity problem." The simultaneity problem
is easily explained: We do not know whether deference regimes influ-
ence outcome votes, or outcome votes influence deference regimes (that
is, the Justices select a deference regime that justifies their outcome
vote). This problem is difficult to resolve empirically, however. Nonethe-
less, we suggest a way to reach some preliminary conclusions.
The conclusions we reach are surprising to the conventional wisdom
of both political scientists and law professors. Contrary to the predictions
of political scientists, rule of law considerations do play a role in Supreme
Court deference to agency interpretations; contrary to the predictions of
165. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of
Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist
Eras, 89 Judicature 220 (2006) (presenting empirical analysis of Court's labor cases and
finding that legislative history canons constrain "liberal" context-oriented Justices like
Breyer more than textual canons constrain "conservative" text-oriented Justices like Scalia).
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law professors, ideological views play a role as well.16 6 We shall explore
both of these observations in connection with another case study, intro-
duced in this Part.
A. Problems Making Causal Inferences in Previous Studies
The "endogeneity" or "simultaneity" problem with drawing causal in-
ferences from statistical data is prominent, pervasive, and perhaps inevita-
ble when attempting to discover "what motivates judges." In the context
of this study, drawing causal inferences regarding the relationship be-
tween deference doctrine and case outcomes is inevitably complicated by
the fact that the Justices decide simultaneously whether to apply a partic-
ular deference regime and whether to uphold or overturn the agency
policy at issue. Naive regression analysis (that is, regression analysis that
does not attempt to correct for the simultaneity problem) finds that each
decision is strongly correlated with the other-hence it is hard to con-
clude that either "causes" the other.
TABLE 6: DEFERENCE REGIME AND THE DECISION TO UPHOLD
Consultative
No regime, deference, Chevron, Beth Seminole Rock,
Antideference Skidmore Israel Curtiss-Wright
Uphold Agency 60.76 78.21 72.13 88.41
Overturn Agency 39.24 21.79 27.87 11.59
Pearson chi2 (3) = 249.0136 Pr = 0.000
Let us be more specific. Simple cross-tabulations, set forth in Table
6, show that a strong correlation exists between deference regime and
outcome votes. Unsurprisingly, Table 7 shows that a Justice's vote to up-
hold or overturn an agency is a statistically significant predictor of his or
her vote for a deference regime. Table 8 shows that a Justice's deference
regime vote is also a statistically significant predictor of whether she or he
votes to overturn an agency action. This simultaneous relationship sug-
gests an endogeneity problem that precludes valid causal interpretation
of the estimates from either equation. As a result, the relationship be-
tween deference regimes and the decision to uphold an agency interpre-
tation is unclear. Justices may first decide whether to uphold or overturn
an agency and then choose a deference regime supporting this outcome;
that is, the decision to uphold has a causal effect on the deference regime
decision. Alternatively, Justices may first decide whether to apply a defer-
ence regime and then determine whether to uphold the agency interpre-
tation; that is, the deference regime decision has a causal effect on the
decision to uphold. Or there might be a third variable that drives the
other two.
166. Compare supra Part II.A (describing legal model), with supra Part II.B
(describing attitudinal model).
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TABLE 7: PREDICTING SUPPORT OF DEFERENCE REGIMES
Dependent Variable: Support for deference (1) (2)
Justice votes to uphold agency -0.79*** -0.79***
(0.129) (0.128)
Agency position diverges from Justice ideology -0.0065 -0.013
(0.0151) (0.0228)
Ideological preference ofJustice -0.043*** -0.032
(0.00988) (0.0521)
Continuous agency position -0.36*** -0.36***
(0.070) (0.070)
Unified government -0.19 -0.20
(0.136) (0.147)











































Notes: Table provides ordered logit coefficient estimates (robust standard errors clustered on
the cases shown in parentheses).
* Means significant at 5% level. ** Means significant at 1% level. *** Means significant at .01%
level, two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 8: PREDICrING THE DECISION TO UPHOLD
OR OVERTURN AN AGENCY
1769
Dependent Variable: Justice votes to uphold agency (1) (2)
Deference regime vote -0.47*** -0.48***
(0.0832) (0.084)
Agency position diverges from Justice ideology 0.29*** 0.38***
(0.0188) (0.0291)
Ideological preference of Justice -0.029* 0.050
(0.0130) (0.0481)
Continuous agency position 0.0432 0.048
(0.0576) (0.059)
Unified government -0.14 -0.18
(0.108) (0.120)



































Notes: Table provides ordered logit coefficient estimates (robust standard errors clustered
on the cases shown in parentheses).
* Means significant at 5% level. ** Means significant at 1% level. *** Means significant at .01%
level, two-tailed tests.
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This endogeneity (or "simultaneity") problem is one that has chal-
lenged economists and political scientists and has eluded law professors
studying judicial deference to agency interpretations. Very few legal stud-
ies have even flagged this problem, much less suggested a methodology
for isolating different variables and suggesting evidence for causal rela-
tionships between those variables and the behavior ofjudges as modeled
by the theories laid out in Part II.
The more sophisticated empirical studies use a number of ap-
proaches to address the simultaneity problem. Some studies design a
field experiment in which the variable of interest is randomly assigned to
the relevant decisionmaker.16 7 This approach cannot be applied to the
Supreme Court; the Justices do not subject themselves to academically
designed experiments.
Other studies use an "instrument," or a variable that alters the inde-
pendent variable of interest in a way that is clearly uncorrelated with the
dependent variable.16 8 We considered this approach but were unable to
utilize it because we cannot identify a variable that (in our view) clearly
affects only the choice of a deference regime or only the decision to up-
hold or overturn the agency without affecting the other. We considered
several possible instruments. For example, one might claim that "con-
gressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the agency" is a variable
that affects only the choice of a deference regime, for it is the announced
test for applying Chevron-but many legal scholars (the authors included)
believe that variable also affects the Justices' decision to uphold the
agency's interpretation. 169 Thus, it is not a suitable instrument. A more
promising instrument would be an external and unanticipated "shock"
that altered the scope or substance of one deference regime. Such a
shock would allow us to isolate how doctrine influences the Justices be-
cause we could measure how the Justices respond to the doctrinal change
relative to how they treat similar cases where the altered doctrine is inap-
plicable. Unfortunately, we lack such a "shock" because the Court itself
imposes doctrinal changes.
Finally, some studies have relied on regression discontinuity to solve
the simultaneity problem. 170 This approach exploits an externally de-
fined, clear classification rule by analyzing the average difference in out-
167. For the seminal paper, see Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of
Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 653, 653-63 (2000).
168. See, e.g., Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Does Compulsory School
Attendance Affect Schooling and Earnings?, 106 Q. J. Econ. 979, 994-1002 (1991) (using
quarter of birth as instrument affecting high school dropout rates in a way uncorrelated
with earnings).
169. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1129.
170. See, e.g., David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A
Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 Am. Econ. Rev.
772, 772-73 (1994) (comparing employment rates in New Jersey and Pennsylvania when
New Jersey, but not Pennsylvania, increased its minimum wage).
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comes between observations that fall on each side of the threshold. That
does not solve the problem here, because no quantifiable threshold exists
to determine when the Justices should apply a particular deference re-
gime. In short, none of the widely used methods of drawing causal infer-
ence is applicable to solve the problem at hand. In that event, we have
opted for a second-best strategy that may not "solve" the problem, but
that might help us evaluate the depth of the simultaneity problem and
generate some useful predictive results. We now turn to this
methodology.
B. The Simultaneous Equation Model
Political scientists and economists have applied two-equation models
to analyze similar problems.17 1 For instance,Jeffrey Staton estimated that
the Mexican Supreme Court's simultaneous decision to invalidate or up-
hold a law and to issue a statement promoting the decision supported an
account of constitutional review in which judges wield their authority
through case promotion. 7 2 The two-equation approach accounted for
the possibility that the decision to uphold the law influences the decision
to promote the decision. The particular approach we use is a "bivariate
mixed-response probit model."1 73 Similarly, Lisa Baldez and her coau-
thors used simultaneous equations to analyze whether judicial review
standards mediate the effect of constitutional provisions on judicial deci-
sionmaking.17 4 We follow this approach to analyze the relationship be-
tween deference and outcome decisions.
The simultaneous equation model is designed to analyze data gener-
ated by an actor making concurrent and interrelated decisions. Our
model simultaneously estimates an equation via maximum likelihood pre-
dicting Justices' deference regime votes and an equation predicting
whether Justices vote to uphold or overturn the agency. The model ad-
171. See generally Adam J. Berinsky, The Two Faces of Public Opinion, 43 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 1209 (1999) (examining effect of perceptions of social desirability on public opinion
survey responses); Derek Leslie & Stephen Drinkwater, Staying On in Full-Time Education:
Reasons for Higher Participation Rates Among Ethnic Minority Males and Females, 66
Economica 63 (1999) (examining different economic and ethnic factors contributing to
higher percentage of ethnic mionties pursuing education beyond compulsory age in
Britain); William Reed, A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation, 44
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 84 (2000) (using simultaneous models of escalation and conflict onset to
control for interdependent relationship between the two factors in international
relations); Mark B. Stewart & Joanna K. Swaffield, Low Pay Dynamics and Transition
Probabilities, 66 Economica 23 (1999) (examining effect of low pay one year on likelihood
of low pay in following year).
172. Jeffrey K. Staton, Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case
Results, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 98 (2006).
173. This technique was first presented in Lisa Baldez, Lee Epstein & Andrew D.
Martin, Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?, 35J. Legal Stud.
243, 261 (2006). Professor Martin and his colleagues were kind enough to share their
code.
174. See id. at 260-62.
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dresses the fact that the decisions are related by allowing a portion of the
error term (the portion of the variation in the outcome that the model
does not capture) in each equation to be correlated with a corresponding
portion of the error term in the other equation. This correlation cap-
tures the dependence between the two outcomes. To take City ofJackson
as an example, the correlation parameter captures the relationship be-
tween support for deference and support for affirming the EEOC. If the
correlation parameter equaled zero, the two decisions would be unre-
lated, or independent.
Such a model offers several advantages over naive regression analysis.
First, and most important, the simultaneous equation model allows a
more precise and more reliable assessment of the dependence between
the two equations. In particular, a statistically significant correlation pa-
rameter indicates that dependence exists between deference regime and
case outcome.1 7 5 This does not isolate whether the deference regime
causes case outcomes or vice versa, but it shows that the two variables are
correlated after controlling for other variables in the model. By control-
ling for other variables, we can be more certain that the correlation be-
tween deference regime and upholding the agency is not being driven by
a third variable.
Second, the model makes some progress in dealing with the simulta-
neity (or endogeneity) problem presented by naive regression analysis.
By treating both outcomes as dependent variables, the model handles
their dependence through the correlation parameter. By contrast, naive
analysis fails to model this dependence. This can create a correlation
between the error term and the independent variables, resulting in bi-
ased parameter estimates. Addressing this problem eliminates this source
of bias. Third, the simultaneous equation model incorporates more data
than is possible when estimating separate models. These advantages al-
low a more efficient and unbiased estimate of the parameters in both
models.1 76
Although we cannot draw causal inferences regarding the relation-
ship between deference doctrine and outcome decisions, we make several
important improvements to previous studies. To begin with, we analyze
voting at the level of individual Justices in particular cases. By contrast,
previous studies, such as the Eskridge and Baer study, focused on analyz-
ing how the Court as a collective entity applied deference doctrine.1 7 7 In
particular, Eskridge and Baer only analyzed the application of deference
doctrine in majority or plurality opinions.1 7 8 Our study incorporates ap-
plication of deference doctrine in all concurring and dissenting opinions,
creating a full data set of deference votes for every participatingJustice in
every case. This individual level analysis allows us to test theories more
175. See id. at 261-62.
176. Id.
177. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1094; Merrill, supra note 49, at 980.
178. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1094.
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precisely, because a number of important variables differ at the level of
individualJustices. Ideological preferences are one such example.' 7 9 Us-
ing Justice-level data allows us to test such individual level variation more
precisely than prior studies have done. Moreover, our model controls for
a multitude of variables that may influence both deference doctrine and
outcomes. This strategy reduces the probability that an omitted variable
drives the results. The cross-tabulations presented in Eskridge and Baer
only present the correlation between pairs of variables in isolation, creat-
ing the possibility that a third variable intermediates the reported rela-
tionship. As noted, the model's primary limitation is that the results can-
not be interpreted causally. Instead, the results are predictive.
The first equation predicts deference regime votes (Vj>) by a particu-
lar Justice (j) in a particular case (c). The dependent variable, Vje, is
coded ordinally as follows: (1) no deference regime and antideference,
(2) Skidmore and consultative deference, (3) Chevron and equivalent pre-
Chevron regimes, (4) Seminole Rock or Curtiss-Wright.1 8 0 Coding of the de-
pendent variable was taken from Eskridge and Baer, 18 but regimes were
condensed by combining all of the regimes with the same level of defer-
ence. For instance, consultative deference and Skidmore deference re-
ceive the same coding because they accord roughly equivalent levels of
deference. The variables are explained below, but for present purposes
the regression equation is:
Vc = Bo + B3(justice-agency agreemenc) + B23(justice fixed ef-
fects) + Bs(continuous agency policyc) + B4i(legislative rule,) +
Bi (adjudication,) + B6i(agency-unified government alignmentc)
+ 87i(policy complexityc) + Bsi(congressional delegation to the
agency) + 9i(relative ideological proximity of lower courts and
agencies) + ujc + rj,
The second equation predicts whether an individual Justice (j) votes
to uphold (0) or overturn (1) an agency in an individual case (c). 18 2 The
model uses a similar set of independent variables as the first model:
Ujc = 80 + B,(justice-agency agreemenc) + B2(continuous agency
policyc) + Bs](legislative rule,) + B43(adjudication,) + Bs(agency-
unified government alignmentc) + B6j(policy complexityc) +
837 (congressional delegation to the agency,)+ BEs(relative ideo-
logical proximity of lower courts and agencies) + ujc + rje
179. See infra Table 11 and Figure 3.
180. Condensing Seminole Rock/Auer and Curtiss-Wight into the Chevron category had
no effect on the results. This is unsurprising given that Seminole Rock/Auer and Curtiss-
Wright comprise only 1.5% of total cases. Results are available from authors upon request.
181. For a description of the methodology, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at
1216-21 (dividing deference into seven regimes described in Part I, supra).
182. The dependent variable in the first equation is on an ordinal scale ranging from
1 to 4. This is necessarily an approximation of the latent level of deference afforded by
each regime, as no objective quantitative measure of deference exists. The dependent
variable in the second equation is necessarily dichotomous, asjudges may either uphold or
overturn agencies.
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C. Applying the Simultaneous Equations Model to Suggest What Motivates the
justices in Agency Deference Cases
Now consider how this model can provide a useful starting point for
determining whether the Justices follow the legal, attitudinal, or strategic
models of decisionmaking. The conventional wisdom among political
scientists is that ideology dominates legal criteria, while some law profes-
sors (and virtually all judges) insist that the law is all that matters.' 8 3
We shall start with the legal model.18 4 Recall, from Part III, that the
legal model does not hold up well if deference regimes are understood,
most formally, as matters of stare decisis. Such a hypothesis is inconsis-
tent with the data. But a "canons" model is also a "legal" model for defer-
ence, as illustrated by Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in City of
Jackson. Because a canons model, as traditionally understood, is so flexi-
ble and does not enjoy the formalist bite of stare decisis, we do not test
for it directly. Instead, we run a series of more indirect tests. Each test
draws from the Court's public justification for deference, namely, the
rule of law value that going along with agency decisions assertedly has for
the Supreme Court (and the country).
We start with the easiest regime to test, namely, super deference to
agency interpretations of their own rules. Although the Court rarely an-
nounces that it is applying the Seminole Rock/Auer regime when it is evalu-
ating such interpretations, it might be the case that agency interpretation
of its own rules correlates to super high deference in practice. To test for
that, we include a dummy variable to measure whether an agency is inter-
preting its own rule, the supposed triggering mechanism for Seminole
Rock/Auer deference. If the Justices go along with the agency at super
high rates in such cases, there is indirect legal bite for Seminole Rock/Auer
even if the Court does not formally apply that deference regime.
We next examine the data in light of the doctrinal trigger for Chevron
deference. Thus, we factor in a dummy variable to measure whether
Congress delegated authority for the agency to promulgate the policy at
issue. (Recall that Chevron, as interpreted in Mead, is the appropriate def-
erence regime when an agency is acting under a congressional delegation
of lawmaking authority to that agency. 8 5 ) Coding rules for this variable
are available in Eskridge and Baer.' 86 The Court should be expected to
183. See supra notes 75-117 and accompanying text (discussing divergent
interpretive theories espoused by legal scholars and political scientists).
184. See infra Part IV.C.1.
185. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 230-33 (2001). For a recent
application of this principle, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-59 (2006) (citing
Mead).
186. Thus, Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1209-11, examine agency authority
under the strict historical approach to lawmaking delegation laid out in Thomas A. Merrill
& Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention,
116 Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002), and under the more lenient approach followed by the
federal circuit courts in the 1970s and afterwards. Generally, we shall follow Eskridge and
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uphold agency interpretations when Congress has authorized the agency
to engage in lawmaking. Similarly, dummy variables for whether the pol-
icy at issue was either a legislative rule' 8 7 or an adjudication are used to
test whether Justices follow administrative law doctrine and apply a more
deferential regime to formal agency decisions.s8 8 This variable is corre-
lated with the proper application of Chevron deference, because the large
majority of agency rules and adjudications are made pursuant to congres-
sional delegations that fall within Chevron's domain.'8 9 Both variables are
interpreted relative to the baseline of informal agency policymaking; a
positive coefficient therefore signifies that the Justices defer more to rules
and adjudication than to informal policies.
Unlike Seminole Rock/Auer and Chevron, the Skidmore regime does not
have a distinctive legal trigger; Skidmore ought to be the default regime
whenever one of the formal regimes does not apply. 190 Under Skidmore,
the Court will consider how cogent the agency interpretation is, how
longstanding it has been, and whether the agency has applied a distinc-
tive expertise.' 9 While testing for "cogency" is too subjective, we indi-
rectly test for the other two factors. Eskridge and Baer's measure of
whether the agency policy at issue was consistent and longstanding is
used to test the second factor.' 9 2 Higher values of this variable indicate
that the policy is more recent, so the coefficient is expected to be nega-
tive if the Justices grant greater deference to continuous policies.
To test the third Skidmore factor, we use a series of dummy variables
that measure the complexity of the agency policy. The Supreme Court
has been particularly agreeable to agency interpretations of statutes that
are relatively technical and involve a specialized expertise that most law-
yers and judges do not possess.' 9 3 To test whether the Justices actually
Baer in taking a broad view of delegation (the lower court approach), because it is the one
the Supreme Court apparently follows.
187. "Legislative rules" are the administrative equivalent of public laws passed by
Congress. Like public laws, rules are legally binding, generally applicable, and
nonretroactive. In this paper, the term "legislative rule" is defined to include all rules
adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment process. See 5
U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (codifying procedure for proposing and adopting "legislative rules").
188. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27 (holding that agency's power to adjudicate
shows delegation of congressional authority suitable for Chevron deference).
189. Id. at 229-30 (recognizing "a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron
treatment is express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication").
190. See id. at 227-28 (describing Skidmore as default regime for how deferential
judges should be to agency interpretations, with Chevron being a "special" case for extra
deference where there has been congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to
agency).
191. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89-93 (2007)
(analyzing reasonableness of statutory interpretation by head of administrative agency).
192. For details on Eskridge and Baer's coding scheme for the continuity of agency
positions, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1206.
193. Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (citing "the related expertise of
the [a]gency" as rationale for granting deference).
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cite deference regimes more frequently when faced with technical poli-
cies, cases are classified as highly technical, 194 intermediate,19 5 highly
normative,' 9 6 or court-centered.1 9 7 Classification of cases into particular
policy areas is taken from Eskridge and Baer.198 The Court should be
expected to cite a more deferential regime when evaluating technical
agency policies because a number of important administrative law deci-
sions cite agency expertise as an important rationale for judicial
deference.1 9 9
After considering the rule of law model, we then turn to the attitudi-
nal model. 20 0 justice-agency agreement tests the attitudinal model's pre-
diction that Justices will vote for a more deferential regime if the agency
policy at issue is compatible with their ideological preferences. This vari-
able is calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between
the ideological position of the agency's decision 20 1 and the Justice's
Martin-Quinn ideology score 202 for the Supreme Court Term in which
the case was heard. If ideological approval of agency policy decisions in-
fluences howJustices apply deference regimes, an increase in this variable
should reduce the level of deference.
We test the attitudinal model's prediction that Justices hold unique
preferences over deference regimes; our model includes a fixed effect for
each Justice who served from 1983 to 2005. A fixed effect is essentially a
dummy variable that is coded "1" if the Justice in question is voting. If
the fixed effect for a Justice is statistically significant, his or her prefer-
ence over deference doctrine is distinct from those of Justice Souter.
Justice Souter is the baseline because he was the ideological median
among all Justices serving from 1983 to 2005.203 If Justices have distinct
preferences over deference doctrine, their fixed effects should be statisti-
cally significant.
194. The following policies fell into this category: taxation, intellectual property,
pensions, telecommunications, energy, transportation, and bankruptcy.
195. The following policies fell into this category: environment, business regulation,
federal lands, health and safety, education, and housing.
196. The following policies fell into this category: criminal law, civil rights, Indian
law, labor relations, entitlement programs, federal government, immigration, and foreign
affairs/national security.
197. The following policies fell into this category: federal procedure and maritime
law.
198. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1205.
199. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (noting importance of "great expertise").
200. See infra Part IV.C.2.
201. Agency ideologies were placed on the Martin-Quinn scale via the following rule:
Agency policies coded in the Eskridge-Baer data set as liberal were assigned a Martin-
Quinn of -1, mixed policies were coded as 0, and conservative policies as 1. For details on
the coding methodology for agency decisions, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at
1205-06.
202. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 102.
203. See infra Figure 3.
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Last of all, we evaluate the strategic model using our data set.2 0 4 A
dummy variable is coded as "1" if the agency policy at issue conflicted
with the policy preferences of the sitting unified government and "0" oth-
erwise. For instance, a liberal agency policy that was challenged before
the Court at a time in which the Congress and Presidency were both con-
trolled by Republicans (the "conservative" party) received a 1. All cases
heard during a time of divided partisan control of the Presidency and
Congress received a 0. Coding rules for the ideological direction of
agency policy decisions are included in Eskridge and Baer.205 If the likely
response of the political branches influences how the Justices vote to ap-
ply deference doctrine, they should vote for less deferential regimes on
policies opposed by both the Congress and President.
We also include a variable to measure whether the Court was ideo-
logically closer to lower courts or to agencies. The ideological position of
each branch was measured with Judicial Common Space Scores, which
are comparable across institutions.206 The Common Space score of the
Justice measures Supreme Court ideology; the President's Common
Space score measures agency ideology;207 and the average Common
Space ideological score of all appellate circuits measures lower court ide-
ology. The absolute value of the distance between the Justice ideology
score and the lower courts is compared to the absolute value of the dis-
tance between the Court median and the agencies. If the Cohen and
Spitzer version of the strategic model is correct, the Court will apply more
deferential regimes when agencies are closer to the Court's ideology than
lower courts are. Conversely, the Court will apply less deferential regimes
when its ideology is closer to that of the lower courts than to that of
agencies. 208
Before discussing what variables influence the Court's application of
deference doctrine in detail, we would like to flag at the outset our find-
ing that is the biggest departure from the previous empirical literature,
most of which has been generated by political scientists. Specifically, we
204. See infra Part IV.C.3.
205. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1205.
206. For a description of these scores, see Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common
Space, 23J.L. Econ. & Org. 303 (2007).
207. Although other forces such as Congress and the courts clearly influence agency
behavior, presidential preferences are used as a proxy of agency ideology because a large
literature shows that presidents exert significant authority over agencies. See, e.g., Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2244, 2248 (2001) (arguing "the
regulatory activity of the executive branch [became] more and more an extension of the
President's own policy and political agenda"); Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive
Theory of "Congressional Dominance," 12 Legal Stud. Q. 475, 489 (1987) (arguing that
President appoints agency heads who are "conducive to presidential control").
208. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 474-75 (finding Court adjusts deference
levels to achieve policy goals).
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find that deference doctrine matters. Deference doctrine is correlated
with how Justices vote on case outcomes. 20 9 If they apply deference re-
gimes sincerely, Justices should be less likely to vote to overturn an agency
when they vote for a more deferential regime.2 10 We found that the cor-
relation parameter (r) between deference regime and outcome is statisti-
cally significant, showing that deference doctrine is strongly correlated
with case outcomes after controlling for a number of other variables. 2 11
Although our result does not establish a causal pathway, it does establish
that deference regimes play an important role in Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking. TheJustices either manipulate deference doctrine tojustify
outcomes or they apply deference doctrine sincerely. This analysis sug-
gests that the "canons" (rather than a "precedent" or stare decisis) ap-
proach to deference regimes that all the Justices follow has an effect on
their decisionmaking. The predictability we find lends some credibility to
the weak legal account of the Supreme Court's evaluation of agency inter-
pretations-while at the same time we further demonstrate that ideology
and political context also affect the Court's decisionmaking.
1. Testing the Legal Model. - This Article does not directly test
whether Justices apply administrative law doctrine faithfully when voting
on deference regimes. To do so would be almost impossible. For exam-
ple, if the Court applies the Chevron regime, it will first determine
whether Congress has directly addressed the issue in suit; to make this
determination, the Court will examine the statutory text and structure,
the law's legislative history, and relevant statutory precedents. 2 12 If the
Court arrives at a clear answer after consulting these sources, it will follow
Congress's directive, whatever that may be. If there is no clear answer,
the Court will defer to any reasonable interpretation taken by the
agency. 213 To determine whether the Court has faithfully followed the
rule of law in each case, one would have to determine that the Court (1)
followed the correct deference regime, (2) was right about any clear stat-
utory meaning, and, if applicable, (3) was right about the reasonableness
of the agency's interpretation. This exercise would have to be accom-
plished with high intercoder reliability for all 667 cases in our data set.
This is a task we have not even attempted. The Supreme Court takes the
hardest cases, usually where intelligent lower courtjudges have disagreed
about the correct legal analysis-and we have no reliable mechanism to
second-guess those judges and the Supreme CourtJustices on these mat-
209. See infra Table 9.
210. See supra Table 6.
211. The correlation is negative because the dependent variables for each of the two
equations are coded in the opposite direction.
212. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (stating first question is "whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at
issue"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 20, at 834-35 (describing "Chevron's famous 'two-
step' procedure").
213. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11, 845 (holding that "question for the Court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute").
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ters of legal interpretation. In short, we do not directly test the robust-
ness of the legal model in the context of our 667 agency deference cases.
Instead, we use several proxies to test, indirectly, whether the Court
is attentive to legal concerns when the Justices decide cases where there is
an agency interpretation on point. The proxies we use are the policies
underlying and justifying various deference regimes: Is the agency inter-
preting its own rule or regulation (Seminole Rock/Auer)? Is the agency
acting pursuant to congressional delegation of lawmaking authority
(Cheuron/Mead)? Is the agency interpretation longstanding, and is it in-
formed by the agency's comparative expertise (Skidmore)? The advantage
of these proxies is that they are easier to determine objectively. Either
the Court's opinion or the Solicitor General's brief (usually both) reliably
tells us whether the agency is interpreting its own rule or regulation.
Whether there is congressional delegation is trickier, but under the
broad view of delegation the Court has taken since Chevron, it is usually
possible to make that determination by reading the underlying statute.2 14
Whether an agency's interpretation is "longstanding" or involves "exper-
tise" is the most subjective enterprise, but we have followed bright-line
criteria for applying these spongier considerations.215
We do not test to determine whether the Justices faithfully follow the
precise deference regimes (Seminole Rock, Chevron, Skidmore); the Eskridge
and Baer study established that the Justices are very uneven in this regard,
especially in their tendency not to mention (much less follow) deference
regimes in a majority of the cases where they are probably relevant.2 16
Nonetheless, in the current study we do find a strong relationship be-
tween most but not all of these rule of law policies and the Court's will-
ingness to follow agency interpretations.2 1 7 By using the simultaneous
equation model, we can say that the correlations are particularly robust,
because the model controls for other relevant variables. Although our
results also suggest that ideology is playing some role in the Justices' deci-
sions whether to defer to or agree with agency interpretations, our find-
ings support the claim that legal criteria do make a difference in these
cases-contrary to strong versions of the attitudinal model.
a. Agency Interpretations of Its Own Rules. - The Eskridge and Baer
study found that the Court rarely cited the Seminole Rock/Auer deference
regime, but also found a super-high agreement rate in Supreme Court
cases when the agency was interpreting one of its own rules.2 18 From that
214. For complications in this effort to determine congressional delegation, see
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1209-11. In practice, moreover, the Justices will
sometimes quarrel over precisely how much or what kind of lawmaking power Congress
has delegated to the agency. E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
215. For the coding rules we have followed, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at
1203-26.
216. Id. at 1123-29 & tbls.4-6 (finding Court did not invoke name of deference
regime almost as much as it invoked name of Chevron).
217. See infra Table 10.
218. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1103-04.
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super-high rate, one might, naively, conclude that the rule of law under-
pinning for Seminole Rock/Auer exercises an independent effect on the
Justices' inclination to either cite a deference regime or to go along with
an agency interpretation. Under the simultaneous equation model, how-
ever, the effect of this variable (whether the agency was interpreting its
own rule) was not statistically significant for either outcome.
This surprising result does not establish that agency interpretation of
rules has no effect on the Justices' decisions to cite a deference regime or
to go along with agency interpretations. Instead, this result suggests that
agency interpretation of its own rules is highly correlated with other vari-
ables. The result with respect to the decision to overturn or uphold the
agency may have been a product of the high correlation between agency
interpretations of rules and other legal variables. Most importantly, the
correlation between Seminole Rock/Auer eligibility and agency issuance of
a rule was quite high (83%). This correlation may have mitigated the
marginal effect of agency interpretation of rules. Put differently, Seminole
Rock/Auer eligibility had little effect beyond the fact that an agency rule
was frequently at issue.
The result with respect to deference doctrine is simpler to explain.
This result was likely influenced by the fact that the Justices rarely applied
Seminole Rock/Auer. The Justices voted to apply Seminole Rock/Auer in only
8% of cases where the agency interpreted its own rules. The Justices only
voted to apply Seminole Rock/Auer in 1% of their total votes. In short, the
regime itself had little effect because it was rarely applied. (One reason
for this is that other deference regimes were available to the Justices, and
so Seminole Rock/Auer was probably overlooked or deemed to add little or
nothing to the guidance of that other regime.) We shall in Part V argue
that the infrequency with which less prominent regimes like Seminole
Rock/Auer were applied supports condensing the number of deference
regimes.
b. Congressional Delegation of Lawmaking Authority to Agencies. - Con-
trast our results for the Seminole Rock/Auer criterion with those for the
Cheuron/Mead criterion. Running the data through our model, with
dummy variables for the Chevron/Mead trigger (congressional delega-
tion) and for agency use of that trigger (agency rulemaking and adjudica-
tion), we find a statistically significant relationship between these rule of
law considerations and the Justices' willingness to announce a deference
regime and their willingness to go along with agency interpretations.
That is, the Justices apply more deferential regimes when evaluating adju-
dications and legislative rules, as opposed to informal agency interpreta-
tions. And the Justices cite deference regimes (not just Chevron, of
course) more frequently when hearing agency policies authorized by
1780 [Vol. 110:1727
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clear congressional delegation. Both results are consistent with the
Court's decision in Mead.2 19
These results provide support for the weaker version of the legal
model. Even though the Justices do not rigorously apply Chevron/Mead
as a matter of stare decisis (the stronger version of the legal model),
there is a statistically significant correlation between a congressional dele-
gation of lawmaking authority to an agency and the Court's invocation of
a deference regime.220 Using the simultaneous equations model, we can
say that the correlation is particularly robust, because all other variables
(including ideology) are excluded. 2 21 Thus, our analysis is the first to
demonstrate that the standards outlined for the Chevron/Mead deference
regime are reliably correlated with deference voting, even after control-
ling for other political and strategic influences. This empirical finding
may have some normative significance, for it lends support to Mead's con-
troversial holding that the Chevron deference regime is applicable only
when the agency is acting pursuant to an explicit or implicit congres-
sional delegation of lawmaking authority. 222
This finding therefore represents an important contribution to the
deference literature and ought to be of particular interest to political
scientists, because it is the first statistical evidence that rule of law consid-
erations cannot be excluded from the conversation about what motivates
Supreme Court Justices in agency deference cases. Our findings do not
establish that the Justices are motivated by nothing but rule of law consid-
erations, and so our examination remains open to the further testing of
the attitudinal and strategic models below.
c. Agency Interpretations That Are Longstanding or Involve Expertise. -
Other rule of law considerations are those underlying the more informal
deference regime entailed in Skidmore. Running the data through our
model, with dummy variables for the most easily testable Skidmore consid-
erations, we find a significant effect for one of these rule of law considera-
tions on the Justices' willingness to go along with agency interpretations,
but no effect for the other that we tested. (Recall that we do not even test
the Skidmore "agency offers persuasive reasoning" factor because we find it
too subjective.)
To begin with, we find a statistically significant correlation between a
longstanding agency policy and the Justices' willingness to apply defer-
219. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 230-33 (2001) (holding that
informal agency classification rulings deserve less deference than other agency rulings
made "with a lawmaking pretense in mind").
220. See infra Table 9 (showing correlation of .60).
221. See infra Table 9.
222. For continued controversy ten years after Mead was handed down, see Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479-80 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing, alone on the Court, for
Mead to be overruled).
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ence regimes and to go along with the agency's interpretation.2 2 3 This
prominent Skidmore factor suggests that there are rule of law reliance in-
terests at stake in the agency's interpretation, and our data indicate that
such a reliance effect is motivating the Justices to give more lenient treat-
ment to the agency's interpretation in such cases. This finding is consis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent holding that recently altered agency
policies should sometimes receive less deferential treatment 224 and with
opinions such as Barnhart v. Walton arguing that longstanding policies
should receive more deferential treatment even when Chevron's trigger
(congressional delegation) is apparent.2 2 5
This finding provides important support for our thesis that the defer-
ence regimes are more like canons than like precedents entitled to stare
decisis effect. Justice Breyer's opinion in Barnhart went well beyond
Chevron/Mead when it invoked reliance interests as confirming the need
for deference, even though it was uncontested that the Mead trigger-
congressional delegation-supported Chevron deference. That level of
candor about reliance interests is unusual in the Court's agency interpre-
tation cases-but our data suggest that this is a process that influences
the Justices in a lot of cases, in addition to Barnhart.
On the other hand, we came up with mixed results for another
prominent Skidmore factor, namely, agency expertise.2 2 6 Specifically, the
complexity of the agency policy decision at issue was not correlated with
application of deference doctrine. This was a surprising finding, because
agency expertise has since the New Deal been the most commonly ex-
pressed rationale for judicial deference. Under the simultaneous equa-
tion model, however, the Justices did not grant agencies greater defer-
223. For details on Eskridge and Baer's coding scheme for the continuity of agency
positions, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1206. One reader queried: In this and
perhaps other runs of the data, have we included a variable to codify which presidential
administration originated the agency interpretation? We have not. The reason is that in
many, perhaps most, instances it was not clear to us which presidential administration was
"responsible" for a precise agency interpretation. Rulemaking commenced under
President A but completed under President B cannot unequivocally be attributed just to
the latter. An agency interpretation first publicly announced in an amicus brief filed by
President B's Solicitor General might have originated in the agency under President A. In
some instances, it is simply not clear when an agency position actually originated.
224. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268-69 (2006) (holding recent
interpretation by Attorney General receives only Skidmore deference because it was "not
promulgated pursuant to the Attorney General's authority" and that weight given to
interpretation depends in part on consistency with earlier and later pronouncements); see
also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) ("We hold that the policy announced in the
challenged regulations is 'sufficiently substantial and consistent' to compel the conclusion
that Congress has approved it."); Theodore W. Ruger, FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The
Norm of Agency Continuity, in Statutory Interpretation Stories (William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2010).
225. 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002) ("[T]his Court will normally accord particular
deference to an agency interpretation of 'longstanding' duration." (quoting N. Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982))).
226. See infra Table 9.
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ence when evaluating "technical" agency policies. This finding may
simply indicate that the expertise rationale does not influence how the
Justices apply deference doctrine. Alternatively, this finding may be a
product of measurement imprecision. We inferred "complexity" of indi-
vidual cases from a general judgment about the complexity of the
agency's general policy jurisdiction.2 2 7 These agency-wide classifications
are inevitably imprecise when applied to the full set of individual cases.
Hence, further testing, using more refined criteria, might discover an ef-
fect that our simultaneous equation model did not.
Consistent with the findings of the Eskridge and Baer study,2 28 how-
ever, we also found that the Justices were less apt to overturn policies
issued by agencies in highly and modestly technical areas. 229 This is an
important finding. Although our model does not allow us to say that
super-high agreement rates are the same as super-high deference rates, these
findings provide further evidence that an agency's comparative expertise
(vis-A-vis the Court) probably motivates the Justices to go along with a
wider range of agency interpretations. The irony, of course, is that the
super-high agreement rates did not generate super-high invocations of
specific deference regimes (as shown in Table 9, the technical variable is
insignificant for deference regime, but not for the decision to overturn or
uphold the agency). Did the Justices simply overlook deference doctrine
in technical cases? Overall, the technical cases did not generate as much
internal debate among the Justices (there were fewer concurring and dis-
senting opinions, as well as five-four splits among the Justices), and this
may explain the disparity. In any event, this important finding further
supports our conclusion in Part III that the strongest form of the legal
model (where deference precedents like Chevron have formal stare decisis
effect) does not motivate the Justices in these cases.
Collectively, the foregoing findings suggest that legal concerns influ-
ence the Court's application of deference doctrine. The findings do not
preclude the possibility that functional concerns also play a significant
role in these results, however. Functional concerns such as a desire to
maintain a national rule of law, to respect comparative institutional com-
petence, or to maintain the Court's legitimacy are often correlated with
legal concerns. 230 The empirical model does not measure these func-
tional concerns. As a result, omitted variable bias could influence the
results, attributing functional concerns to legal concerns. Even complete
data on all functional concerns and legal concerns would not resolve this
problem, however. Legal doctrine is often crafted to accommodate func-
227. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
228. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1144-47 & tbl.16.
229. See infra Table 9.
230. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1168-79 (explaining and analyzing these
functional concerns).
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tional concerns, making efforts to separate the two impossible. These re-
sults therefore may be a product of other unmeasured variables such as
functional concerns that are correlated with legal doctrine.
2. Testing the Attitudinal Model. - Applying the simultaneous equa-
tion model, we find that ideology also correlates significantly with how
Justices vote on deference doctrines. As Table 9 reports, Justices system-
atically support less deferential regimes for policies with which they disa-
gree. Likewise, Justices are more likely to vote to overturn policies with
which they disagree. The coefficient on a Justice's ideological disagree-
ment with the agency position is positive and highly significant, sug-
gesting that ideological disagreement increases the propensity to over-
turn the agency. Together, these findings suggest that ideological
preferences influence both deference regime votes and outcome votes.
These findings strongly suggest that Justices do not select deference re-
gimes solely on the basis of legal considerations. As political scientists
maintain, ideology matters.
HeinOnline  -- 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1784 2010
2010] CHEVRON AS CANON 1785
TABLE 9. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR THE BIVARIATE MIXED-






Agency-Justice Ideological Difference -0.06 0.02*
Continuity -0.23 0.02*
Technical Policy -0.06 0.04
Intermediate Policy -0.04 0.04
Court-centered Policy -0.13 0.06*
Legislative Rule 0.49 0.06*
Adjudication 0.32 0.06*
Congressional Delegation 0.60 0.05*
Agency Interpretation of Its Own Rule 0.04 0.05
Agency Policy Contrary to Unified Government Preferences -0.16 0.05*
Justice-level Fixed Effects2 3 1  Included
Relative Ideological Proximity of Lower Courts and Agencies2 3 2  -0.13 0.4*
Constant 0.06 0.07
Cut Point 1 0.96 0.02*
Cut Point 2 1.38 0.04*
Case Outcome Equation:
Constant -0.91 0.05*
Agency-justice Ideological Difference 0.18 0.01*
Continuity 0.11 0.02*
Technical Policy -0.41 0.04*
Intermediate Policy -0.22 0.05*
Court-centered Policy -0.24 0.07*
Legislative Rule -0.09 0.07
Adjudication 0.11 0.08
Congressional Delegation 0.08 0.07
Agency Interpretation of Its Own Rule 0.01 0.06
Agency Policy Contrary to Unified Government Preferences 0.06 0.05
Relative Ideological Proximity of Lower Courts and Agencies 0.34 0.05*
R. Correlation -0.22 0.02*
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
Notes: N = 5897; log-likelihood=-9210.92. The dependent variable in equation 1 is deference
regime; the dependent variable in equation 2 is whether the agency is overturned; r represents
the correlation between the two equations.
231. All Justice fixed effects were statistically insignificant with the exception of
Justices Blackmun and Marshall.
232. The relative proximity was coded so that positive values indicate that the lower
courts are closer than agencies. A strategic court would grant less deference under such
conditions, so the expected coefficient value is negative.
HeinOnline  -- 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1785 2010
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 10: LEGAL VARIABLES AND DEFERENCE REGIME
Longstanding Agency
Agency Congressional Interpreting
Policy Delegation Own Rules
No Regime, Antideference 47.57 29.80 30.07
Consultative Deference, Skidmore 27.12 22.54 30.52
Chevron, Beth Israel 22.78 42.17 31.28
Seminole Rock 1.81 3.92 7.44
Curtiss-Wright 0.72 1.58 0.68
The results from the simultaneous equation model also demonstrate
that Justices do not display distinct preferences over deference regimes.
The fixed effects are statistically insignificant for all Justices except
Blackmun and Marshall. This finding is in accordance with Part III's ag-
gregate-level analysis suggesting thatJustices do not exhibit unique defer-
ence regime preferences in their voting patterns.2 33 In short, ideological
concerns influence deference regime votes. The Justices do not exhibit
differences in their aggregate deference regime voting patterns, however.
Conservative Justices and liberal Justices support deference regimes at
roughly the same overall rates, because each group supports applying
more deferential regimes when faced with ideologically compatible
agency policies.
The Justices' ideal points illustrate the foregoing dynamic. Ideal
point estimates represent the propensity of each Justice to vote for a par-
ticular deference regime relative to his or her colleagues. Ideal points
are calculated by conducting a factor analysis on deference regime voting
data. The factor analysis uncovers a pattern of association in the data,
which represents the propensity of particular Justices to support defer-
ence doctrine. The analysis is done by performing Bayesian inference via
simulation. 234 The algorithm takes the data and the prior distribution
and uses Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to estimate a posterior dis-
tribution, which represents the ideal point.2 3 5 The model returns an
ideal point estimate for each Justice that maximizes the ability of each
factor in the model to explain the deference regime votes. To place the
deference regime ideal points in context, the scores are compared to
Justice ideology scores used in much current research on the Court.2 36
These scores are calculated using a method of statistical inference that is
very similar to the technique used to generate the Martin-Quinn ideology
233. See, e.g., supra Table 2.
234. For an overview of this technique, see generally Jeff Strnad, Should Legal
Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 195, 195-203 (2007).
235. Software to conduct this analysis was developed by Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M.
Quinn & John Hee Park, MCMCpack 1.0, at http://mcmcpack.wustl.edu (2004).
236. See, e.g., Martin & Quinn, supra note 102, at 146 tbl.1.
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scores.23 7 The values of the ideal points are not on the same scale, how-
ever. Only the order should be compared between deference regime
preferences and ideological preferences.
TABLE 11: IDEAL POINr ESTIMATES FOR JUSTICES OVER
DEFERENCE REGIMES, 1983-2005
Liberal Agenc Conservative Agency
All Cases Interpretation Interpretation
95 Percent 95 Percent 95 Percent
Mean Interval Mean Interval Mean Interval
Blackmun 0.60 0.34, 0.91 -0.71 -1.14, -. 036 0.57 0.25, 0.96
Brennan 0.98 0.56, 1.64 -1.45 -2.35, -0.78 0.75 0.33, 1.40
Breyer 0.48 0.23, 0.79 -0.83 -1.43, -0.37 0.26 -0.11, 0.68
Burger -0.43 -1.24, 0.15 0.91 0.02, 2.15 -0.08 -0.83, 0.47
Ginsburg 0.36 0.13, 0.61 -0.66 -1.11, -0.29 0.12 -0.25, 0.49
Kennedy -0.38 -0.60, -0.15 0.45 0.15, 0.77 -0.28 -0.63, 0.03
Marshall 1.06 0.62, 1.69 -1.21 -2.08, -0.70 1.01 0.47, 1.88
O'Connor -0.21 -0.41, 0.01 0.23 -0.05, 0.52 -0.16 -0.46, 0.13
Powell 0.07 -0.31, 0.43 0.08 -0.50, 0.69 0.14 -0.23, 0.54
Rehnguist -0.45 -0.67, -0.22 0.52 0.21, 0.85 -0.36 -0.74, -0.06
Scalia -1.16 -1.68, -0.77 1.21 0.67, 2.10 -1.12 -2.01, -0.56
Souter 0.21 0.01, 0.45 -0.56 -0.98, -0.21 -0.18 -0.50, 0.13
Stevens 0.70 0.44, 1.00 -0.92 -1.59, -0.54 0.56 0.21, 0.98
Thomas -0.95 -1.34, -0.62 0.97 0.55, 1.47 -1.15 -2.22, -0.53
White -0.11 -0.40, 0.16 -0.15 -0.58, 0.31 -0.29 -0.65, 0.04
Deference regime ideal points and ideological preferences are
strongly related, as reflected in Table 11 and Figure 3. The correlation
between ideological preferences and deference regime preferences is
0.92, with liberal Justices favoring less deferential regimes than the con-
servatives when conservative agency interpretations are at issue. When
only liberal agency policies are analyzed, the results are reversed: Liber-
als support more deferential regimes and conservatives support less defer-
ential regimes. Together, these results show that an independent defer-
ence doctrine dimension does not emerge from the Justices' voting
patterns. Instead, deference regime votes closely track votes on final dis-
positions. This finding reconciles the conflict in the bivariate mixed-re-
sponse probit model results presented in Table 9 above. Justices have
statistically indistinct deference regime ideal points because ideological
voting balances out in aggregate. That is, total deference regime voting
appears relatively equal because liberal Justices support deferential re-
gimes for liberal agency policies, and conservative Justices support defer-
ential regimes for conservative agency policies.
237. Id. at 137-45.
238. Ideological classification of agency policy decisions is taken from Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 24.
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FIGURE 3: IDEOLOGY AND DEFERENCE IDEAL POINTS

















Notes: Figure provides the average Martin-Quinn annual ideology score for each justice over the
period 1983-2005 weighted by the number of cases decided per year.
DoJustices actively manipulate deference regimes to pursue ideolog-
ical preferences? Analyzing this question directly would require a window
into the cognitive process by which Justices decide cases, which we do not
have. There is some indication, though, that the Justices are not system-
atically manipulating deference regimes. Consider a situation in which
Justices face different incentives-close cases as opposed to lopsided
cases.
In close cases, Justices seek to win and maintain five votes. As a con-
sequence, they are highly attuned to the preferences of their colleagues,
and will tend to balance their preferences about deference doctrine
against preferences over other legal issues and over the case holding.
Justices may avoid invoking a deference regime that would create dissen-
sion within their tentative majority coalitions or may support a regime
favored by a wavering or undecided colleague. The incentives differ in
lopsided cases. Because the outcome is apparent and does not depend
upon one or two critical colleagues, the authoring Justice in a lopsided
case has greater freedom to structure the opinion the way she or he
wants, without worrying about securing an uncertain fifth vote. The
Justice may therefore invoke her or his preferred deference regime. This
preference may be motivated by the attitudinal or strategic concerns
mentioned in the theoretical discussion above. Justices may not be en-
tirely unconstrained in these cases, however. In some cases, they may de-
sire to win unanimous support of their colleagues to increase the legiti-
macy of a decision. Theoretically, however, Justices ought to be, on
balance, less constrained in lopsided cases. If their preferences are suffi-
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ciently intense and heterogeneous, Justices ought therefore to differ
more on deference regime votes in lopsided cases than in close cases.
TABLE 12: DEFERENCE REGIMES VOTES IN LOPSIDED CASES
Majority Concur Dissent Total
No Regime, Antideference 46.25 65.68 67.05 48.92
Consultative Deference, Skidmore 33.51 22.51 15.71 31.61
Chevron, Beth Israel 17.40 10.70 14.94 16.79
Seminole Rock, Curtiss-Wight 2.84 1.11 2.30 2.69
Note: Table provides distribution of deference regimes applied in all majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions.
Pearson chi2 (6) = 80.3674 Pr = 0.000
TABLE 13: DEFERENCE REGIMES VOTES IN CLOSE CASES
Majority Concur Dissent Total
No Regime, Antideference 47.74 47.78 58.13 51.76
Consultative Deference, Skidmore 26.50 17.78 14.60 21.49
Chevron, Beth Israel 22.65 33.33 25.21 24.15
Seminole Rock, Curtiss-Wright 3.10 1.11 2.07 2.61
Note: Table provides distribution of deference regimes applied in all majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions.
Pearson chi2 (6) = 45.3913 Pr = 0.000
The hypothesis suggested by strategic behavior theory is that Justices
will actively manipulate deference doctrine in close cases and will vote
more sincerely in lopsided cases. Contrary to the hypothesis, Tables 12
and 13 report our finding that the Justices behave similarly in close and
lopsided cases. Thus, they do not vote for deference regimes more fre-
quently in lopsided cases. Instead, they actually opt not to apply any def-
erence regime more frequently in lopsided cases. This suggests that
Justices generally devote more effort to close cases and therefore take the
time to apply a deference regime. Conversely, they do not spend the
effort in lopsided cases to consider whether to apply a deference regime.
20101 1789
HeinOnline  -- 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1789 2010
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 14: IDEAL POINT ESTIMATES FOR JUSTICES
REGIMES BY CASE MARGIN
OVER DEFERENCE
Close Cases Lopsided Case
All Cases (5-4, 6-3) (7-2 or greater)
95 Percent 95 Percent 95 Percent
Mean Interval Mean Interval Mean Interval
Blackmun 0.60 0.34, 0.91 0.08 -0.14, 0.32 0.32 -0.06, 0.72
Brennan 0.98 0.56, 1.64 0.08 -0.18, 0.36 -0.03 -0.57, 0.45
Breyer 0.48 0.23, 0.79 0.18 -0.04, 0.41 0.30 -0.14, 0.82
Burger -0.43 -1.24, 0.15 -0.23 -0.73, 0.14 0.85 0.05, 1.99
Ginsburg 0.36 0.13, 0.61 0.15 -0.06, 0.37 0.06 -0.40, 0.53
Kennedy -0.38 -0.60, -0.15 -0.21 -0.42, 0.00 -0.21 -0.56, 0.12
Marshall 1.06 0.62, 1.69 0.07 -0.18, 0.36 0.44 -0.05, 0.93
O'Connor -0.21 -0.41, 0.01 -0.19 -0.39, 0.02 -0.29 -0.64, 0.05
Powell 0.07 -0.31, 0.43 -0.26 -0.63, 0.05 -0.42 -1.19, 0.21
Rehnquist -0.45 -0.67, -0.22 -0.29 -0.52, -0.07 -0.32 -0.68, 0.02
Scalia -1.16 -1.68, -0.77 -0.28 -0.50, -0.07 -1.32 -2.14, -0.70
Souter 0.21 0.01, 0.45 0.14 -0.07, 0.36 -0.14 -0.51, 0.22
Stevens 0.70 0.44, 1.00 4.90 3.81, 5.99 1.09 0.55, 2.04
Thomas -0.95 -1.34, -0.62 -0.53 -0.84, -0.26 -0.88 -1.43, -0.45
White -0.11 -0.40, 0.16 -0.17 -0.44, 0.09 -0.24 -0.69, 0.19
Ideal point analysis confirms this result. As Table 14 reveals, Justices
behave consistently regardless of case-vote margin. The absolute value of
the ideal point scores should not be compared between close and lop-
sided votes, because the estimates are designed to be compared only to
other scores generated using the same data. More importantly, the or-
dering of the Justices is comparable across analyses. A comparison of the
ordering shows that only Chief Justice Burger, Justice Marshall, and
Justice Powell displayed significant movement in the rank order. Ideal
point estimates for all of these Justices were generated with relatively little
data, so the standard errors and associated 95% credible interval are
quite large. All other Justices remained within three places of their over-
all position. This result shows that a very different incentive structure
does not induce the Justices to behave differently when applying defer-
ence doctrine.
We have several potential explanations for this surprising lack of ma-
nipulation. First, and perhaps most important, the Justices do not display
unique preferences about deference doctrine in their voting. Although
some Justices say (we think sincerely) that they have distinct preferences
over deference doctrine, Part III of this Article demonstrates that those
preferences are relatively weak; preferences over legislative history doc-
trine, another area of methodological disagreement not subject to stare
1790 [Vol. 110:1727
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decisis, are stronger for the Justices than their preferences over defer-
ence. If the Justices place relatively little emphasis on deference doc-
trine, then it would have relatively little effect on intra-Court bargaining.
As a result, Justices would have little incentive to engage in such
manipulation.
Second, peer monitoring effects may constrain Justices from manipu-
lating deference doctrine. Justices may fear that their colleagues with dif-
ferent ideological preferences will expose implausible applications of def-
erence doctrine. Empirical work such as the pioneering study by Dean
Richard Revesz suggests that this dynamic moderates the behavior of ap-
peals courtjudges. 23 9 This effect may exist because Justices in the major-
ity adjust their decisions to avoid provoking a dissent. Deliberation
among circuit court judges with different ideological perspectives may
also have a moderating effect.24 0 To be sure, such peer monitoring may
be less effective on the Supreme Court. Peer effects may be stronger on
appeals courts because judges sit in smaller panels. Moreover, the norms
of disagreement differ. In particular, dissents are viewed as more con-
frontational on the appeals courts, and so there is more collegial pressure
not to issue them. 24 1 Nonetheless, the fact that the Court is a collegial
body likely checks the inclination of Justices to manipulate deference
doctrine at the margin.
Third, the law matters, too. The previous subpart demonstrates that
legal doctrine influences how Justices vote to apply deference doctrine.
Legal concerns may therefore prevent Justices from engaging in blatant
manipulation of deference regimes. For instance, Justices may be reluc-
tant to deny Chevron deference to a formal agency policy such as a legisla-
tive rule or an adjudication with which they disagree because they are
concerned about the appearance of misapplying doctrine. The same
concern may also reduce strategic behavior in cases where Congress
clearly delegated to the agency. In short, the Justices may be loath to
bend deference doctrine in the relatively clear cases.
3. Testing the Strategic Model. - The strategic model predicts that the
Court considers and anticipates the preferences of Congress and the
239. See Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 61, at 1765-66 (reporting that
ideological voting on D.C. Circuit is less pronounced when panels are ideologically
diverse). For a response to Dean Revesz by Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, see Edwards,
supra note 84, to which Revesz replied in Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the
D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 Va. L. Rev. 805 (1999).
240. See Richard Posner, How Judges Think 31 (2008) (suggesting diverse appellate
court panel composition influences outcomes); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under
Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 299, 308 (2004) (explaining view that
collegiality and deliberation affect appellate judicial outcomes); Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, supra note 61, at 1765-66.
241. See Posner, supra note 240, at 33. For empirical analysis of panel effects, see
Cross & Tiller, supra note 58, at 2175-76; Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note
61, at 1765-66.
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President when issuing decisions. The strategic model enjoys much less
academic support than the legal and attitudinal models. Law professors
generally hew to the legal model, and judges distance themselves from
any model suggesting that they are not applying neutral legal criteria
when they decide cases; like the attitudinal model, the strategic model
undermines the sharp distinction between "law" and "politics" thatjudges
and their law professor allies believe is important to the legitimacy of the
rule of law.24 2 Yet political scientists have not embraced the strategic
model either. Attitudinalists such as Segal and Spaeth have criticized it
and have produced empirical studies suggesting that it is wrong.2 4 3 What
our data reveal, however, is that the strategic model is supported by em-
pirical evidence.
Accordingly, our simultaneous equation model supports one predic-
tion of the strategic model, as we find that the Justices apply less deferen-
tial regimes for agency policies that are likely to be opposed by both the
sitting President and Congress. The Justices are also more likely to vote
to overturn such policies, but this coefficient is not statistically distinct
from zero, as revealed in Table 9. This latter result is consistent with a
large body of political science literature, although academics continue to
debate the issue. 24 4
These findings provide qualified support for the strategic model, but
several caveats are in order. First, the measures of the preferences of the
Justices, of the median member of Congress, of the President, and the
agency policy decision at issue are admittedly rough, and measurement
error could theoretically be correlated with an omitted variable that
drives the results. On the other hand, measurement error may actually
bias the coefficients toward zero, making the findings all the more robust.
Second, the fact that the Justices apply less deferential regimes to agency
decisions opposed by both Congress and the President does not necessa-
rily indicate that they are concerned about provoking retaliation by mak-
ing a decision, such as citing Chevron instead of Skidmore. Instead, the
Justices may simply use deference doctrine to justify outcomes that will
satisfy the political branches. Third, our finding of a strategic effect is
particularly striking because the analysis includes votes by all Justices.
Most versions of the strategic model predict that only Justices in the ma-
jority are constrained, because the political branches will not respond to
votes that fail to change the law. A more precise test of the theory may
actually yield stronger results.
Although our results are tentative, they are the first to show that stra-
tegic considerations may influence how the Justices apply deference doc-
trine. If so, then Congress and the President have a greater impact on
242. See, e.g. Edwards, supra note 84, at 1339-54 (criticizing empirical study
demonstrating that judges on his court often vote ideologically and strategically).
243. See Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 97, at 44-76.
244. For a review of this literature, see generally Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court
in American Politics, 6 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 161 (2003).
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the Court than accounts focusing only on case outcomes suggest. For
instance, if the political branches influence the Court's doctrinal choices,
then the effects could easily reverberate among the lower courts, includ-
ing the D.C. Circuit, which hears many important administrative law
cases.24 5 The results in this Article do not establish that such dynamics
actually occur, but they suggest this as a plausible hypothesis that ought
to be tested in the future.
Our results are also consistent with the alternative version of the stra-
tegic model advanced by Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer.2 4 6 The
Justices apply less deferential regimes to agency policies when the Justices
are ideologically closer to the lower courts than to agencies. Conversely,
the Justices are also more likely to overturn agency policies when the
Justices are ideologically closer to the lower courts than to agencies.
These findings suggest that the Justices are sensitive to relative ideological
preferences of lower courts and agencies, and they use deference doc-
trine and outcome decisions to delegate strategically.
Although the same caveats mentioned above regarding measure-
ment error are in order, this finding represents an important advance to
the academic literature. Existing research has not analyzed what impact
the ideology of lower courts and of agencies has on deference doctrine,
instead focusing on case outcomes.24 7 Our results are the first to do so,
and our findings indicate that the Justices' application of deference doc-
trine responds to the views of external actors such as lower courts and
agencies. If so, this suggests that the ideology of the lower courts actually
influences the doctrine that the Court directs to the lower courts. This
supports arguments by law professors such as Peter Strauss and positive
245. Professor (and University Provost) Elizabeth Garrett suggests to us that Chevron
has had the greatest impact on the D.C. Circuit. Indeed, D.C. Circuit judges were early
and key proponents of an expansive application of Chevron. E.g., Scalia, Judicial
Deference, supra note 15, at 516 (discussing pre-Chevron decisions in the D.C. Circuit that
deferred to agency action based on theoretical justification similar to Chevron's); Starr,
supra note 13, at 295-96 (discussing D.C. Circuit's expansive application of Chevron in
recent cases). We found no empirical support for the further claim that D.C. Circuit
judges on average have internalized Chevron more than other kinds ofjudges. Thus, none
of the Justices who sat on the D.C. Circuit-Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas-had a
statistically distinct preference over deference doctrine. (We do not count Chief Justice
Roberts, for whom we have too few Supreme Court observations.) Also, we included a
variable in our model testing whetherJustices who hired more clerks from the D.C. Circuit
were more likely to vote for opinions citing deference regimes. The coefficient for this
variable did not approach statistical significance, however. Finally, the proportion of D.C.
Circuit clerks was not correlated with whether Justices cited deference regimes when
authoring opinions. Hence, we are skeptical that the D.C. Circuit has inculcated a culture
of deference that has any influence at the Supreme Court level.
246. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 441-56 (laying out model).
247. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text (reviewing academic literature on
deference doctrine).
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political theorists such as McNollgast, who argue that the Court uses doc-
trine to manage the lower courts. 24 8
This finding also contributes to the debate between Cohen and
Spitzer, on the one hand, and Stephenson, on the other, regarding the
influence of lower courts and agencies on whether the Justices uphold
agencies.2 4 9 Our results support Cohen and Spitzer's argument that the
Justices tend to delegate authority to the ideologically closer institution
(either lower courts or agencies) and that they use deference doctrine to
do so. 250 Although our study is far from the final word on the debate
over Cohen and Spitzer's thesis, we do provide an empirically robust basis
for supporting their and Peter Strauss's notion that Chevron involves the
Court's supervision of lower courts as well as agencies.2 5 1
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTINUUM OF DEFERENCE
In exploring the implications of our empirical findings, we now
abandon City ofJackson as our "representative" case, for City ofJackson re-
flected several of the hypotheses we tested and rejected in this study.
Consider another Supreme Court case that better captures some of the
conclusions supported by our empirical analysis: Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers.252 According to the government, the
Clean Water Act authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to exercise
discretion to deny a waste disposal permit for a group of Illinois cities
seeking to dispose of trash in abandoned gravel pits.2 5 3 The Corps deter-
mined that the gravel pits constituted "navigable waters" subject to pro-
tection under the Act. The Corps rejected the permit because waste dis-
posal in the gravel pits would disrupt a habitat for protected birds. 254
The cities sued the Corps, alleging that it exceeded its authority under
the Clean Water Act: The section of the Act authorizing the Corps to
grant permits for discharge of water into "navigable waters" did not ex-
tend to gravel pits. As a result, the Corps lacked authority to deny the
permit. The Corps responded that its decision was consistent with the
text of the Clean Water Act, which defines "navigable waters" as all "wa-
ters of the United States," a category that logically includes gravel pits
248. McNollgast, supra note 111, at 1634; Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra
note 15, at 1095.
249. See Stephenson, Mixed Signals, supra note 12, at 709 (discussing differences
between Stephenson's findings and Cohen and Spitzer's findings).
250. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 474-76.
251. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 15, at 1095 (arguing, in
leading work of scholarship, that Chevron is effort by Court to manage efforts of diverse
array of lower court judges).
252. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
253. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
254. See id.
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that are connected to the national hydrological system.2 5 5 According to
the government, Congress had also provided implicit approval by declin-
ing subsequent opportunities to overturn the policy. 25 6
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Illinois cities. Writing for
the five-Justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that gravel
pits did not fall under the Clean Water Act's definition of "navigable wa-
ters," so the Corps lacked authority to deny a permit to the cities. The
majority first discussed precedent, distinguishing the case from United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.25 7 In the earlier case, the Court had
upheld a Corps policy applying the same section of the Clean Water Act
to wetlands adjacent to navigable waterways. 25 8 In Solid Waste, Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court's earlier decision had hinged
on the fact that wetlands were "inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of
the United States."2 59 Gravel pits were not so similarly intertwined with
navigable waters, however. In response to the Corps's argument that the
legislative history supported its interpretation, the majority argued that
the legislative background might support the Corps's jurisdiction over
wetlands, but was silent on unconnected bodies of water such as gravel
pits.
2 6 0
Only after finding a statutory plain meaning and essentially ruling
against the government did the ChiefJustice turn to the deference argu-
ment. The Chevron regime was apparently applicable, because no one
disputed that the Corps was acting pursuant to a congressional delegation
of lawmaking authority. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion
started with Chevron, however, but both closed with a discussion of how
that regime should have been applied-a practice that is consistent with
our observation that the Justices on the whole treat Chevron more as a
canon of statutory construction than as a binding precedent. Although
the majority may have considered the possibility that the statutory text
was clear, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, even if the statute were
ambiguous, "we would not extend Chevron deference here," because the
Corps's decision raised a constitutional issue. 2 61 In particular, the policy
may have improperly extended Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause, thereby encroaching upon state sovereiguty. Absent a clear state-
ment of congressional intent, the majority declined to grant Chevron def-
255. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 18-21, Solid Waste, 531 U.S. 159 (No. 99-
1178) (invoking Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), for statutory
definition of "navigable waters").
256. Id. at 21-28.
257. 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (unanimous opinion).
258. Id. at 139.
259. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134).
260. Id. at 170-71.
261. Id. at 172-73.
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erence to a policy raising such constitutional issues. The majority instead
followed the canon to avoid constitutional questions.26 2
Like the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens's dis-
senting opinion devoted its greatest attention to legislative history263 and
precedent.2 64 At the end of his opinion, Justice Stevens made a strong
appeal to deference. The statutory definition ("waters of the United
States"2 65 ) was pretty open-ended, and the Court had earlier deferred to
the Corps's broad construction to include property that was part of a
larger, interconnected aquatic system. 266 justice Stevens objected that
the Court's invocation of the avoidance canon was untenable, as the
Court's Commerce Clause precedents afforded no reason to doubt the
constitutionality of the Corps's assumption ofjurisdiction. Indeed, "[t]he
Corps's interpretation of the statute as extending beyond navigable wa-
ters, tributaries of navigable waters, and wetlands adjacent to each is man-
ifestly reasonable and therefore entitled to deference."2 67 Although not
mentioned by the dissenters, it is also significant that the Corps in Solid
Waste was interpreting its own prior regulation (the one upheld in
Riverside Bayview) and therefore was entitled to Seminole Rock/Auer defer-
ence as well as Chevron deference. 26 8
Solid Waste illustrates several of the empirical themes we have been
developing in this Article: The Justices do not follow Chevron and other
deference regime decisions as precedents entitled to strict stare decisis
effect; they treat deference regimes more as canons of statutory construc-
tion; and they are influenced by legal as well as ideological considerations
when they decide whether to apply a deference regime and to uphold or
overturn an agency interpretation. These empirical themes can be tied
to the ongoing debates about Chevron and to the doctrinal framework the
Court ought to be developing to guide its own decisionmaking when
there is an agency interpretation of the statute on point. Consider three
normative doctrinal ramifications of our study.
A. Lowering the Stakes of the Deference Debate
So much of the Chevron scholarship, and the occasional Supreme
Court dissent, is overheated with claims that the future of the rule of law
and judicial review rise or fall with the precise articulation of Chevron's
domain. Boosters assume that universal Chevron will liberate agencies
262. Id. at 174 ("We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative deference.").
263. Id. at 177-82 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
264. Id. at 185-87.
265. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).
266. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1985) (White, J., writing for a
unanimous Court)).
267. Id. at 192.
268. Id. at 163-65 (majority opinion).
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from meddlesome judges and save a lot of money or resources.2 6 9 Critics
assume that a broad reading of Chevron would imperil the Supreme
Court's Marbury role as the guarantor of the rule of law or would turn
loose agencies to engage in unreviewed mischief.2 7 0 At the Supreme
Court level, these fears and their intensity are not only exaggerated, but
they are close to nonsense.
Our empirical analysis ought to have the effect of debunking strong
claims evaluating different conceptualizations of deference doctrine.
The big picture created by our data is that, notwithstanding their stated
(and we think sincere) differences of opinion regarding Chevron's do-
main, the Justices do not frequently disagree among themselves as to the
applicability of Chevron or other deference regimes;27 1 they vote to apply
Chevron at roughly equal rates and unanimously ignore Chevron in many
cases where it is applicable; 272 and even when authoring opinions, they
tend to cluster together.2 73 This big picture is not only one where
Justices rarely treat Chevron as a precedent entitled to strict stare decisis
effect, but also one where Justices rarely even consistently treat Chevron as
a high stakes canon.
The same points can be made through analysis of the advocates of
diametrically opposed understandings of Chevron itself. That is, Justices
Scalia and Breyer have advanced opposing visions of deference regimes,
but their claims about the importance of the debate are refuted by their
own performance as Justices. Part III demonstrates that neither Justice
Breyer nor Justice Scalia insists on his preferred regime as a matter of
stare decisis and that Justices Scalia, Breyer, and their colleagues join
opinions that ignore the deference regimes when clearly applicable.2 74
To be sure, when Justice Scalia authors opinions, he is somewhat more
likely to invoke Chevron than other Justices, 275 but he does not invoke it
nearly as often as his universal Chevron theory would suggest, nor does he
269. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-40 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Court's moderate understanding of Chevron's domain is an
"avulsive" shift in law and will be a disaster); Vermeule, supra note 91, at 215 (arguing that
country would save a lot of money if agencies were substantially left alone by meddling
judges); see also David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 141-42 (2000) (arguing that judges should be
deferential to agency interpretations, which tend to be more public-spirited than those
judges are likely to render).
270. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
Admin. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1986) (arguing broad interpretation of Chevron would be
'seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless"); Mark Seidenfeld,
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87
Cornell L. Rev. 486, 547 (2002) (concluding that judicial review of agency decisionmaking
has accountability benefits).
271. See supra Table 1.
272. See supra Table 2.
273. See supra Table 3 and Figure 2.
274. See supra Table 2 and Figure 1.
275. See supra Table 3 and Figure 2.
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often file concurring or dissenting opinions insisting on the application
of Chevron.2 7 6 Also, Justice Scalia frequently authors opinions that follow
more informal deference regimes such as Skidmore.277 Likewise, when he
authors opinions, Justice Breyer is more prone to follow the informal
Skidmore regime than most other Justices but invokes the more formal
regimes about as much as the average Justice2 7 8 and rarely writes special
concurring or dissenting opinions insisting on Skidmore.27 9
Solid Waste is an illustration of the foregoing empirically based con-
clusion. Recall that the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court said that
Chevron would not be applicable even if the statute were ambiguous (be-
cause of possible constitutional difficulties)-without a peep out of
Justice Scalia, even though the Chief Justice's observation was at some
odds with Justice Scalia's strongly positivist theory of statutory interpreta-
tion.28 0 Nor did Justice Scalia (or Justice Stevens) even notice that
Seminole Rock/Auer deference was formally applicable in Solid Waste; in
other cases, where Seminole Rock/Auer cut in conservative directions,
Justice Scalia has sometimes been insistent that the Court at least ac-
knowledge the relevance of this deference regime and has demanded
that the Court defer unless the statute is clear.2 81
Correspondingly, Justice Breyer, a strong exponent of a more flexi-
ble deference regime, joined every sentence of Justice Stevens's dissent-
ing opinion, which insisted on strict adherence to the Chevron regime. 8
Although Justice Breyer is inclined to accord less deference when agen-
cies have adopted dramatically new constructions, he allowed that feature
of Solid Waste to pass by.
Solid Waste also illustrates an important feature of the deference de-
bate that is suggested by our analysis in Part IV. Recall that we found
some influence of legal considerations upon the Justices' behavior in the
667 cases in our data set-but we also found that ideology played a signif-
icant role. Solid Waste illustrates this latter point. Even though the statu-
tory text ("waters of the United States") was vast and expansive, five prop-
erty-protecting ideological conservatives insisted that there was a plain
meaning cutting against the Corps under Chevron.283 The same conserva-
tives then "discovered" constitutional problems with the Corps's assertion
276. See supra Table 1.
277. See supra Table 3.
278. See supra Table 3 and Figure 2.
279. See supra Table 1.
280. See Liu, supra note 125, at 41 (examining systemically Justice Scalia's positivist
philosophy).
281. Compare Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (declining to afford Auer
deference to agency interpretation of its own regulation where regulation "parrot[ed]" the
statute), with id. at 276-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting Court apply Auer deference to
protect pro-life directive seeking to head off federalist experiment in death with dignity).
282. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 191 (2001)
(Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
283. Id. at 170 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.).
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ofjurisdiction over local gravel pits, even though the agency's jurisdiction
was supported by scientific evidence that local gravel pits of this sort im-
plicate the national hydrological system (and therefore fall securely
within the Court's longstanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
Whatever "formal" deference regime the Court says it is applying, the
actual fate of an agency's interpretation depends on a cluster of vari-
ables-or canons-only one of which is the deference regime. In Solid
Waste, the Justices devoted little of their attention to the Chevron issue;
both the majority and dissenting opinions dedicated more pages of the
U.S. Reports to discussing the dictionary and other sources for fixing a
meaning on "waters";28 4 the expectations of Congress when it enacted
the Clean Water Act in 1972 and amended it in 1977;285 the Court's
precedents interpreting that statute, as amended;28 6 and the constitu-
tional questions generated by the agency's expansive interpretation.2 8 7
This debate among the Justices-in a high-profile case where no party or
Justice disputed that the triggering condition for Chevron existed
(namely, delegation of lawmaking authority to the Corps) -illustrates
our conclusion that deference doctrine functions as one of many compet-
ing canons of statutory interpretation. Specifically, it functions much like
the plain meaning rule (and the dictionary canon for determining "plain
meaning"); the committee report and purpose canons for discerning leg-
islative intent; and the avoidance canon-all presumptions of legislative
meaning that the Justices invoke frequently and sincerely, even if
unsystematically.
In many cases, moreover, the ultimate disposition will rest on the
Justices' ideological agreement with, or at least comfort with, what the
agency is doing. "Waters of the United States" can ebb and flow, depend-
ing on the normative reaction of the judges more than on their fealty to
particular deference regimes. Thus, the ascendancy of Chevron within the
Supreme Court does not assure that agency interpretations will prevail
any more than would be the case under the formally less deferential
Skidmore regime. Conversely, if the Court abandoned Chevron entirely
and followed standard statutory interpretation methodology, it is far from
clear that agencies would fare any worse.
Our argument here is only that our data lower the stakes of the
Court's deference debates; our argument is not that the debates have no
stakes whatsoever. To begin with, our study focuses only on Supreme
Court practice; formal deference regimes taken seriously by lower courts
might generate much of the benefit (or cost) asserted by Justices Scalia
and Breyer. Indeed, the empirical evidence for applying Chevron by the
284. Id. at 163-64, 167-71; id. at 175, 177, 180-82, 188-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 167-72, 174 (majority opinion); id. at 179-82, 185-86, 188-90 (StevensJ.,
dissenting).
286. Id. at 167, 171-72 (majority opinion); id. at 176, 181, 184-86, 190-91 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 172-74 (majority opinion); id at 181, 192-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit tentatively suggests that this defer-
ence regime has made a difference and has reduced that court's tendency
toward political polarization with respect to statutory interpretation
issues.2 88
Moreover, even at the Supreme Court level, the evidence assembled
in Part IV supports the conclusion that rule of law norms do matter in
some cases. Recall City of Jackson, where deference doctrine (Chevron)
made a difference in the Court's disposition, as conservative Justice Scalia
went along with a liberal interpretation of a civil rights law because of
Chevron. The analysis in Part IV indicates that the Court's practice in-
cludes many examples of both City offackson (where deference doctrine
makes a difference) and Solid Waste (where it does not).
B. Simplifying and Canonizing the Court's Continuum of Deference
Our study provides some ammunition for scholars suggesting im-
provements in the Supreme Court's "continuum of deference." 28 9 Not
surprisingly, we endorse Eskridge and Baer's proposal for simplifying the
continuum, boiling down the proliferation of categories to three: (1) an-
tideference, (2) Skidmore, and (3) Chevron.2 90 Our most novel point is the
evidence presented in Part IV indicating that Seminole Rock/Auer does not
operate as a distinct deference regime at the Supreme Court level: The
Court rarely applies that regime when the agency is interpreting its own
rules (as in Solid Waste), and agency application of its own rules does not
always motivate the Justices to apply any kind of deference regime.2 91
This deference regime should be assimilated into Chevron (where the rule
was issued pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking author-
ity) and Skidmore (where it was not).292 The agency should not necessa-
rily receive a deference bounce because it is applying its own prior
rule.2 9 3 Our results show that both ideological preferences and legal con-
288. See Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 61, at 1729-32, 1767 (arguing
polarized voting in D.C. Circuit is strong when judges are reviewing agency decisions for
arbitrariness, and less strong when deferring to agency interpretations under Chevron).
One of us presented our data to the assembled judges and practitioners at the D.C.
Circuit's 2010 Conference; judges of varying ideologies told us that Chevron had some
dampening effect on ideological disagreement within the D.C. Circuit. As Dean Revesz
cautioned in his article, we need to take judicial self-reporting with a grain of salt. Still, we
find such accounts credible.
289. For a discussion of Supreme Court deference doctrine, see supra Part I.
290. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1092 (arguing the Court should apply
three deference regimes: antideference, Skidmore, and Chevron).
291. See supra Table 10.
292. In the Court's big Auer decision after 2006 (the terminal date for the Eskridge
and Baer data set), Justice Scalia tartly observed that the Court was really just applying
Chevron. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479-80
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
293. See Manning, supra note 13, at 617 (cautioning that Seminole Rock/Auer
deference carried risk that agencies would bootstrap their views into law by adopting vague
regulations and then interpreting them ambitiously).
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cerns influence how the Justices vote to apply deference regimes. Simpli-
fying the deference continuum might mitigate the former impulse and
strengthen the latter. Ideological manipulation of deference would be
more transparent with a simplified deference continuum. Moreover, ac-
curate application of legal precedent would be easier under a simplified
continuum.
Should one go further and eliminate all the "deference regimes,"
perhaps because they are so haphazardly applied? One might argue from
our data and examples that there is no reason to believe that following an
openly functional approach will undermine the deference appropriately
due agencies from the Supreme Court. It is quite possible that it would
have an effect in the D.C. Circuit, but the same effect might accrue now
that its judges are aware (from studies such as this one) that Chevron is
more like a Potemkin Village than like the Russian Revolution. We re-
main reluctant to take such a radical approach without more data or
more experience, in large part because Chevron does make a distinctive
contribution by recognizing that, when Congress delegates "lawmaking"
authority to agencies, the role of judges ought to be different.294 Relat-
edly, when Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to agencies, the
Supreme Court needs to be clear when it is finding a statutory plain
meaning (which interpretation the agency cannot change) and when it is
deferring to the agency acting within its zone of reasonableness (which
interpretation the agency can change). This suggests the utility of defer-
ence debates such as the ones found in the three City ofJackson opinions.
On the other hand, the question of how much lawmaking authority
Congress has granted the agency is often bound up with the merits of the
case, at least at the Supreme Court level. Thus, in City ofJackson, seven
Justices (all the participating Justices except for Justice Scalia) were not
willing to say that Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the EEOC
to create a disparate impact claim for relief.29 5 Nor in Solid Waste were
the five majority justices willing to say that Congress delegated lawmaking
authority to take wetlands regulation to the furthest reaches of Congress's
own Commerce Clause authority. This suggests the intuition, which we
have not tested, that congressional delegation issues and merits issues are
often interconnected; they are not entirely separable issues. In those
cases, Chevron is not doing any distinctive work-but there are probably
enough Supreme Court cases where it is doing substantial work to coun-
sel against ending the Chevron analysis.29 6 Another ramification of our
294. This is not a novel point. For an excellent conceptual statement, see Louis L.
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239, 249-57 (1955).
295. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239--40 (2005) (Stevens, J., joined by
Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (concluding statute itself authorized
recovery in disparate impact cases); id. at 262-67 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing this was not case where agency exercised its delegated
authority). The Chief Justice did not participate in City ofjackson.
296. For an example where a "liberal" Democrat Justice went along with
"conservative" agency cost-benefit innovation out of deference to the EPA, see Entergy
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analysis is to reinforce the possible utility of an antideference regime
where constitutional or other normative concerns trump both Chevron
and Skidmore and reverse the burden: The agency loses unless it can show
clear statutory support for its interpretation.
If one wants a doctrinal formulation for our normative analysis, we
suggest pitching the boiled-down deference regimes as canons of statu-
tory construction, along the following lines:
* Antideference: a clear statement requirement for the agency to
demonstrate that statutory text authorizes its expansive statutory
interpretation when the statute is penal, or the interpretation
poses genuine constitutional difficulties.
* Skidmore: a presumption favoring agency interpretations that are
longstanding (especially if there has been public as well as private
reliance) and/or that involve the application of special expertise
to technical problems.
* Chevron: a presumption favoring agency interpretations issued
pursuant to congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to
agencies, with the corollary that agencies can alter their interpreta-
tions within the zone of reasonableness suggested by the statutory
scheme.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Solid Waste is an exam-
ple of the first canon in operation: Because the Court believed that the
Corps's interpretation was on the constitutional periphery, it wanted a
clearer statement from Congress before it would allow the agency to ven-
ture that close.2 97 justice Stevens's plurality opinion in City ofJackson il-
lustrates the second (Skidmore) canon: Because the Court believed that
the EEOC had consistently maintained that the ADEA provided a cause
of action for disparate impact liability, it presumed in favor of such a
construction. 298 justice Scalia's concurring opinion in City ofJackson and
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Solid Waste are classic examples of
the third (Chevron) canon: Because those concurring or dissenting
Justices believed that there were agency interpretations rendered pursu-
ant to congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, they were going
to follow those interpretations unless inconsistent with the relevant statu-
tory texts.2
9 9
The Court should also clarify the scope or contours of these canons
(or of the existing deference regimes). Surely, the Court should clarify
Chevron's domain, perhaps announcing that agencies would enjoy
Chevron deference for any regulation promulgated as a result of congres-
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1512-16 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
297. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001).
298. City ofJackson, 544 U.S. at 239-40 (plurality opinion).
299. Id. at 243-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 177-82 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
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sional delegation of substantive rulemaking authority and for any order
accompanying an adjudication pursuant to congressional authoriza-
tion.3 0 0 The Court might at some point include a nonexclusive list of
statutory authorizations that meet these requirements. A simplified set of
clearly defined deference canons or regimes would have a higher
probability of consistent application than the current system. This consis-
tency would make deference doctrine more transparent and predictable,
sending a clearer message to the lower courts and reducing reliance con-
cerns among litigants. Again, this might reduce the Justices' tendency to
allow ideology to influence application of deference and might increase
the importance of legal concerns.
Simplification and clarification proposals are probably the most that
can be accomplished by focusing on deference doctrine generally. More
ambitious proposals promising great benefits from a rethinking of the
deference canons suffer from the implausibility of providing those bene-
fits and from the likelihood of offsetting costs. For example, our empiri-
cal findings throw cold water on Justice Scalia's view (reflected in his City
of Jackson concurring opinion) that all interpretations endorsed by an
agency's head after some administrative deliberation should receive
Chevron deference.3 0 1 Heroically and unrealistically assuming that uni-
versal deference would be a good thing-namely, the advantages out-
weigh the drawbacks-it is unlikely that the judicial branch would will-
ingly hand over so much power and interpretive authority to the
executive branch. Indeed, our study suggests that, even in Chevron's
more limited domain (where there has been congressional delegation of
lawmaking authority), the Supreme Court has not handed over ultimate
interpretive authority to agencies. On issues they care about, like prop-
erty (Solid Waste) and civil rights (City ofJackson), the Justices retain the
final say. The correlation between ideological preferences and applica-
tion of deference further supports this point.30 2
If one really agreed with Justice Scalia and his academic supporters
that lower court judges are not to be trusted and agencies should receive
near absolute deference when the statute is unclear, a theoretically better
doctrinal proposal is the suggestion by Professors Jacob Gersen and
300. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (suggesting
such a rule). Ironically, Mead itself has been cogently criticized for lacking clarity. See,
e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1491-92 (2005) (describing lower court confusion resulting from
Mead).
301. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 241-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing importance of
Chevron-style deference); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)
(Scalia, J., writing for unanimous Court) (articulating with greater precision the distinction
between pure "litigating positions," not entitled to deference, and regulations adopted
after deliberative process, sometimes responding to litigation but nonetheless entitled to
deference (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988))); Bowen,
488 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., for unanimous Court) (expressing similar view).
302. See supra Table 11.
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Adrian Vermeule that Chevron be transformed into a voting rule: If the
Chevron trigger is met, the agency interpretation prevails unless the
Supreme Court rejects it by 6-3 or a more lopsided majority.3 03 In a
thoughtful and learned response, Professor Richard Pierce says that such
a proposal would transfer too much interpretive authority to the execu-
tive branch and, fortunately, has no chance of being adopted.304 If one
agrees with Professor Pierce (as we do) thatjudges perform useful moni-
toring of executive department interpretations, the Gersen-Vermeule
proposal ought to be rejected. But if one believes that judicial second-
guessing of agency interpretations is fraught with errors and other costs
that outweigh its benefits, then our study supports their view that a bright-
line voting rule could be superior to the current approach, whether un-
derstood as a canon or as a binding precedent.
Our caution is that Chevron as a supermajority voting rule would not
capture all of the benefits promised by Gersen and Vermeule and would
have an unacknowledged cost. The voting rule would not capture all the
promised benefits, so long as the trigger required five Justices to make a
particular finding (such as congressional delegation of lawmaking au-
thority). As City ofjackson illustrates, there is often legitimate debate over
Chevron's domain, and a supermajority voting rule would certainly raise
the stakes over the domain issue and produce more decisions where a
majority of the Court would refuse to pull the trigger. The unacknowl-
edged cost is illustrated by Solid Waste, where none of the Justices denied
that Chevron's trigger had been pressed. Under the Gersen-Vermeule vot-
ing rule, the Corps of Engineers' interpretation would, in theory, have
prevailed, even though five Justices were strongly opposed to it. On the
one hand, as we just suggested, the majority Justices would have been
tempted to say that Chevron's trigger had not been activated; indeed, this
is one reading of the majority opinion. On the other hand, the majority
Justices would have been tempted to strike down the agency action as
unconstitutional in some cases. Overall, the hydraulic effect of the pro-
posal would be to motivate the Justices toward more constitutional activ-
ism (how much more is impossible to foresee). This is potentially a sig-
nificant cost to society, because it takes more issues out of the political
process-precisely contrary to Chevron's primary virtue (leaving policy is-
sues with the political process).
303. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 Yale L.J. 676,
688-701 (2007).
304. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron Should Not Be Converted into a Voting Rule:
A Response to Gersen and Vermeule's Proposal, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 248 (2007), at
www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/administrative-law/chevron-
should-not-be-converted-into-a-voting-rule:-a-response-to-gersen-and-vermeule%27s-
proposal/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting critique of proposal that
Chevron be transformed into voting rule).
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C. What Is the Best Way to Assure judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations?
As a normative matter, we are unpersuaded by commentators who
claim that the Supreme Court is not deferential enough to agency statu-
tory interpretations.3 0 5 But it is hardly unreasonable to reach such a con-
clusion. (Let us be clear: Defenders of the current level ofjudicial review
have no more evidence supporting the status quo than critics have for
their position.3 0 6 ) Is a liberalization of deference regimes, such as univer-
sal Chevron, a plausible way to achieve greater judicial deference? Our
empirical survey suggests that it is not: The Justices follow existing defer-
ence regimes inconsistently, and they are unlikely to be more conscien-
tious about adhering to a liberalized Chevron regime.
Our analysis also suggests better ways to achieve the goal of judicial
acquiescence in agency innovations. Our suggestions are addressed to
Congress and to the agencies-this is perhaps appropriate in light of
Chevron's emphasis on the greater legitimacy for policymaking accom-
plished by Congress (primarily) and agencies (secondarily).
On the one hand, we would suggest that Congress deliberate about
how much it trusts agencies versus courts to implement statutes-and
then draft appropriate delegations.30 7 If Congress trusts courts to imple-
ment the statute better, there should be no or just limited delegation of
authority to the agency. Also, Congress ought to consider antideference
provisions in statutes that delegate rulemaking (or other authority) if
Congress wants hard look judicial scrutiny. Conversely, if Congress trusts
the agency to implement the statute better than courts, Congress should
draft broad delegations to the agency. Because our study establishes that
the Supreme Court applies deferential review (even if not usually
Chevron) and goes along with agency views most often when there has
been a broad congressional delegation, such a move would probably be
305. For scholars hailing the administrative state and urging strong judicial deference
(and hence a broad understanding of Chevron), see, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 91; Frank
B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C.
L. Rev. 1013, 1014-57 (2000) ("Judicial review functionally undermines the substance of
the law by pledging fealty to its letter. The resulting effects on administrative programs
alone should be sufficient to dejustify judicial review."); Spence & Cross, supra note 269, at
128-42 (defending public choice theory and noting that "the delegation of
decisionmaking power to unelected bureaucrats is true to the spirit of Madisonian
democracy, and . . . the scholarly obsession with countermajoritarian difficulties is best
understood as a modem variant of the populist challenge to Madisonian liberalism, rather
than a defense of founding principles"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The
Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2580-2602 (2006) (arguing
Chevron is a "kind of counter-Marbury" and that "it suggests that in the face of ambiguity, it
is emphatically the province of the executive department to say what the law is").
306. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2041,
2073-75 (2006) (book review) (discussing critics' position as lacking empirical
grounding).
307. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power:
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1036,
1070 (2006) (outlining tradeoff between delegation to agencies and courts).
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efficacious. Our results suggesting that the Justices pay heed to congres-
sional preferences when applying deference doctrine further support this
point. Finally, such a move would be democratically legitimate, as our
elected representatives in Congress would be providing the needed trig-
ger, and they could calibrate where deference ought to be due and where
not.
On the other hand, the agency can increase the likelihood that its
interpretations receive greater deference by following formal policymak-
ing processes: either notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudi-
cation. The data establish that the Supreme Court is most likely to apply
a deference regime when Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to
the agency and the agency has followed a deliberative process such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking.3 0 8
Likewise, agencies are most likely to prevail under these circum-
stances, as the EEOC did in City offackson.30 9 (Contrast Solid Waste, where
the Corps of Engineers did not prevail, in part because it had not en-
gaged in a public deliberative process to justify an expansive assertion of
wetlands jurisdiction.3 1 0 ) Like our suggestion for Congress, this recom-
mendation enhances democratic legitimacy. Formal agency processes
grant greater direct participatory rights to affected parties. These
processes also empower affected parties to monitor the agency on behalf
of Congress and the President.3 11
VI. JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
Read through the lens of our empirical findings, Solid Waste also sug-
gests some broader implications of our present study. We label these im-
plications "jurisprudential" because they are not prescriptions about the
Supreme Court's doctrinal formulations so much as they are conclusions
about how the law works at the Supreme Court level. As before, we cau-
tion that our study does not treat the larger system of lower courts, with
Supreme Court review, created under the auspices of Article III. Conclu-
sions about that larger system would require a much more ambitious em-
pirical study, but the one we have conducted does suggest some impor-
tant thoughts about jurisprudential debates concerning the rule of law,
stare decisis, and rules versus standards. We conclude with some
thoughts about the role of norms in Supreme Court statutory
interpretation.
308. See supra Table 7.
309. See supra Table 8.
310. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757-58 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (chastising Corps for not engaging in rulemaking after Solid Waste).
311. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 176 (1984) (arguing
that Congress uses procedures to empower interest groups to assist in monitoring
bureaucracy).
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A. Difficulty of Giving Stare Decisis Effect to Methodological Reasoning
Some judges and law professors maintain that some of the Supreme
Court's methodological decisions ought to be precedents entitled to stare
decisis effect at the Supreme Court level as well as among lower courts.3 12
Our results and previous discussion demonstrate that such a stare decisis
model captures neither the formal presentation nor the reality of the
Supreme Court's treatment of deference doctrine.
We now extend our analysis to other methodological issues such as
word meaning, legislative history, statutory purpose, constitutional issues,
and even statutory plain meaning. Solid Waste illustrates how lurking con-
stitutional issues might throw a monkey wrench into how "plain" the
Justices find statutory text to be: The majority found clarity in the soupy
term "waters" where the dissenters did not, and surely the difference was
not one of methodology. A more recent example is even more dramatic.
In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Holder, the Court ruled that
a utility district was a "political subdivision" eligible to opt out of the
Voting Rights Act, even though the statutory definition of "political subdi-
vision" did not reasonably include the district.3 13 Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion for the Court-including arch-textualist Justice Scalia-declined
to apply the plain meaning rule but certainly cannot be read as "overrul-
ing" the plain meaning rule. Like a canon, and unlike a precedent, the
plain meaning rule represents a judicial practice that can be invoked, or
not, depending on how weighty its underlying value might be. In
Northwest Austin, the plain meaning rule was outweighed by the Court's
reluctance to tackle the serious constitutional issue presented by section 5
of the Voting Rights Act.3 1 4
We use the plain meaning rule as our opening example because it is
the one methodological canon we would expect the Supreme Court to
honor most consistently, yet the Justices do not treat it as a matter of stare
decisis. This is much more true of canons relating to legislative history.
In Riverside Bayview, the Supreme Court (Justice Stevens writing) paid lav-
ish attention to and relied on the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Water
Act 3 1 5-while in Solid Waste the Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist writing)
said that legislative amendments constituted subsequent legislative his-
312. E.g., Foster, supra note 77, at 1884-99; Gluck, supra note 19, at 1771-811
(discussing favorably several state court systems that treat statutory interpretation
methodology as matter of stare decisis); cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil
Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (treating statutory
interpretation as matter that should be settled by precedent but without discussing it in
stare decisis terms).
313. 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513-15 (2009).
314. Id. at 2512-17 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 7 3 - 1 9 7 3 p (2006)).
315. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135-39
(1985) (using history of Clean Water Act of 1977 to justify administrative interpretation of
congressional action).
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tory that were too unreliable to be decisive.3 16 Justice Scalia, the Court's
biggest critic of legislative history generally and of committee reports in
particular, would never treat Riverside Bayview as a precedent settling the
issue of committee reports. Yet in Rapanos v. United States (the Court's
most recent interpretation of the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water
Act), his plurality opinion carefully treated Riverside Bayview as a binding
precedent allowing the Corps of Engineers to regulate property adjacent
to traditionally navigable waters (a jurisdictional expansion Scalia would
not likely have endorsed as a matter of first impression).3 1 7
Although Justices sometimes seem to treat Chevron as binding as a
matter of stare decisis (illustrated by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in City ofJackson), Chevron is more typically treated like a canon of con-
struction (illustrated by Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in City of
Jackson, by ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Solid Waste,
and probably by Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Rapanos). This idea
can be generalized: In matters of statutory interpretation methodology,
it is harder for the Supreme Court to follow a stare decisis approach than
it is in matters of statutory substance.
This conclusion initially struck us as counterintuitive. Two of the
core values of stare decisis are legal predictability and judicial econ-
omy.3 18 If the Supreme Court always excluded legislative history (includ-
ing committee reports) from consideration in statutory cases, as the
British House of Lords did until 1993,319 judges would follow a more par-
simonious methodology; such a trimmed back method might generate
more predictable results and probably would save judicial time and en-
ergy.320 Yet these virtues of stare decisis have not prevailed on matters of
methodology even in England, where the House of Lords jettisoned its
exclusionary rule in 1993-and efforts by the Lordships to create a new
stare decisis regime to govern the use of legislative materials have on the
whole been unsuccessful. 32 1 Part III of this Article finds that even Justice
Scalia, who seems to believe (intensely) that Chevron ought to govern as a
316. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps. Of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168-71 (2001)
(Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court).
317. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731, 734-35 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) (declining to read Riverside Bayview broadly but carefully respecting and
reaffirming its precise holdings); accord Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 171-72 (applying similar
reasoning).
318. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 Geo. LJ.
2225, 2237-48 (1997) (synthesizing values of stare decisis for American legal system);
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 789, 812-52 (2002)
(analyzing functions of stare decisis).
319. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.) 598-603 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(discussing previous precedents precluding English judges from relying on parliamentary
debates when construing ambiguous statutes, and then overruling those precedents).
320. See Foster, supra note 77, at 1884-97 (making argument for giving stare decisis
effect to methodological decisions).
321. SeeJamesJ. Brudney, Pepper v. Hart, in Statutory Interpretation Stories (William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2010).
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matter of stare decisis, does not behave any differently than his colleagues
in the general run of cases and, indeed, authors opinions that routinely
ignore Chevron even though his universal-application interpretation
would demand that the "precedent" be followed, distinguished, or at least
discussed.
Solid Waste and the other wetlands cases suggest some reasons why
stare decisis does not stick as well in the realm of statutory methodology
as it does in the realm of statutory substance. One reason invokes a third
value commonly associated with stare decisis, namely, reliance. If the
Supreme Court rules that the Corps of Engineers can regulate land adja-
cent to traditional navigable waters as "waters of the United States," as the
Court did in Riverside Bayview,322 agency officials, state officials, legisla-
tors, lawyers, and land planners will rely on that interpretation as they
interact all over the country. Especially with regard to property interests,
Americans rely on settled law, including judicial doctrine, as they plan
their activities.32 3 This is a powerful reason for even regulation-hating
Justices such as Justices Rehnquist and Scalia not to revisit the Court's
holding in Riverside Bayview (though not a good reason to expand that
holding to increase the Corps's jurisdiction beyond the property explic-
itly covered by the earlier precedent). Indeed, reliance is probably a
more powerful support for stare decisis for property precedents than the
rule of law and judicial economy reasons-but it is not so powerful for
matters of methodology. One might say that Congress relies on judicial
methodology when it passes statutes, because legal staff and lobbyists tell
Congress how the statute will probably be applied, but the leading empir-
ical study found that congressional staff often ignored the relevant statu-
tory interpretation techniques actually employed by the Supreme
Court.3 2 4 This reliance interest is, typically, not very powerful.
Consider a homely example. The legislature adopts a law fining per-
sons who bring a "vehicle" into a public park,32 5 and the state's highest
court relies on legislative history to interpret the law not to cover tricycles
(a "vehicle," broadly understood, but not the "intended" meaning of the
term according to the state justices). Parents and kids will rely on that
interpretation, not only to bring tricycles into the park, but also to make
decisions about how to spend money (more money will be spent on tricy-
cles). Legislators will rely on that interpretation as well; if they revise the
322. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129-39 (1985).
323. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1994) (demanding
"clear and manifest" statement from Congress before Court will read statute to unsettle
state property rules (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990))).
324. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 615 (2002) ("It was not that the staffers
did not know the rules or recognize the interpretive virtues; it was that those virtues
frequently were trumped by competing virtues demanded by the institutional context of
the legislature.").
325. The hypothetical is of course adapted from the famous vehicles-in-the-park
exercise deployed by H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 123-26 (1961).
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vehicles-in-the-park law, they might decide not to create a statutory defini-
tion of "vehicle," if they are happy with the evolving law on the matter.
Park administrators will rely on the interpretation as they maintain the
park; for example, they might create specific tricycle paths for kids to use.
If the court adopted a new interpretive regime, say one that excluded
legislative history, some legislators and law professors might object, but
few if any citizens, lawyers, or administrators would say that their reliance
interests were sacrificed by the regime shift. If, however, the court also
said it was overruling the earlier precedent exempting tricycles from the
prohibition and fine, there would certainly be howls of protest, in large
part because of reliance interests.
Relatedly, people care more about statutory substance than they care
about interpretive process. It is more important to have clear winners
and losers when the Court is deciding substantive matters under a statute
than when the Court is deciding whether to exclude or sometimes con-
sider legislative history. Perhaps people ought to care more about inter-
pretive process, but the fact is that they do not. The statutory issues that
deeply engage the average citizen include matters such as the permissibil-
ity of race-based affirmative action in the workplace, efforts to expand
marriage (or create a new institution) to include lesbian and gay couples,
"green" restrictions on traditional uses of private property, and the allow-
ance of official torture against detained persons, especially when there is
reasonable doubt that they are really enemies or terrorists. 32 6 Our analy-
sis of deference doctrine suggests that the Justices often behave similarly,
prioritizing outcomes over process. This phenomenon is even more
acute when deference doctrine directly conflicts with substantive stare
decisis. 327
Finally, statutory interpretation methodology itself is a cluster of val-
ues and concerns that do not lend themselves to a rule-based stare deci-
sis. 3 2 8 Statutory interpreters rely on plain meanings for rule of law and
legislative supremacy reasons. Evidence of legislative intent (such as the
statute's drafting and deliberation history) can be useful evidence rele-
vant to both values, but more directly serves the additional value of de-
326. Cf. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Public Opinion and Constitutional
Controversy (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (focusing on
American public's opinion of these issues to allow "evaluat[ion of] the costs and benefits of
a more pluralized and less court-focused approach to constitutional development").
327. See Pierce, Role of Theory, supra note 15, at 485 n.92, 504 (noting "judge's basic
political philosophy shapes the amount of deference he will give to agency actions").
328. Sydney Foster makes the important point that stare decisis can operate in the
domain of standards as well as that of rules, but does not deny that stare decisis will tend to
operate differently in each realm, unless there is a "'rulification'" of the standard, as the
Supreme Court often will do. Foster, supra note 77, at 1901-05 (quoting Frederick
Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 803, 803 (2005)). Our concern is that statutory methodology resists hard and fast
rulification; even the uncontroversial plain meaning rule gives way in a lot of cases that are
not specified beforehand.
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mocracy; larger normative concerns, such as Congress's constitutional au-
thority, might bend a statute in another direction altogether, yet judges
take these into consideration as well (vide Solid Waste, where the constitu-
tional concern seems to have been paramount). In short, statutory inter-
pretation methodology does not seem susceptible to the rule-like ap-
proach of stare decisis-instead, it is what John Ferejohn and one of us
has called an "interpretive regime," a web of considerations with different
and varying weights rather than a set of hierarchical rules.3 29 Note that
when legislatures codify statutory interpretation methodology, they usu-
ally provide laundry lists of considerations and not sharply delineated
rules.3 30 At least some of these rules are going to be in tension with other
rules, undermining efforts at strict stare decisis application. The inevita-
ble vagueness of these rules complicates the task even further.
We have sympathy for the recommendations of younger scholars
such as Sydney Foster and Abbe Gluck who argue for bringing more or-
der to statutory interpretation methodology.3 3 1 As a normative matter, in
fact, we find that the case for stare decisis is especially strong for the core
Chevron proposition that when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to
an agency, judges are required to defer to any reasonable agency inter-
pretation, unless Congress has resolved the issue in the statute. This is a
foundational principle of the modern regulatory state-yet the Justices
(including Justice Scalia) do not even afford the principle lip service in
most cases where it is applicable, much less stare decisis effect. And when
the principle is applicable, it is sometimes trumped by other considera-
tions (canons), as in Solid Waste, where the avoidance canon trumped the
Chevron canon.33 2
Procedurally, we think that "more order" (if it is to be had) will come
through more candid and filled out interpretive regimes (the canons
idea) rather than through the mechanism of stare decisis. Realistically,
we are pessimistic that the Supreme Court will actually adhere to a more
rigid regime than the one it has followed for the last several generations.
But this debate also has interesting implications for the older rules versus
standards debate, to which we now turn.
329. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the
Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law: NOMOS XXXVI, at 265, 267 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994); see
also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at 66-67 (developing interpretive regime idea
further and applying it to Court's practice).
330. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
Geo. L.J. 341, 408 nn.359-360 (2009) (noting legislatures giving nonexhaustive lists of
rules and broad instructions).
331. Foster, supra note 77, at 1867 (advocating "giving stare decisis effect to doctrines
of statutory interpretation"); Gluck, supra note 19, at 1846-55 (arguing for interpretive
consensus).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 261-262.
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B. Rules Versus Standards: Practical Constraints on the Justices' Discretion
Scholars and judges typically assume that bright-line rules are more
constraining on judicial and administrative decisionmakers than context-
saturated standards.33 3 This assumption is one of the few points of wide
agreement in the longstanding debate about the relative utility of rules
and standards.3 3 4 Notably, however, we are not aware of any rigorous
empirical evidence to this effect, and there is good reason to doubt or
qualify the conventional wisdom. To be sure, it is plausible to think that
bright-line rules are more constraining under many circumstances. A law
that says drivers may not exceed sixty-five miles per hour usually con-
strains judges more than a law that says drivers should not "drive faster
than conditions safely warrant." But it is also plausible to think that stan-
dards will sometimes constrain judges more. In our opinion, a law that
tells judges the Corps of Engineers can regulate the "waters of the United
States" constrains them less than a law that tells judges that the Corps can
regulate property only when they can demonstrate through scientifically
reliable evidence that the property is an integral part of a regional hydro-
logical system. The reason is that the bright-line term ("waters of the
United States") is susceptible to many different meanings, depending on
context and the viewpoint of the interpreter. In contrast, the hydrologi-
cal system approach requires verification by scientists, whose arguments
are buttressed by objectively determinable tests and measurements. In
short, context-sensitive legal directives (like standards) can sometimes be
more constraining than context-independent directives (like rules).
Likewise, an interpretive method that tells judges to consider only
the "plain meaning" of the statutory text might sometimes constrain
judges more than a method that tells judges to consider textual plain
meaning and the statute's legislative history-but not always, and perhaps
not typically. Recall the vehicles-in-the-park statute. If a judge just con-
sulted the statutory text, we have no idea whether she would apply the
statute to tricycles; it would depend, completely, on how broadly the
judge wanted to read the term "vehicle" and perhaps whether she follows
the rule of lenity, which directs that judges should interpret penal stat-
utes against the state. Ajudge who consulted the legislative history as well
as the text would be more constrained if the history gave some examples
of what the legislators were aiming at (for example, motorized machines,
333. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 91; see also Friedrich A. von Hayek, The
Political Ideal of the Rule of Law 43-49, 58-60 (1955); F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom
72-78 (1944); Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 Am. Econ. Rev.
560, 561 (1983) (finding simple rules produce more predictable behavior than complex
standards).
334. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577,
592-93 (1988) (explaining bright-line rules have effect of fixing legal consequences);
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 399-401 (1985) (asserting
traditionalists see bright-line rules as constraints); Sullivan, supra note 90, at 69-95
(explaining divisions between Justices regarding rules and standards during 1991 term).
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a common understanding of "vehicles") or even the legislative purpose
(such as noise and other pollution from motorized machines). In short,
a more context-oriented approach to statutory interpretation might, over-
all, constrain judges more than a parsimonious textualism.3 35 Indeed,
this is precisely what Professors James Brudney and Corey Ditslear have
demonstrated empirically in their impressive survey of the Supreme
Court's labor cases decided between 1969 and 2004.336
As an abstract matter, therefore, there is no compelling reason to
think that a rule-like approach such as Chevron will necessarily constrain
judges more than a standards approach such as Skidmore. Is there a solid
reason to think that a regime treating Chevron as a matter of stare decisis
will "constrain" Supreme Court Justices more than a regime treating
Chevron as a canon of statutory construction? Consider this contrast
within the Court. Justice Scalia has the broadest understanding of
Chevron among the Justices and sometimes says Chevron is a precedent (a
rule) that must be followed, yet he is one of the less deferential Justices
on the current Court. Justice Breyer, in contrast, considers Chevron more
as a canon or balancing factor (standards), yet he is the most deferential
Justice who served through most of the period our survey covers and is
the most deferential Justice on the current Court.3 3 7 This contrast does
not prove that standards are better than rules on the dimension of con-
straint-but it does undermine the facile assumption that rules are always
more constraining than standards. It also suggests the hypothesis that
other factors, such as ajudicial temperament or a nondogmatic approach
to one's own views, are more important to agency deference than the
form of legal directives.
Solid Waste suggests that this point can be generalized beyond Justice
Scalia. The Court's most conservative Justices (Figure 3) joined the Chief
Justice's Solid Waste opinion that conceded the applicability of the Chevron
regime but refused to defer to the agency's interpretation, either because
they implausibly thought "waters of the United States" sets unambiguous
limits on the agency or because they worried that the agency was pushing
the statute toward the constitutional periphery. (No Justice argued, how-
ever, that the agency's application was actually unconstitutional.) Even if
335. For a prominent recent example of the discretion afforded by strict textualism,
see Justice Scalia's opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716 (2006) (citing
only one of many examples from Webster's Dictionary for meaning of word "waters").
336. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 165, at 227-28. The authors argue that
legislative history probably constrains judges more reliably than text-based canons do. See
id. at 228 ("The findings here indicate ... that the relatively neutral aspects of legislative
history reliance . . . may be explained at least in part based on certain recurrent and
principled judicial approaches to the record."). The authors argue that legislative history
probably "constrains" judges more reliably than text-based canons do. Id.
337. For the contrast between highly deferential Justice Breyer and somewhat less
deferential Justice Scalia, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 24, at 1154 tbl.20; Miles &
Sunstein, supra note 64, at 832-33 (finding even sharper difference between deferential
Justice Breyer and less deferential Justice Scalia, but from more limited data set).
2010] 1813
HeinOnline  -- 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1813 2010
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
it were considered binding precedent, Chevron is filled with loopholes
(like the constitutional avoidance canon) and depends in application
upon how dogmatic one chooses to be about construing open-textured
language ("waters")-and so it is hard to see how constraining it would
be in the "hard cases." Solid Waste also illustrates the old saw that rules
and standards tend to merge as they are applied over time: Bright-line
rules accumulate exceptions, qualifications, and loopholes that make
them more like standards, while standards are applied in ways that create
regularities along the lines of rules.33 8
The five majority Justices (Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) in Solid Waste were together on the Court for
most of the twenty-two years of Supreme Court cases in our data set.3 3 9
They were all jurists who emphasized statutory plain meanings and the
authority of Chevron, at least as a strong canon or as binding prece-
dent.340 All appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush, they were a block
of political conservatives. 34 1 Our data demonstrate that these conserva-
tive Justices went along with conservative agency interpretations at signifi-
cantly higher rates than they did with liberal agency interpretations and
that this statistically significant ideological voting occurred in cases where
Chevron was applicable as well as in the larger data set. This evidence cuts
against the conclusion that Chevron always constrains these conservative
Justices.3 42
338. This point originates in Hart & Sacks, supra note 90, at 139-41.
339. Between 1991, when Justice Thomas joined the Court, and 2005, when Justice
O'Connor left it, these five conservative Republican Justices served continuously together
on the Court. They were, for example, the majority block that decided Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
340. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275-83 (2006) (Scalia, J., joined by
Roberts, C.J. & Thomas,J., dissenting) (treating Chevron and Auer as precedents entitled to
serious stare decisis effect and emphasizing statutory plain meaning with regard to agency
delegation issue); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-72
(2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia & Thomas, JJ.) (trumping
agency's view with statutory plain meaning and presenting decision as consistent with
Chevron); K Mart v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 291-93 (1988) (Kennedy,J.) (following statutory
plain meaning and deferring to Agency on issue where there was ambiguity). A final
example is Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), in which Justice O'Connor,
writing for seven Justices, including all five conservatives, argued that Chevron should be
applied only to instances where Congress has clearly given an agency lawmaking authority
over the particular issue in suit. Id. at 478-79, 482-84.
The conservative Justices are most strongly divided on whether Chevron should be
applied beyond instances where Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to agencies.
Compare Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing for Chevron deference), with id. at
586-87 (Thomas, J., for the Court) (rejecting broader reading of Chevron).
341. See supra Figure 3.
342. Is the fact that conservative Justices such as Scalia and Rehnquist went along with
a majority of liberal agency interpretations in cases where they applied the Chevron
framework evidence that Chevron exercises some constraining power? Unfortunately, no.
This is the simultaneity problem again: Willingness to go along with the agency
interpretation is correlated with willingness to cite Chevron. Better evidence is the fact that
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To be sure, our evidence does not establish that Chevron imposed no
constraint whatsoever on these conservative Justices, who after all fre-
quently went along with liberal agency interpretations. 343 City of jackson
might be an example of a case where a conservative (Justice Scalia) voted
for a liberal agency interpretation because he felt constrained by Chevron.
It is not clear how many votes by conservative Justices had that feature, for
Solid Waste is much more representative of our data than City ofJackson
(where only Justice Scalia surprised us with his vote). Most of the cases
presenting salient ideological divisions went the way of Solid Waste, where
neither ambiguous statutory texts nor Chevron could save a liberal agency
interpretation from invalidation.34 4 And there are important cases where
an apparent plain meaning and Chevron deference cut in favor of liberal
agency interpretations, yet the conservative Justices still invalidated the
agency rules through manipulation of plain meaning analysis and con-
struction of new loopholes around Chevron.34 5
CONCLUSION: NoRms MATrER
At the Supreme Court, norms matter. This is easy to see in City of
Jackson, where the non-discrimination norm was in play. The longstand-
ing EEOC view, that facially neutral policies can still be "discriminatory"
when their impact is felt by a protected group and their business justifica-
tion is weak, is a view that American culture has accepted as a good
norm. 3 4 6 It surely inspired the Court's four moderate-to-liberal Justices
to join Justice Stevens's plurality opinion which tried to hard wire the
EEOC's interpretation into the statute-but it also likely motivated
Justice Scalia, a strong conservative, to "go along" with the agency, with
this effect shows up also when we include the entire set of cases where Chevron was
potentially applicable (though usually not cited), because the agency was acting under
delegated lawmaking authority.
343. See supra Table 11.
344. See supra Table 11 (showing Justices flip deference preferences based on
changes in ideological content of agency decisions being reviewed).
345. In one case, the five conservative Justices read "best technology available" to
mean agency "cost-benefit analysis." See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1498, 1510 (2009). In another case, the five conservative Justices made holistic arguments
that Congress did not delegate authority to revise tobacco rules to the FDA and found that
these arguments trumped the statutory plain meaning and Chevron. FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Finally, four conservatives (one conservative did not
participate in the case) plus Justice Ginsburg imposed a narrow meaning on "modify" and
trumped Chevron when the agency was making a "major" policy shift. MCI Telecommc'ns.
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
346. Donald Schwartz, Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., Quinnipiac University Poll:
U.S. Voters Disagree 3-1 with Sotomayor on Key Case, Quinnipiac University National Poll
Finds; Most Say Abolish Affirmative Action (reporting that in wake of Supreme Court's
2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), 70% of Americans believed
that City of New Haven should be required to use results of promotion test even if result
was that no blacks were promoted).
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the option of a later shift in policy.34 7 He was probably not wild about
the EEOC's policy, but he recognized that it was the mainstream view-
point (accepted by Republican and Democratic administrations alike)
and felt that he had no text-based reason to trump that policy on rule of
law grounds. Note that more controversial policies on which accepted
public norms have not settled into a national consensus, such as affirma-
tive action, likely would not have motivated Justice Scalia to go along with
an agency interpretation. The reason is that he personally feels that non-
discrimination law is inverted by such policies, and he is willing to say so
because the polity remains normatively divided with regard to the justice
or wisdom of affirmative action.3 48
In short, norms matter. The norms that matter are not just the per-
sonal beliefs of the Justices, but also the political consensuses among ex-
perts and other institutions, as well as the norms accepted by the media
and by most Americans. Norms matter for each Justice as she or he de-
cides whether terms like "discriminate" or "waters" have a plain meaning.
They matter for the Court as an institution whose fragile legitimacy can
be undermined if its opinions strike commentators and citizens as incon-
sistent with settled public values. They matter for the ability of the fed-
eral government as a whole to carry out national projects.
The wetlands cases are dramatic examples of the importance of
norms. From Bayview to Solid Waste, property-protecting conservatives
such as ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia did not dispute that the
statutory term "navigable waters" (defined in the statute as "waters of the
United States") extended well beyond waterways that were "navigable" in
the traditional sense and, indeed, extended to property that was not
water-saturated all the time. This is an astounding concession for such
conservatives to make-but it is a concession they thought they had to
make to an aggressive agency that seemed to have the blessing of both
Congress and expert opinion. But the conservatives were not willing to
extend this concession to a gravel pit that was connected to the national
hydrological system more indirectly. If the Court had gone along with
the Corps in Solid Waste, conservative Justices feared there would be no
effective limit on that agency's wetlands rules-virtually any piece of prop-
erty would be included, and would be heavily regulated. The conserva-
tives saw nothing in the statute (or, if they were peeking, the legislative
history) to support such vast jurisdiction, and they sought to rein in the
agency. This was, we repeat, a substantive judgment. But it was more
than the "personal" beliefs of the conservative Justices; it was a reasoned
347. See Smith v. City ofJackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243-45 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing EEOC's liberal interpretation was
affirmation of "longstanding position of the Department of Labor"); id. at 247 (accepting
plurality's substantive points as establishing that EEOC's view is "eminently reasonable").
348. E.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(denouncing vigorously Court's allowance of affirmative action, which "inverted" statute
and victimized "politically impotent" white men).
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judgment on their part, with one eye to the norms that existed among
Congress, the experts, and the public.349
As the observant reader will have noticed, our view that norms mat-
ter is not grounded in empirical analysis, though it is consistent with that
analysis. For example, we document ideological voting much of the time
by all the Justices, but not all of the time. (According to Table 11, Justice
Thomas, the most conservative, and Justice Stevens, the most liberal, vote
for results contrary to their political views in more than one-third of the
cases.) But at a certain point, the objective data run out and are of lim-
ited utility in understanding what choices the Justices are making and
why they make them. We close with this hypothesis: When deciding
whether to go along with an agency interpretation the Justice does not
find ideologically congenial, the Justice will consider not only the inten-
sity of her or his personal views, but also the national political landscape
and the likely public and political response to overriding the agency on
this particular issue.
Academics and practitioners alike frequently assume that federal
judges faithfully defer to agency interpretations of statutes. This untested
assumption has underpinned much of the debate over the scope and ex-
tent of deference doctrine. Our analysis finds that this assumption is un-
founded. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the Justices do not treat
deference regime precedents such as Chevron as matters of stare decisis.
Instead, the Justices apply deference doctrine inconsistently, responding
to their ideological preferences, the policies underlying the major defer-
ence regimes, and the preferences of Congress and the President.
These results support reforms to reduce the number of deference
regimes. The results also bolster characterizing deference doctrines as
canons of statutory construction, and not binding precedents. These re-
sults also raise larger doubts about the ability to grant stare decisis effect
to methods of statutory interpretation. The application of such methods
is inherently subjective, and may be influenced by ideological preferences
and societal norms. Reforms to establish binding, bright-line interpretive
rules are therefore unlikely to succeed.
349. For evidence that the Corps was taking wetlands regulation far afield, with
politically risky results, see generally Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of
Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 1
N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 987 (2005); Kirk Emerson, Taking the Land Rights Movement
Seriously, in A Wolf in the Garden: The Land Rights Movement and the New
Environmental Debate 115, 115-34 (Philip D. Brick & R. McGreggor Cawley eds., 1996).
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